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Nate Neligh
This dissertation tackles two important developing topics in economics: network formation
and the allocation of attention. First, it examine the idea that the timing of entry into
the network is a crucial determinant of a node’s final centrality. We propose a model of
strategic network growth which makes novel predictions about the forward-looking behaviors
of players. In particular, the model predicts that agents entering the network at specific times
will become central “vie for dominance”. In a laboratory experiment, we find that players
do exhibit “vying for dominance” behavior, but do not always do so at the predicted critical
times. A model of heterogeneous risk aversion best fits the observed deviations from initial
predictions. Timing determines whether players have the opportunity to become attempt
to become dominant, but individual characteristics determine whether players exploit that
opportunity.
This dissertation also examines models of rational inattention, in which decision-makers ra-
tionally evaluate the trade-off between the costs and the benefits of information acquisition.
We provide results on recovering the implicit attention cost function by looking at the rela-
tionship between incentives and performance. We conduct laboratory experiments consisting
of simple perceptual tasks with fine-grained variation in the level of potential rewards. We
find that most subjects exhibit monotonicity in performance with respect to potential re-
wards, and there is mixed evidence on continuity and convexity of costs. We also perform a
model selection exercise and find that subjects’ behavior is generally most consistent with a
small but diverse subset of cost functions commonly assumed in the literature.
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Vying for Dominance: An Experiment in Dynamic Network Formation
1. Vying for Dominance: An Experiment
in Dynamic Network Formation
1.1. Introduction
Network structures play a vital role in determining the behavior of many economic systems.1
This makes it important to understand how networks form and, in particular, how some nodes
end up as central (i.e. how a node ends up being “close” to many other nodes). In many
settings, being close to other nodes is profitable–it means having more information, more
opportunities for exchange, or more power2–but why are some nodes (firms, individuals,
politicians) more central than others?
We hypothesize that the timing of entry into a network plays a critical role in determining
which nodes are the most central in the eventual network. It is common wisdom in the
technology industry that startup timing, that is when a new firm joins the market, is critical
to eventual success. In general, it is neither the first firm to enter an industry nor the last
that ends up being the most successful.3 It is not just fundamental differences between nodes
1For theoretical evidence see: Corominas-Bosch (2004); Kranton and Minehart (2001); Allouch (2015);
Apt et al. (2016); McCubbins and Weller (2012); Carpenter et al. (2012). For reviews of the empirical
evidence see: Bala and Goyal (2000); Jackson (2003); Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); Carrillo and Gaduh
(2012). For experimental evidence see: Charness et al. (2007); Charness et al. (2014); Kittel and Luhan
(2013); McCubbins and Weller (2012); Kosfield (2003).
2Theoretical Evidence: Kranton and Minehart (2001); Blume et al. (2009); Apt et al. (2016); Chen and
Teng (2016)
Empirical Evidence: Pollack et al. (2015); Sarigöl et al. (2014); Powell et al. (1996); Rossi et al. (2015)
3See Lilien and Yoon (1990).
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or equilibrium selection that determines whether a node becomes well connected; when the
node joins the network can also have a large impact.
Figure 1.1.: The formation of a network of compatibilities in animation software starting
at the top left and going clock-wise.
The following example illustrates how the order of entry may impact which nodes become
central. Figure 1.1 shows the formation of a network where connections represent compati-
bilities between pieces of animation software. At the start the network contained Photoshop
and Poser, which were not connected. Maya entered the network and connected to both of
the existing softwares. Later, additional animation softwares joined the network, and they
all connected to Maya. By 2017, Maya has become the dominant firm in the animation
software market, with more compatibilities than any other software in the network.
One possible hypothesis is that Maya became dominant in the network because it joined
at a critical time. By connecting to both Photoshop and Poser, Maya became central,
meaning that subsequent players wanted to connect to it. Earlier players could not achieve
high enough centrality to dominate the network because there were not enough players to
connect to. For later players it was too expensive to challenge Maya’s position of dominance.
2
Vying for Dominance: An Experiment in Dynamic Network Formation
In order to better understand how opportunities to vie for dominance arise in this type of
system, we construct a dynamic model of network formation with forward looking strategic
agents. In the model, players form a network by joining one at a time. As they join,
players unilaterally decide which existing nodes to connect with. Centrality is beneficial,
but connections are costly.4
Having a dynamic model of this type is essential in exploring the impact of entry timing
on centrality, because entry timing is an inherently dynamic feature: players make decision
taking into account their expectation of future moves. According to our hypothesis, Maya
is willing to sustain the cost of connecting to both Photoshop and Poser, because it expects
that this action will generate connections from other softwares in the future. As we discuss
in Section 1.1.1, previous models of network formation have either ignored dynamics entirely,
had agents who are not strategic and forward looking, or are constructed in such a way that
equilibrium depends only on static features of the network.
In Section 1.3 we discuss the basic features of the model. When the cost of connections
is high relative to the benefits of centrality, the minimally connected network is efficient,
and players will form the minimally connected network in equilibrium. When the reverse
is true, the maximally connected network is efficient and players will form the maximally
connected network. However, we find a potentially large intermediate parameter region
where players form non-degenerate networks, and behavior can be strategically rich. Two
intuitively plausible moves that occur in many equilibria are a myopic action or vying for
dominance.
Definition: A myopic move is a move which would be optimal if the game ended imme-
diately after that move. In the games we discuss in this paper, this means making one
connection to one of the most central (or dominant) nodes.
Definition: Vying for dominance is a move causing the player to become one of the dominant
nodes immediately after his move.




Solving the unconstrained version of the game can be difficult for large networks. We focus
on two approaches which simplify the game so that equilibrium behavior can be exhaustively
characterized as either vying for dominance or taking a myopic action.5
One approach–summarized here, and covered in more depth in Chapter 2–involves restricting
the game so that each player must connect to one of the most central nodes. Surprisingly, this
simple, plausible restriction is powerful enough to limit the set of possible networks and thus
keep the game solvable. In this game we find that vying for dominance happens periodically;
the time between vying moves increasing exponentially as the game progresses in response
to the increasing cost of vying. This result highlights a general property: players who vie for
dominance do so because they expect connections from future players taking myopic actions.
As the network becomes larger, and vying for dominance increasingly costly, more myopic
players are needed to justify the investment made by each new vying player. The timing
between vying moves must therefore increase.
In this chapter we focus on a scenario that is both theoretically tractable and easily amenable
to experimental testing: we restrict the maximal size of the network by limiting the number
of nodes. If the network is small enough, then the only equilibrium moves are myopic or
vying for dominance. This restriction, is natural for our study, since it would be impractical
to study much larger network in an experimental laboratory.
We begin by solving a game with five players, the setting used in the lab. Player 5’s move
is simple; he should play a myopic move. The interesting behavior is that of the interme-
diate players, 3 and 4. Their incentives to vie for dominance naturally depend on the cost
of connections, essentially creating four parameter regions. Player 4 can profitably vie for
dominance in the two lower cost regions but not in the higher two. The logic is not trivial,
however: a player’s incentives depend also on the number of competing central nodes they
face when they enter the network and, crucially, on their expectation of future nodes’ be-
havior. There is a parameter region where Player 4 will not vie for dominance if there are
5With some caveats regarding the exact definition of myopic in the case of the first approach. See Neligh
(2017) for more details.
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too many competing central nodes. Player 3 wants Player 4 to vie, however, so he chooses
not to vie in that cost region when he otherwise might have. This leads to an interesting
non-monotonic relationship between the cost of connections and vying behavior for Player
3.
Section 1.4 describes the experiment we used to test the model of the five-node game. We
ran two treatments with different costs for connections, corresponding to the second lowest
and the second highest of the parameter regions previously mentioned. Using our solution
to the five-node game, we predict that in the low cost treatment Player 3 should choose
a myopic move and Player 4 should vie for dominance, and in the high cost treatment we
should see the reverse.
In Section 1.5 we present the data, and compare it to the predictions of the model. In general,
most players either vied for dominance or chose myopic moves as predicted. However, players
often did not always vie for dominance at the predicted critical times. Broadly speaking,
the model does better in predicting the play for later movers. The prediction that player 5
always plays myopically is well supported. For player 4, the comparative statics were right,
but the levels were sometimes wrong. Player 4 is predicted to vie most often when costs are
low, and when Player 3 did not vie, and this is the case in our data. However, Player 4s only
vied 22% of the time in that scenario, far different from the 100% predicted by the theory.
For Player 3 even the comparative static was wrong: Player 3s were found to vie more when
costs were low.
Overall, players vied for dominance less often than expected, but when they did vie, they
did so more often in conditions where the average gain from vying was higher. One possible
explanation for the difference from the equilibrium prediction is that players have some
aversion to vying for dominance which could be overcome with high enough payoffs. Because
vying is a risky option relative to playing myopically, risk aversion is a natural candidate. In
Section 1.6 we explore the possibility that risk aversion is influencing subjects’ choices. We
elicit risk preferences and find that they have significant power in predicting when players
vie for dominance. On the basis of this finding we develop a version of the model with
5
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heterogeneous risk preferences. We find that this model does a good job of matching the
aggregate moments in the data.
Our conclusion then is that timing does play a strong role in whether nodes have the oppor-
tunity to become central However, whether nodes (individuals, managers, firms) are able to
exploit the opportunity that the right timing gives them depends on individual characteristics
as well.
1.1.1. Literature: Theory and Experiments on Network Formation
Before we present the model, we review the literature concerning theories and experiments
on networks and network formation.
Previous models of network formation are not well suited to studying the role of vying for
dominance and entry timing in determining network structure. These models generally at-
tribute node centrality to either luck6 or some combination of fundamentals and equilibrium
selection7 rather than the timing of node entry. For example, because any pairwise stable
network can be a solution in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), whether node is central depends
only on whether there exists a pairwise stable network where that node is central (fun-
damentals) and whether that pairwise stable network happens to be the one that is chosen
(equilibrium selection). Existing models of network formation usually lack at least one of the
critical elements for exploring the impact of entry timing on centrality: either the agents are
not forward looking, the nodes do not enter the network sequentially, or the set of solutions
depends only on static features of the network.
The earliest models of network formation, such as the preferential attachment model of Yule
(1925) and the small world model of Erdös and Rényi (1960) did not include any optimizing
agents or strategic behavior.
Network formation models were introduced to economics by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
6Kim and Jo (2009)
7Watts (2001); Currarini and Morelli (2000); Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); Bala and Goyal (2000)
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and their model of cooperative network formation. In this model, a network is stable if no two
unconnected players want to form a connection, and no player who is party to a connection
wishes to break that connection. This network formation process is called cooperative,
because two players must agree on a connection for it to persist. This model has no dynamic
aspect.
Bala and Goyal (2000) propose a similar stability based network formation model, but they
allowed players to generate connections unilaterally. As such, their model is referred to as
non-cooperative network formation. Bala and Goyal (2000) also introduces dynamics to their
models, but as in many dynamic models of network formation players were not strategically
forward looking.8 Players are assumed to best respond to the strategies of players from the
previous period. In a similar vein, the model of Watts (2001) assumes that players myopically
update their connections, and in the model of Kim and Jo (2009) connections only provide
an immediate benefit.
There are several papers that do include dynamics as well as forward looking strategic
agents. In many of these models, payoffs or game structures are chosen such that the set
of possible outcomes depends on some static feature of the network. For example Currarini
and Morelli (2000) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) both find that only efficient networks
can be supported in equilibria of their game. Song and van der Schaar (2015) find that
the dynamic network formation process can converge to any network which satisfies a static
individual rationality constraint requiring that each player make a payoff of at least zero.
These papers either lack strong history dependence or use specialized payoff functions which
simplify strategic considerations.
While dynamics do not drop out of the network formation model of Aumann and Myerson
(1988), the payoff function used guarantees that only complete connected components can
form. In other words, all nodes in a “group” must be connected to all other nodes in that
group. Only the number of nodes in a particular group matters, because only one structure
is possible for a given group size. This allows the network formation model to be reduced
8 Watts (2001) and Kim and Jo (2009)
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to a more standard model of dynamic coalition formation where players are picking their
groups.
The model of Chowdhury (2008) is one of the most similar to our own. Both models include
sequential link formation and forward-looking strategic agents. In addition, there is the
possibility in Chowdhury (2008) for early movers to make myopically sub-optimal moves
in hopes of gaining future connections, which can be thought of as loosely similar to the
vying for dominance behavior of our model. However, Chowdhury (2008) assumes that each
node can only sponsor one connection, and thus rules out by assumption the possibility of
competing for centrality by making multiple connections that is the center of the present
paper.
Our experiment is designed with a more defined temporal structure than previous network
formation experiments.9 It is this rigid time structure that allows us to carefully study how
entry order and move order relate to the eventual centrality of nodes.
To our knowledge, there is only one other paper in the economics literature which has
examined network growth in with a similar structure. Celen and Hyndman (2006) have
players form small three-person networks using a fairly similar sequential process to the one
used in this experiment. In their experiment, new players can pay to gain information about
the state of the world from older nodes. The informational flows form a directed network.
Our experiment differs from Celen and Hyndman (2006) in that players care about the
behavior of later nodes and the network is larger, which makes the space of possible behavior
much richer. In Celen and Hyndman (2006), the behavior of future players is irrelevant.
Players are instead concerned with inferring the behavior of previous players. As such, we
need to conduct a new experiment to test the vying for dominance prediction of Neligh
(2017) and to examine the importance of entry timing in determining node centrality.
Several experiments have found that network structure can have large impacts on behavior.
9Carrillo and Gaduh (2012); Bernasconi and Galizzi (2005); Carrillo and Gaduh (2012); Kearns et al.
(2012); van Leeuwen et al. (2013)
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Experimentalists have studied the impact of network structure on trading games,10 public
goods games,11 and group decision making games.12 A good review of older experiments
examining the role of network structure in determining economic outcomes can be found in
Kosfield (2003).
Experiments have been conducted testing various network formation models. In examining
these studies, we find two consistent important findings which are potentially relevant to
our own experiment. First, is the competition for centrality. Players want to be central,
because it is often beneficial to be so in many experimental setups. As such, there are often
several players all attempting to become central in these experiments. Second, is the role
of heterogeneity. Player differences, whether inherent or exogenously given, have a large
impact on the behavior of players in network formation games.
Kearns et al. (2012), van Leeuwen et al. (2013), and Goeree et al. (2007) all find evidence
that competition for centrality plays a role in determining whether and how players converge
to a stable solution. In all experiments, players were slow in converging to stable networks,
at least in part because multiple players consistently tried to become the most central in the
network. Players can be heterogeneous in how much they compete for centrality. Kearns
et al. (2012) found a very bi-modal distribution of connections made. Players either made a
lot of connections or very few. In Section 1.6 we examine how heterogeneity in players can
influence the competition for centrality in our experiment.
Competition for centrality is a very important feature of our model as well. Players vie for
dominance by making multiple connections in hopes of being highly central and receiving
many connections as the game progresses. However, while this competition for centrality
has been a confounding factor in previous studies, it is a direct prediction in our model. As
such, it will allow us to discuss the phenomenon with more rigor and detail than in previous
studies.
10Charness et al. (2007)
11Charness et al. (2014); Carpenter et al. (2012)




We now present the general concept of the network formation model. There is a set of
players, each one represented by a node. New players/nodes join the network one at a
time. As players join the network, they choose which existing nodes to connect to. They
must connect to at least one existing node. Once the last player has joined the network
and made their choice the game ends, and players receive points based on the number of
connections they made and their position in the final network. Centrality is beneficial but
making connections is costly.
We now present the model formally. There is a set of players represented by nodes indexed
j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Networks are represented as G = {n(G);x(G)} where n(G) is a set of nodes,
and x(G) is a set of edges represents by pairs of nodes. The networks are also indexed by
time as Gt where t ∈ {1, 2, ...J}. Note that there is one time period for every player/node,
so indices are largely interchangeable. The game begins with the initial network containing
only Node 1 G1 = {1; ∅}.
A strategy for player j maps every possible network state they can face, Gt−1, to a distri-
bution over sets of connections. Each set of connections ht must be non-empty and contain
only connections between Node t and existing nodes in Gt−1. Player t is choosing which
existing nodes to connect to.
After player t makes their move, the network evolves according to the following rule:
Gt = Gt−1 ∪ {t;ht}
In other words, the new network is created by adding a node representing the new player
and all of the connections made by that player to the existing network.
The game concludes after Player J makes his choice, generating the final network GJ .
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Once the game has concluded, each player gets a payoff according to the following utility
function.
ui(hi, GJ) = Y − C|hi|+Bζi(GJ , δ) (1)
Y ∈ IR is a constant base payoff. C|hi| is the cost of connections by individual i who
purchased the set of connections hi. C ∈ IR+ is the constant cost of connections. Bζi(GJ , δ)
is the benefit from centrality. B ∈ IR+ is a constant multiplier, and ζ(GJ , δ) = ∑j 6=i δdij(GJ )−1
is a standard measure of closeness centrality. Decomposing ∑j 6=i δdij(GJ )−1, δ ∈ (0, 1) is a
geometric discount factor. dij(Gt) is the minimum distance between Node i and Node j in
edges under network Gt. The minus one in the exponent adjusts the term such that we do
not have to normalize B and C with respect to δ.
This type of payoff function is common in the network formation literature. It is very
similar to the payoff function used in Watts (2001) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).13 This
type of network payoff is most relevant for systems in which some beneficial opportunity or
information lands at a random node and then disseminates throughout the network with
value decaying over time. It can, however, be applied as a useful approximation in any
system where more central nodes gain more benefits, as this measure of centrality is highly
correlated with other measures of centrality, especially in networks with low diameter.14
1.2.1. Solutions
We take Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) as our solution concept of choice, because it
captures the idea of fully forwards looking strategic agents. A SPE is defined in the standard
manner, as a strategy profile in which players only choose moves after a given action history
which are optimal for the subgame resulting from that action history. Existence is guaranteed
13Their payoff function is has Y = 0 and B = δ, but otherwise is identical.
14For an examination of correlation in measures of centrality in real world networks, see Valente et al. (2008)
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by the fact that we are considering a finite game of perfect information. The solution to the
game is not always unique. Because this is a finite game of perfect information, multiplicity
of equilibria derives from the manner in which players resolve indifferences. As such it is
useful to address the way players resolve indifferences in a systematic manner.
Definition. Tie-Breaking Rule: a tie-breaking rule refers to some rule by which players
resolve indifferences in the construction of a SPE.
A player’s tie-breaking rule can be thought of as a mapping from action histories to dis-
tributions over strict orderings of moves. Whichever strict ordering is drawn after a given
action history is used to transform the current actor’s weak preference ordering on moves
into a strict one (thereby determining that player’s move). Note that the indifferences in
this game are due to structural symmetries and similarities inherent in network formation
and are not related to off path behavior. As such the indifferences cannot be easily dealt
with using equilibrium refinements or payoff perturbations. 15
Note that because indifference resolution is the only source of multiplicity in this game, a
solution to the game can be fully characterized by the set of parameters and the tie-breaking
rules employed by all players.
1.3. Results
1.3.1. Efficiency Results
We first explore the structure of the efficient network. This depends on the parameters of




> (1 − δ) most of the outcomes are
not Pareto ranked, but we can productively consider whether networks are efficient in the
following sense.
15In face, tie-breaking rules behave much like small move dependent bonus payment perturbations which
are drawn randomly from a distribution which depends on the move history of the game, assuming that
the payments are small enough never to change the relationship of two moves between which the player
is not indifferent.
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Definition: We say an outcome network GJ is efficient if it generates the highest possible
sum of utilities of all feasible outcome networks for given parameters. This is equivalent to
the “strong efficiency” of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).




< 2(1− δ), then the efficient network is the complete network.
• If C
B
> 2(1− δ), then the efficient network is the star network (on Node 1 or Node 2)
• If C
B
= 2(1− δ), then all feasible networks which contain stars are efficient
For proofs, see Chapter 2.
This result is similar to that of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) with a few key differences.
First, the empty network is never efficient, because it is never feasible in this game. Second,
the threshold below which the complete network is efficient in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
is C/B = 1 − δ. This difference comes from the fact that, in our model, the cost of each
connection is only paid once by the player who makes it. In the cooperative game, the
connection is costly to both parties. As such connections must be twice as costly in our
game before they become socially inefficient.
Note that, while the sequential nature of the game does impose limits on the set of feasible
networks, it does not impose strong limits on the structure of the networks other than
connectedness. Given any connected network of un-indexed nodes, we can find a sequence
of actions which generates a network of that same shape.
1.3.2. Subgame Perfect Equilibria







< (1 − δ) then the complete network is the unique network which can form in
SPEs of the game.
• If C
B
> (1− δ), then the complete network is no longer a possible outcome of any SPE
at all. To see this consider the move of Player J .
• If C
B
> (J − 1) − 1−δJ−31−δ , then the star networks centered on Node 1 and Node 2 are
the only networks which can be formed in SPEs of the game.
For proofs, see Neligh (2017).
As in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), when C < 1 − δ the complete network forms as the
possible only outcome of subgame perfect equilibria, and when C > 1 − δ. That is where
the similarities end, however. The ability of earlier moves to affect the incentives of later
players means that the potential benefits of additional connections are much higher than in
a one shot model; recall the vying for dominance discussed in the introduction. As such, we
cannot guarantee a minimally connected network unless costs are relatively very high.
Also, note that the right hand side of the condition, C
B
> (J − 1)− 1−δJ−31−δ , is increasing in J ,
so the condition is more restrictive in large networks. Intuitively, this means that it is easier
to generate non-star networks when the number of players is large and when the geometric
discount factor is large.
Proposition SPE 2 is tight as long as δ is small in a weaker sense than for Proposition SPE 1.
If C
B
< J−2 and δ is sufficiently small such that there exist a SPE of the game parameterized
by C
B
and δ which does not always generate a star network.16
1.3.3. Summary of Results
These results are intuitive and are generally quite robust to small changes in the assumptions
of the model.17 These results also provide a basis for some of the more novel results such
16Proof in Chapter 2
17See Chapter 2 and related appendices for examples of ways that the results can be generalized. In that
chapter we loosen assumption on the timing of entry, the homogeneity of nodes, and when nodes can
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as those discussed in Section1.3.5 and tested in the experiment. The results of the previous
sections are summarized in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2.: Visualization of parameter regions of interest. Threshold locations imply low δ.
f(J, δ) = δ−δJ−31−δ .
There are parameter regions where the star network and complete network are formed as
the unique SPE outcome and regions where they efficient. There are also regions where both
networks are efficient. In addition, there is an interesting region, where we cannot guarantee
either the star or the complete network. In the yellow region, the complete network cannot
form. The star network can form, but it is not guaranteed to be a solution, and it is never
the unique SPE outcome as long as δ is small. Instead, we often see more complex strategic
behaviors in the yellow region, like vying for dominance.
The above results are comparable to those found in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Watts
(2001) with several major differences. First, the fact that we are using non-cooperative
network formation shifts the efficiency threshold, Since the region where the complete net-
work is guaranteed does not shift, this change allows for the possibility of inefficient under-
connection.
Second, the nature of the non-degenerate networks that can form is very different. The
stable networks in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) are always locally efficient in the sense
that changing them by adding or removing one connection will decrease the overall sum
of payoffs generated by the network. Inefficiency in their model is driven by the difference
between global and local optimum. In our model, on the other hand, local optimality is
make connection. We also examine what happens when players can own multiple nodes and when the
end of the game is not deterministic.
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not guaranteed. Inefficiency is instead driven by the existence of positive and negative
externalities. The positive externalities are easy to see, because players are benefiting from
connections that other players pay for, but the negative externalities are somewhat subtler.
Players can vie for dominance in order to gain connections from future players, but vying for
dominance can produce negative externalities by crowding out players who would otherwise
be dominant. An example of this is shown in Section 1.3.5.
It is interesting to note that, unlike in previous literature, when J is high and δ is low it
is possible to generate both inefficiently under-connected networks and inefficiently over-
connected networks through SPEs. Inefficient under-connection arises when (1 − δ) < C
B
<
2(1− δ), and inefficient over-connection can arise when (J − 1)− 1−δJ−31−δ > CB > 2(1− δ).
1.3.4. Vying for Dominance
The question naturally arises of what happens in the non-degenerate region (yellow) region.
Behavior in this region is rich and can include a lot of strategically interesting move such as
vying for dominance and taking myopic actions. As discussed in the introduction, a myopic
move is a move which would be optimal if the game ended immediately after that move
In all of the cases we discuss in this paper, a myopic move involves making a single con-
nection to one of the most central (dominant) nodes, and vying for dominance corresponds
to connecting to all existing nodes. See Figure 1.3 for examples of these behaviors. It is
important to note that when we say players take a myopic action, we do not mean that they
are not forward looking and strategic. As we will show, the myopic action is often optimal
in the subgame perfect sense. Players can also vie for dominance.
In general, even more complex types of behavior exist in this parameter region than just
these two, making it hard to solve see Chapter 2 for an example of a six node network in
which a player makes a more strategically sophisticated move: setting up a later player to
vie for dominance by making a sub-optimal one connection move. As we increase the size
of the network, the possible strategic complexity increases further. In addition, brute force
16
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Figure 1.3.: An unattached Player 3 (top) may choose to make a myopic move (lower right) or
vie for dominance (lower left).
backwards induction rapidly becomes unfeasible. In a J node network would require looking
at the payoffs associated with (J − 1)! 2J2−J possible networks.
In order to make things solvable we focus on cases in which vying and myopia are the only
moves. 18 In one case we restrict the game such that players are always required to connect
to at least one of the most central nodes in the network. This is called the Dominant Node
Restricted Game, and it is one of the main focuses of Chapter 2. We can also focus on
smaller simple networks such as when J = 5 and C/B > 1, as we do for the remainder of
this chapter.
1.3.5. The Five-Node Game
In this section we will solve the game with five nodes and C/B > 1. 19 Recall that solutions
to the game are characterized by the parameters and the tie-breaking rule. We will use the
random tie-breaking rule in which each optimal move is picked with equal chance. This
tie-breaking rule is chosen for two reasons. First, it doesn’t ex-ante favor any node. Second,
it matches well with experimental data as we show in Section 1.5.1. We discuss other tie
18With some caveats discussed in detail in Chapter 2
19The game is solvable when C/B < 1, but the behaviors are very different from that used for other regions,
so that case is covered in the Appendix Section A.1.
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breaking approaches in the Appendix Section A.5.
We solve the game by backwards induction.
1.3.5.1. Player 5
Regardless of network configuration, Player 5 will always connect to a single dominant node.
Player 5 will take an action that is myopically optimal: connecting to a single dominant
node. This is the best one connection move, and the benefit of multiple connection moves is
never worth the additional cost.
When there are multiple dominant nodes, Player 5 will connect to one at random due to the
assumed tie-breaking rule. For examples of possible moves from Player 5 see Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4.: Several examples of possible move by Player 5. In cases with dotted lines,
Player 5 picks one connection at random.
1.3.5.2. Player 4
Player 4’s move can depend on the type of network he is facing. He can face two networks,
ignoring the symmetric case. We say that two networks are symmetric if the nodes of one
18
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network can be relabeled to create the other. Because our tie-breaking rule does not depend
on node labels, symmetric networks generate effectively identical behavior. The network
after Player 3 connects only to Node 1 is symmetric to the network after Player 3 connects
only to Node 2 If Player 3 made one connection, Player 4 faces a network with one dominant
node. If Player 3 made two connections, Player 4 faces a network with three dominant nodes.
See Figure 1.5 for examples of the networks Player 4 can face.
Figure 1.5.: Possible networks faced by Player 4
Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node: We first consider the case where Player 4 is facing
one dominant node. There are a number of moves that Player 4 can make, but we will focus
on two moves which will serve as bases for comparison: the myopic move (connecting to a
single dominant node) and vying for dominance by connecting to all existing nodes.
When Player 4 plays a myopic move, he connects to a single dominant node. His single
connection has a cost of C, and he makes an immediate benefit of B + 2δB (B from one
directly connected node and 2δB from two second degree connected nodes). Because player
4 is not a core there is no chance that player 5 will connect to them. Player 4 will then only
expect to gain δB from his second degree connection with Player 5.
Player 4 can also vie for dominance by connecting to all existing nodes. Making 3 connections
incurs a cost of 3C, and gains Player 4 an immediate benefit of 3B. After this move, Player
4 becomes one of two dominant nodes, so he will have a 50% chance of receiving a connection




Table 1.1 summarizes the costs and benefits for these moves and others available to Player








Myopic C B + 2δB 0 δB
Vie (3 Con) 3C 3B 0.5 0.5B + 0.5δB
Vie (2 Con) 2C 2B + δB 0.25 0.25B + 0.5δB + 0.25δ2B
Other (2 con) 2C 2B + δB 0 δB
Other (1 Con) C B + δB + δ2B 0 0.5δB + 0.5δ2
Table 1.1.: Move costs and benefits for Player 4 facing three dominant nodes. Moves
listed: Myopic–as defined previously; Vie (3 Con)–Becoming dominant by making three
connections; Vie (2 Con)–Becoming dominant by making two connections to the
non-dominant nodes; Other (2 Con)–Making two connections without becoming
dominant; Other (1 Con)–Making one connection to a non-dominant node.
We can immediately see that the one connection non-myopic move is dominated by the
myopic move. In addition, vying for dominance by making two connections is always worse
than either vying for dominance by making three connections or worse than the myopic
move.20 The remaining three possible optimal moves are Myopic, Three Connections Vie,
and Two Connections Not Vie. The payoffs from all three of these options can be normalized
by as functions of one summary parameter C
B(1−δ) .
Figure 1.6 shows the normalized payoffs as a function of C
B(1−δ) . We can see from the figure
that vying for dominance is optimal up until some threshold, after which the myopic move
is optimal which gives us the following




B(1−δ) < 1.25, Player 4 facing one dominant node will connect to all existing nodes
(Vying)
• If C
B(1−δ) > 1.25, Player 4 facing one dominant node will connect to one dominant node
(Myopic)
20To see this, note two connection vie better than three connection vie implies C > 1.25B− 1δB− 0.25δ2B.
Two connection vie better than myopic implies 1.25B − 1.5δB + 0.25δ2B > C. It is impossible for both
statements to be true at the same time. Therefore, vying by making two connections can never be
optimal.
20
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Figure 1.6.: Normalized payoffs for Player 4 facing one dominant node. Payoffs normalized by
subtracting B + 3δB − C and dividing by B(1− δ). Due to the different structure of the
payoffs, some moves (two connection vying and one connections other) cannot be normalized
this way. These moves are always worse than three connection vying or the myopic move.
See Figure 1.7 for visualizations of the optimal moves of Player 4 facing one dominant node.
Figure 1.7.: Visual representations of the possible moves of Player 4 facing one dominant
node: vying for dominance (left) and myopic (right).
This gives us a threshold of interest, whether C
B(1−δ) is above or below 1.25. If we divide our
regions graph from earlier through by 1− δ.
Player 4 Facing Three Dominant Nodes: We now consider Player 4’s move when facing three
dominant nodes. In this situation, Player 4 only has three real moves due to symmetry. He
can make one connect (myopic), two connections, or three connections (vying). The results
of each move are reported in Table 1.2.












Myopic C B + 2δB 0 δB B + 3δB − C
Vie 3C 3B 0.25 0.25B + 0.75δB 3.25B + 0.75δB − 3C
Two Connections 2C 2B + δB 0 δB 2B + 2δB − C
Table 1.2.: Move results for Player 4 facing one dominant node
Figure 1.8.: Normalized payoffs for Player 4 facing three dominant nodes. Payoffs
normalized by subtracting B + 3δB − C and dividing by B(1− δ)
one quarter chance of receiving a connection from Player 5 if he vies for dominance, because
there will be four dominant nodes. See Figure 1.8 for the new normalized payoffs as functions
of C
B(1−δ) .
Vying and myopic moves are again the only optimal moves with vying being optimal up to
some threshold, but the threshold decreased, because the payoffs from vying for dominance
have decreased.




B(1−δ) < 1.125, Player 4 will connect to all existing nodes when facing three dominant
nodes (Vying)
• If C
B(1−δ) > 1.125, Player 4 will connect to one dominant node when facing three
dominant nodes (Myopic)
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See Figure 1.9 for visualizations of the optimal moves of Player 4 facing three dominant
nodes. This adds a second threshold of interest, whether C
B(1−δ) is above or below 1.125.
Figure 1.9.: Visual representations of the possible moves of Player 4 facing three
dominant nodes
1.3.5.3. Player 3
Player 3 always faces the same network: Nodes 1 and 2 connected. As such, he does not
have to condition his move on network faced.
Player 3 also only has two moves (disregarding the symmetric case). He can make one con-
nection (myopic) or two connections (vying for dominance). Player 3 does have to consider,
however, how his own choice effect Player 4’s choice to vie for dominance. Table 1.3 reflects
















(1− δ, 1.125) Yes Yes 1.25 1 Vie
(1.125, 1.25) No Yes 2/3 1 Myopic
(1.25, 123) No No 2/3 0 Vie
(123 ,∞) No No 2/3 0 Myopic




3 , vying is not worth the cost for Player 3. When
C
B(1−δ) drops to the
(1.25, 123) range, vying becomes profitable. If
C
B(1−δ) drops further into the (1.125, 1.25)
range, something interesting happens. When C
B(1−δ) ∈ (1.125, 1.25), whether Player 4 vies
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for dominance depends on whether Player 3 vies for dominance. Player 3 wants Player 4 to
vie, because Player 4 vying provides a connection to Player 3 with probability one.
When C
B(1−δ) ∈ (1− δ, 1.125), Player 4’s decision no longer depends on behavior from Player
3, and vying for dominance is again profitable. We can summarize results in the following
lemma.




B(1−δ) ∈ (1− δ, 1.125), Player 3 makes two connections
• C
B(1−δ) > (1.125, 1.25), Player 3 makes one connection randomly
• C




3 , Player 3 makes one connection randomly
See Figure 1.10 for a visualization of the moves Player 3 makes
Figure 1.10.: Possible moves for Player 3. Vying (left) and myopic(right). In the case
with the dotted line, one connection is picked at random.
Notice that there is now one more threshold we need to keep track of, whether C
B(1−δ) is
above or below 123 . Players 1 and 2 have no decisions to make.
1.3.5.4. Summary
We can then compile the behaviors into solutions for each parameter region discussed.
Proposition 3: The solution to the five-node game with C/B > 1 can be characterized by
the following table:
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C
B(1−δ) Range Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
( 11−δ , 1.125) Vie Vie (Three Connections) Myopic
(1.125, 1.25) Myopic Vie (Three Connections) Myopic
(1.25, 123) Vie Myopic Myopic
(123 ,∞) Myopic Myopic Myopic
For visualizations of what typical networks in each region look like see Figure 1.11.
Figure 1.11.: Typical outcome networks by region.
1.4. The Experiment
1.4.1. The Experimental Game




pii(hi, GJ) = Y − C|hi|+B
∑
j 6=i




Players receive B points for each directly connected node in the final network and b points for
every node at a distance of two.21 Nodes which are farther than two away provide no benefit.
We conducted experiments using the following parameters:J = 5, Y = 160, B = 100, b = 10.
The value of C varied between treatments with high cost treatments using C = 140 and low
cost treatments using C = 110
The modified game with these parameters produces the same solution as the base game with
J = 5, Y = 160, B = 100, δ = 0.1, C = 110, 140. The cost levels 110 and 140 correspond
to solution regions 2 ( C
B(1−δ) ∈ (1.125, 1.25)) and 3 discussed above ( CB(1−δ) ∈ (1.25, 53)) with
typical networks like those represented in Figure 1.12.
Figure 1.12.: Typical networks formed in the experimental treatments
1.4.2. Setup
In this experiment, each round corresponded to the creation of one network for each group.
Players were grouped in sets of three representing Nodes 3 through 522 and were randomly
regrouped and reordered for each round. Each session had 28 rounds, including three practice
21Note that dij in the above refers to dij(GJ)
22Nodes 1 and 2 have no choices and so no players were assigned to those roles.
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rounds and 25 paying rounds. There was only one cost level (110 or 140) per treatment. At
the end of the experiment players were paid $1 for every 200 points earned.
Figure 1.13 presents an example of what players might see during the network formation
process. The viewer’s own node always appears in blue when it is present in the network.
Potential connections appear in blue. They can be created or destroyed by clicking on
existing nodes in the network. Once a player is satisfied with the set of connections they
have chosen, they can click “Confirm” to finalize their connections, adding them to the
network. The next player then uses the newly expanded network as the basis for their own
move.
Figure 1.13.: Examples of what players see during the network formation process.
Beginning from the top left we have: (1) what Player 4 sees while making a decision; (2)
what Player 3 sees while Player 4 makes a decision; and (3) what Player 5 sees after
Player 4 made a decision.
Several of the later C = 110 treatments included question batteries to the end of the experi-




The first battery of questions consisted of a series of binary choices between gambles in a
multiple price list, a la Holt and Laury (2002). The second battery elicited beliefs about the
moves of successive players, incentivized via a quadratic probability scoring rule. Finally, the
third battery consisted of non-incentivized Big Five personality questions, aimed at detecting
subject’s entrepreneurial inclinations.23 We describe the three series of questions in more
detail later in the chapter. The relevant screenshots and additional details are reported in
Appendix Section C. Screenshots of the BFI questions were not included as the questions
were identical to those in John and Srivastava (1999).
1.4.3. Sessions
We conducted all sessions at the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences
(CELSS). The experiment was implemented using the zTree experimental platform,24 and
participants were recruited from the CELSS subject pool which is managed using the Online
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE).25
Table 1.4 summarizes information about the sessions that were run. The questions column
refers to whether or not the question batteries were included at the end of the session. The
C column refers to the cost level for the session. All other columns report demographic
information of potential interest.
1.4.4. Predictions
1.4.4.1. Move Predictions
Using the results from Section 1.3.5 we can make several predictions about the behavior of
players in the experimental game.
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Session C Questions Subject Male Female Engineer Econ Grad
1 110 No 15 10 5 7 2 2
2 140 No 15 7 8 3 1 4
3 140 No 12 4 8 3 1 0
4 110 No 15 5 9 3 1 1
5 140 No 12 5 6 4 1 0
6 110 No 15 7 8 3 2 0
7 110 Yes 15 9 5 3 3 0
8 110 Yes 15 8 7 5 1 0
Total 114 55 56 31 12 7
Table 1.4.: Sessions Summary
• Prediction 1: All players in both treatments will either play a myopic move or vie
for dominance.
• Prediction 2: Player 5
– Player 5 will play a myopic move
• Prediction 3: Player 4
– 3a: Player 4 will vie more often when there is one dominant node and C = 110
than in any other cost/state combination
– 3b: Player 4 will play a myopic move when C = 140 or when C = 110 facing
three dominant nodes
– 3c: Player 4 will vie when there is one dominant node and C = 110
• Prediction 4: Player 3
– 4a: Player 3 will vie more in the C = 140 treatment than in the C = 110
treatment
– 4b: Player 3 will vie in the C = 140 treatment
– 4c: Player 3 will Play a myopic move in the C = 110 treatment
Table 1.5 summarizes the predictions on when players should vie for dominance
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Cost Player 3 Player 4(Facing Three Dominant)
Player 4
(Facing One Dominant) Player5
110 No No Vie No
140 Vie No No No
Table 1.5.: Node Move Predictions
1.4.4.2. Payoffs
Table 1.6 summarizes the expected number of points made by each player
Cost\Player 1 2 3 4 5 Total
110 447.5 337.5 270 185 180 1420
140 440 300 160 150 150 1200
Table 1.6.: Player Payoffs: Predictions
At both cost levels there is a substantial early mover advantage when it comes to profit.
Predictable there is a drop in payoff for all players as we move from low to high cost.
This difference tends to hit the middle players harder, because they either lose their future
connections or have to pay large costs if they wish to become dominant. Early players do
not need to pay high costs to become dominant, and later players will not receive future
connections regardless of the cost.
There are two main effects from the increase in connection costs. First, the total number
of connections goes down, decreasing the efficiency of the outcome network. The high cost
treatment will generate five connections while the low cost treatment will generate six. Sec-
ond, the cost of each connection increases. This means that the social welfare decrease can
be attributed partly to the increase in the cost of existing connections and partly to the
shift to a less efficient configuration. Because the resulting networks always have a largest
minimum distance (diameter) of two in the cases we are examining, each new connection
should increase welfare by 2(B − b)− C points.
It should be noted that the difference in configuration efficiency coupled with the predictabil-
ity of connections number provide an opportunity for a welfare improving taxation/subsidy
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scheme. A planner could impose a flat tax mirrored by a subsidy on connections, thereby en-
forcing the network structure associated with any cost level. Subsidizing connections in this
manner in order to generate a complete network is welfare increasing as long as C
B
< 2(1−δ).
For example, consider what would happen if C = 140 and a planner were to impose a flat
tax of 36 points on each player and then subsidize connections by 30 points. The tax and
subsidy cancel, leaving a balanced budget, and the effective cost of connections becomes 110
points. Welfare would then go from 1200 points to 1420 − 180 = 1240 points, a gain of 40
points.
Due to Proposition EF 1, as long as C < 180 it will always be optimal for the planner to
impose a subsidy on connections such that the effective C is less than 90, since the complete
network is the most efficient possible network in this case. Whether this theoretical gain
from planner intervention can actually be practically achieved depends on whether the actual
networks are responsive to changes in connection cost.
1.4.4.3. Dominant Nodes
The theory also has predictions about which node will be dominant at the end of the game.
Table 1.7 provides the probability that each player will end the game as the dominant node.
Cost\Player 1 2 3 4 5
110 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0
140 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0
Table 1.7.: Probability of Final Dominant Node: Predictions
In the lower cost treatment, weight is shifted toward the later nodes being the final dominant
node more often. Lower costs mean more opportunities for later players to profitably vie
for dominance. More vying later in the game means more efficient networks and a higher




In this section we go over the results use them to explore the relationship between centrality
and entry timing. We also discuss the relationship between costs and efficiency. The primary
unit of observation is the network, although analysis is also performed at the move and
subject level. In sessions with C = 110, we observed a total of 1875 moves by 75 subjects,
or 635 networks; in sessions with C=140 we observed a total of 975 moves by 39 subjects or
325 networks.
1.5.1. Justification of Random Tie-Breaking Rule
Before we examine player behavior in depth, it is important to establish that the random
tie-breaking rule is a credible model for the way players resolve indifferences.
The tie-breaking rule is a complex multidimensional object which would be difficult to es-
timate, but only some features of the tie-breaking rule actually affect optimal equilibrium
play. The critical feature of the random tie-breaking rule for determining incentives is the
fact that a Player 3 or 4 who vies for dominance will receive a connection from the next
player with a probability equal to one over the number of resulting dominant nodes.
Table 1.8 compares the observed frequency of receiving a connection after vying for domi-
nance to the probability predicted by random tie-breaking in different conditions.
Player C Predicted Data Pval Obs
Player 3 110 0.333 0.554 0 372
Player 4, 1 Dominant 110 0.500 0.486 0 37
Player 4, 3 Dominant 110 0.250 0.312 0.003 32
Player 3 140 0.333 0.468 0 111
Player 4, 1 Dominant 140 0.500 1 1 2
Player 4, 3 Dominant 140 0.250 1 0.564 1
Table 1.8.: Probability of Receiving a Connection from the Next Node After Vying for
Dominance
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While there are many significant deviations from the predicted values, they are not large
enough to alter the predicted SPE strategies of the players in any situation. If we were
to substitute those observed frequencies which are significantly different from the predicted
values at the 5% level into the model, it would not change the predicted moves of any player
in any situation.
For example, if Player 4 facing one dominant node in the C = 110 treatment had a 48.6%
chance of receiving a connection from Player 5 after vying for dominance rather than the
50% predicted by uniform random tie-breaking, it would still be optimal for him to do so.
Similarly, if Player 4 facing three dominant nodes in the C = 110 treatment had a 31.2%
chance of receiving a connection after vying, it would still be optimal for him to choose a
myopic move.
1.5.2. Aggregate Data and Prediction 1
In this section we examine the aggregate data and consider whether the data is consistent
with prediction 1: all moves should be either myopic or vying for dominance. Table 1.9
reports the aggregate proportion of each move type.
Random One Multiple
Treatment Vie Myopic Total Benchmark Connections Connections
Total Other Other
C = 110 0.25 0.61 0.86 0.54 0.05 0.09
C = 140 0.13 0.78 0.91 0.54 0.07 0.03
Table 1.9.: Aggregate Move Proportions
The second and third column report the fractions of myopic and vying moves respectively.
Total is the sum of the two. The random benchmark shows what proportion of moves would
be myopic actions or vying for dominance if all players were to mix uniformly randomly
over moves.26 The Other category refers to all moves which are neither myopic actions nor
26Note, we mean each of a Player i’s (i − 1) ∗ 2i−2 = toti feasible moves gets equal probability. As a
consequence, the probability of Player i making j connections is BinomCoef(i−1,j)toti for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., i− 1}.
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vying for dominance. This category is subdivided into moves which involve one connection
to a non-dominant node and moves which involve multiple connections without vying for
dominance. As we can see, the proportion of vying and myopic moves is quite large, and
very few players are choosing moves of other types. We can then say that Prediction 1 seems
to generally hold in the data.
1.5.3. Player 5 and Prediction 2
In this section we look at the behavior of Player 5. Prediction 2 states that Player 5 should
always connect to a single dominant node, which is the myopic move. Figure 1.14 shows the
move proportions of Player 5.
Figure 1.14.: Player 5 move proportions
Moves are categorized as myopic (as defined above), multiple connections, or one connection
not myopic. One connection not myopic moves involve making one connection to a non-
dominant node. These moves can be thought of as small errors, because they are not optimal,
but the amount of points lost by choosing them is fairly small. Multiple connection moves
include any move that corresponds to making more than one connection. These moves can
be thought of as larger errors, because making multiple connections can be fairly costly
relative to the optimal move.
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The three colored dots represent the predicted move proportions (in red), the observed move
proportions (in blue), and the move proportions of a hypothetical player who chose their
move in a uniform random way (in green).27 As we can see, the data is fairly close to
the theoretical predictions, with most players making myopic moves. The data is also quite
different from the random benchmark, so we can conclude that players are generally adhering
to Prediction 2.
1.5.4. Player 4 and Prediction 3
We now look at the behavior of Player 4. Recall that Player 4’s move can depend on the
network he faces. Prediction 3 has three components. Prediction 3a is comparative, stating
that Player 4 should vie for dominance more often when facing one dominant node in the low
cost treatment than in any other cost/state combination. Prediction 3b states that Player 4
should play myopic moves when C = 140 or when C = 110 and facing three dominant nodes.
Prediction 3a states that Player 4 should vie for dominance when facing one dominant node
if C = 110.
Figure 1.15 shows the move proportions for Player 4 under different conditions. Moves are
categorized differently here than in the discussion of Player 5 actions, because Player 4 may
sometimes optimally choose another move: three connection vying for dominance. We must
specify three connection vying, because when facing two one dominant node, Player 4 can
vie for dominance by making two connections to the non-dominant nodes. In equilibrium,
however, vying by making two connections is always worse than vying or making a myopic
move. As before, dots of different colors are included on the figure representing the pre-
dicted move proportions, the observed move proportions, and the move proportions of a
hypothetical player who chose their move in a uniform random way.
As we can see in Figure 1.15 , the proportion of three connection vies is higher for Player 4
facing one dominant node in the C = 110 treatment than for any other situation Player 4
27Given the empirical distribution of network states faced by Player 5.
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Figure 1.15.: Player 4 move proportions
can face. Table 1.10 tests whether this difference is significant. We regressed a dummy for
vying for dominance on each state/cost combination using only Player 4 data. The default
situation is C = 110, facing one dominant node. The coefficients on every other state/cost
combination are significant and negative, meaning that Player 4 vied for dominance more
when C = 110, facing one dominant node than in any other cost/state combination. As such
we can say that the comparative static of Prediction 3a is supported by the data.
We can also see by inspecting Figure 1.15 that Player 4 data matches the theoretical pre-
dictions fairly well in the cases where myopic actions are predicted, so we can say that
prediction 3b is also generally supported. However, the data clearly contradict prediction
3c. When facing C=110, one dominant node, we see more myopic actions and more "Other"
than vying, although it is vying the theory predicts in equilibrium.
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Estimate Std. Error Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.220 0.043 0
C=110 3 Dominant -0.128 0.040 0.001
C=140 1 Dominant -0.173 0.046 0.0002
C=140 3 Dominant -0.211 0.044 0
Table 1.10.: Regression of Player 4 Vie Dummy on Cost/State Combination. Intercept
Corresponds to C=110, One Dominant Node. Errors are clustered at the subject level.
One question that immediately springs to mind is whether, given the small deviations we saw
earlier on the part of Player 5, it is no longer optimal for Player 4 to vie for dominance in the
C = 110 one dominant node condition. However, Player 4’s who make the three-connection
vying move make an average of 1.4 more points than those making myopic moves.28 The
difference is small and not significant at the 5% level, but we can at least say that myopic
moves are not better on average than vying for dominance. As such, the high number of
myopic moves is still unexplained.
1.5.5. Player 3 and Prediction 4
Consider now the behavior of Player 3. Player 3 only has two possible actions:29 they can
either choose the myopic move or they can vie for dominance. Recall, Prediction 4a states
that Player 4 should vie for dominance more in the C = 110 treatment than in the C = 140
treatment. Prediction 4b states that Player 3 should vie in the high cost treatment, and
Prediction 4c states that he should play myopic moves in the low cost treatment.
Figure 1.16 reports the move proportions for Player 3. As before, dots represent the predicted
move proportion, the actual move proportion, and the move proportion of a hypothetical
player choosing an action in a uniform random manner. We can immediately see that
Player 3 is actually vying more in the low cost treatment than in the high cost treatment.
28Note that when there are multiple dominant nodes, there are multiple possible myopic moves, one corre-
sponding to each dominant node.
29Ignoring the symmetric case.
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Figure 1.16.: Move proportions for Player 3
Furthermore, Player 3 is vying the majority of the time when C = 110 and not vying the
majority of the time when C = 140. Predictions 4a, 4b, and 4c do not hold well in the data.
Examining the payoffs of players helps reveal a possible reason for Player 3’s deviation from
predictions, at least in the C = 110 case.
Figure 1.17.: Observed payoffs by situation for players making the predicted move and
players not making the predicted move
Figure 1.17 shows the average observed payoff made by players in each position when they
made the move predicted by theory vs average payoff when making all other moves. As
we would expect, players generally make fewer points when making moves other than the
predicted ones. Those moves should be sub-optimal in equilibrium. The one exception is
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Player 3 for in the C = 110 treatment. Because Player 4 is not vying for dominance when
predicted, Player 3 is actually receiving a lower payoff for playing myopically, making vying
more appealing. Player 4’s deviation has changed Player 3’s optimal move.
1.5.6. Efficiency and Dominance
This subsection examines the consequences of the observed behaviors in terms of efficiency
and dominant nodes.
Figure 1.18.: Average payoff by position, data and prediction. Note that payoffs for
position 1 and 2 are hypothetical as no real players were associated.
Figure 1.18 shows the predicted and actual payoffs for players in each position in both
treatments. In general, payoffs were quite close to the prediction. Overall, players earned
fewer points than predicted with the exception of Players 2 and 3 in the high cost treatment
who likely benefited from a small bias away from connecting to Node 1. Overall each network
generated an average of 1357 points in the C = 110 treatment and 1171 points in the C = 140
treatment, a loss of 4.4% compared to the predicted 1420 points with C=110, and of 2.4%
percent compared to the predicted 1200 points with C=140.
On average players made 5.15 connections per network in the low cost treatment vs 4.47
connections per network in the high cost treatment, suggesting that a tax/subsidy scheme
may still be welfare improving, though less than predicted.
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Figure 1.19.: Cumulative frequency of final most dominant node.
Figure 1.19 shows the cumulative frequencies of each node being the dominant node in the
final network.30 In the C = 110 case there is a definite shift back relative to predictions
with earlier nodes being dominant more often than the theory would suggest. Joining the
network as the third player is more conducive to becoming dominant than joining as the
fourth player. The frequencies are more similar to predictions in the C = 140 case, except
Node 2 is the final dominant node much more often than predicted, taking weight from both
Player 3 and Player 1. We examine the data on final dominant nodes in more detail in
Appendix Section B.1
1.5.7. Summary of Results
We can summarize the results of the experiment with regards to the predictions as follows
with (T) indicating mostly true or true and (F) indicating mostly false or false.
• (T) Prediction 1: All players play myopic moves or vie for dominance.
• (T) Prediction 2: Player 5
– Player 5 will play myopic moves
• Prediction 3: Player 4
30 In the rare occurrence when multiple nodes are dominant in the final network it counts as one observation
for each of them.
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– (T) 3a: Vie more often when one dominant node and C = 110
– (T) 3b: Play myopic moves when C = 140 or when C = 110 and three dominant
nodes
– (F) 3c: Vie when one dominant node and C = 110
• Prediction 4: Player 3
– (F) 4a: Vie more when C = 140 than when C = 110
– (F) 4b: Vie when C = 140
– (F) 4b: Myopic move when C = 110
In order to better understand how the reasons behind the behavioral deviations we can
highlight two noticeable features of the experimental results. First as summarized in Table
1.11, players vie for dominance less often than predicted.
Treatment Prediction Observed
C = 110 0.333 0.248
C = 140 0.333 0.126
Table 1.11.: Fraction of Players Vying for Dominance
Second, players vie for dominance more in situations where the reward is higher. For each
of eight possible role/conditions,31 we calculated the average observed payoff for playing
myopic moves and the average observed payoff for vying for dominance by connecting to all
existing nodes. These values were used to calculate the empirical average gain from vying,
relative to the myopic moves. In Table 1.12 we show the results of a logit regression of
vying for dominance against this average gain from vying. As expected, the effect is both
positive and significant.
It seems plausible that players might have some aversion to vying for dominance which can
be overcome by higher expected gains.






Expected Gain from Vying (Vs Myopic) 0.053 0.000
AIC 1808.96
Table 1.12.: Logit regression of vying by connecting to all nodes against expected gain vs
myopic. Errors clustered at the subject level.
1.6. Risk Aversion
Vying for dominance is an inherently risky move, because players must invest in connections
now in hopes of receiving future connections which, may not arrive. As such, it is plausible
that risk aversion might be driving the deviations that we see in the data. We explore that
possibility in the next section.
1.6.1. Risk Aversion Data
As described earlier, we concluded two of the session with additional questions. The first
battery of questions was used to elicit risk aversion via multiple price lists (MPLs) in the
spirit of Holt and Laury (2002). Each list had ten questions, with each question comparing a
risky option on the left (option A) and a safe option or less risky option on the right (option
B). Option A was a fixed gamble, while option B improved moving down the page. Figure
1.20 shows screenshots of the MPLs.
Figure 1.20.: Screenshots of the multiple price lists used in eliciting risk preferences
Each of the MPLs was designed to mimic the trade-off between vying for dominance and
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playing myopic moves in one of the situations where players frequently vied for dominance
in earlier sessions. The left hand side of each list was a gamble mimicking the equilibrium
payoffs from vying for dominance in a particular situation, while the right hand contained
gambles which improve going from top to bottom, including one gamble that provides the
same payoffs as a myopic action in equilibrium and gambles which more closely match
the observed payoffs from myopic actions The point at which the player switches gives us
information about whether that player is likely to choose a myopic move or vie for dominance
in each situation.
MPL 1 mimics the trade-off faced by Player 4 facing one dominant node in the C = 110
treatment. MPL 2 mimics the trade-off faced by Player 3 in the C = 110 treatment.32 Note
that while MPL 1 is comparing risky options with certain options, MPL 2 is comparing
two risky options. The myopic outcome for Player 3 in the C = 110 treatment has an
uncertain outcome, because Player 4 might vie for dominance afterwards. Appendix C
contains screenshots and a more detailed discussion of list construction.
Previous experiments suggest that risk aversion measured by comparing safe options to
risky options will often be very different from the risk aversion measured by comparing risky
options to risky options.33 This could lead to some differences in observed risk preferences
between MPL 2 and MPL 1.
The data from the MPLs was used in two ways. First, the data was used to categorize players
based on their risk preference type in each list. Based on whether each player’s switch point
was above or below the risk neutral switch point, the players were categorized as risk loving,
risk neutral, or risk averse.34 Players who switched the wrong way, switched multiple times,
32 There was also an MPL 3 which mimics the trade-off faced by Player 3 in the C = 140 treatment, but that
data was not used, because only sessions with C = 110 included question batteries. See C for details.
33This difference can be attributed to the certainty effect found by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or to the
implicit framing of gamble as buying or selling gambles as found by Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) and
Sprenger (2015).
34We were fairly generous with our definition of risk neutral, classifying players with switch points imme-
diately on either side of the risk neutral switch point as risk neutral. In the case of MPL 2 this means
three Switch points were classified as risk neutral, because the risk neutral switch point fell exactly on
one option. In MPLs 1 and 3, two switch points were classified as risk neutral.
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or chose first order stochastically dominated options were categorized as “undefined.” We
use these characterizations to provide a sense of the distribution of risk aversion and the
regularity of player choices, but they are not used in further analysis.
Second, the data was used to estimate a risk aversion parameter from a CRRA model using
the same stochastic model as Holt and Laury (2002).35 Note that because we are only using




1− ηi ηi 6= 1
ln(pi) ηi = 1
In their paper, Holt and Laury (2002) use a power utility function with two parameters which
nests both CARA and CRRA, but we are using situation specific measure of risk aversion
estimated from one list, so only need a one-dimensional measure of risk aversion. Let’s focus
on subjects that are consistent - then the only information in MPL is the switch point. Any
standard measure of risk aversion should be able to fit the data perfectly, with the estimated
risk aversion parameter being some monotone transformation of the switch point.
There is no theoretical reason to believe one utility function is better or to believe that
given the correct specification there should be a linear relationship between the estimated
risk parameter and vying behavior. As such, to show that the results are not dependent on
functional form, we will use the CRRA form in the main text and repeat the analysis with
the CARA form in Appendix Section B.2. Note, there are some empirical reasons we might
prefer CRRA to CARA, which are discussed in that section.
Tables 1.13 and 1.14 include information about the estimated risk aversion parameters and
risk preferences types for players in each MPL.
In general, players look very different in MPL 1 with MPL 2 having substantially different
35defined as Pr(ChooseOptionA) = U(OptionA)
1/µ
U(OptionA)1/µ+U(OptionB)1/µ where µ is a responsiveness parameter.
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Mean η SDev η
MPL 1 0.401 0.429
MPL 2 1.314 1.847
Table 1.13.: Summary Statistics Estimated ηis
Risk Averse Risk Neutral Risk Loving Undef
Panel 1 8 7 3 12
Panel 3 1 12 3 14
Table 1.14.: Estimated Risk Preference Type
risk aversion estimates. This is not surprising given the difference in the type of choices
made. A large number of people have undefined risk types, and those with undefined risk
types generally have multiple switch points. As such, the risk aversion measure may also
contain some information about how much effort and attention players are devoting to the
game.
1.6.2. Other Elicited Values
We also elicited beliefs and personality characteristics for each subject. This allows us to
determine whether deviations from baseline predictions are due primarily to non-equilibrium
beliefs or non standard preferences. the personality characteristics were included as a po-
tential control for preference heterogeneity not captured by risk aversion. There is evidence
that the Big Five personality characteristics are related to entrepreneurial activity, which
can be thought analogous to vying for dominance in our game.36
Belief elicitation took the form of hypothetical questions placing the player in positions 3
or 4, facing specific hypothetical networks and asking the player to estimate the probability
that they would receive a connection from a later node. See AppendixC for screenshots of
belief elicitation questions. The questions were rewarded in a manner that made revealing
36See Zhao and Seibert (2006)
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one’s true predicted average frequency incentive compatible for expected utility maximizing
players (following Schotter and Trevino (2014)). The elicited beliefs were used to construct
an expected number of connections gained from vying. Table 1.15 reports the additional
number of connections expected after vying relative to the myopic move (on average).
Avg Expected Connections Gain from Vying SDev
Player 3 0.337 0.439
Player 4: One Dominant 0.594 0.252
Player 4: Three Dominant 0.276 0.177
Table 1.15.: Beliefs About the Expected Number of Connections Gained of Vying for
Dominance
We also elicited personality characteristics using the Big Five Inventory of John and Srivas-
tava (1999). This test asks people to score their agreement with various statements on a
scale of 1 to 5. These responses are then summed to create metrics of Conscientiousness,
Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Openness, and Extroversion. Table 1.16 summarizes the mean
and the standard deviation for each category among our subjects.
Openness Neuroticism Conscientiousness Agreeableness Extroversion
Mean 37 23.9 31.1 34.2 24.5
Out of 50 40 45 45 40
St Dev 5.2 5.5 6.2 5.5 6.1
Table 1.16.: Summary of Big Five Personality Metrics. Each measure is the sum of scores
from related responses (with scores reversed where appropriate).
1.6.3. Risk Preference and Vying
We now look at whether risk aversion can help to explain vying behavior when controlling
for other elicited characteristics in two situations: Player 3 in the C = 110 treatment and
Player 4 facing one dominant node in the C = 110 treatment. We look at these scenarios
in particular, because these are the only two scenarios in which players can potentially vie
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for dominance in an equilibrium with heterogeneous risk aversion. In all other situations,
players should play myopic moves regardless of risk aversion (See next section).
In Tables 1.17 we regress a dummy for vying for dominance against player characteristics
using data from Player 4 facing one dominant node. In all specifications, the coefficient
for MPL 1 η was negative and significant. In addition, no other coefficients other than the
intercept are significant in any specification.





























































Adj R2 0.058 0.055 0.062 0.153 0.063 0.065
Obs 94 94 94 250 250 250
Table 1.17.: Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node
and Player 3 C = 110. The Player 4 regressions use ηs estimated from MPL 1, while the
Player 3 regressions use η estimated from MPL 2. Errors clustered at the individual
level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
Table 1.17 also shows results of similar regressions, this time predicting the vying behavior
of Player 3. The Player 3 regression looks similar, although here we find that the coefficient
on neuroticism is also significant and negative. It is possible that this is an artifact due to
the large number of variables we are considering, but it is also possible that the neuroticism
measure is capturing some features related to entrepreneurial tendency such as the ability to
easily deal with new situations. Zhao and Seibert (2006) found that neuroticism is negatively
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correlated with entrepreneurial tendency.
In general, risk aversion appears to be influencing vying for dominance behavior. For contrast
in Appendix B.4, we report the results of similar looking at the relationship between risk
aversion as estimated from MPL 1 and the vying behavior of Player 4 facing three dominant
nodes when C = 110. As predicted, there is not a significant impact. In addition, the
coefficients on the risk aversion are substantially smaller. Some readers may be concerned
that our risk aversion measures are picking up confusion or attention due to the large number
of undefined subject. As we show in Appendix SectionB.3, the players with undefined risk
types do not have a significant impact on results.
1.6.4. Equilibrium
So far we have only looked at the individual choice data without considering the equilibrium
effects of introducing heterogeneous risk aversion into the model. In this section we introduce
a model for risk aversion and compare the equilibrium predictions of that model to the data.
The model we use is a very general model of heterogeneous risk aversion:
Ui(hi, GJ) = gi(x(hi, GJ))
where g(x) is a concave function of x. We assume that players know the population distri-
bution of gi but not precise gi of other players. Further, we assume that the population is
sufficiently large that seeing an action does not influence a players beliefs about conditional
distribution of gi in the remaining players. We are ruling out are risk seeking behavior and
behavior inconsistent with expected utility maximization.
While the model is very general, it has fairly specific predictions for behavior in this game
using backwards induction. Under this model, players can only vie in a subset of situations.
In all other situations they play myopic moves.
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Risk Aversion Myopic Prediction 110: When C = 110, Player 5 will play a myopic
move, and Player 4 will play a myopic move when facing three dominant nodes. Player 3
can vie, as can Player 4 when facing one dominant node.
Risk Aversion Myopic Prediction 140: When C = 140, Player 5 will play a myopic
move, and Player 4 will play a myopic move. Player 3 can vie.
Proof in Appendix Section A.3. Table 1.18 summarizes in which situations vying may be
possible.
Cost 3 4 (Three Dominant) 4 (One Dominant) 5
110 Yes (β) No Yes (α) No
140 Yes (κ) No No No
Table 1.18.: Potential for Vying in the General Model with Risk Aversion
1.6.4.1. Aggregate Evidence for the Risk Aversion Model
We now examine how well these aggregate predictions match the data. In Table 1.19 we
show the vying probability in each situation, ordered from most observed vying to least.
The three highest proportions of vying for dominance behavior occur in the three situations
where the risk averse model predicts vying might occur.
Vie Prob RA Prediction RN Prediction
C=110, Node 3 0.576 > 0 0
C=140, Node 3 0.342 > 0 1
C=110, Node 4: 1 Dominant 0.151 > 0 1
C=110, Node 4: 3 Dominant 0.093 0 0
C=110, Node 5 0.011 0 0
C=140, Node 4: 1 Dominant 0.009 0 0
C=140, Node 4: 3 Dominant 0.009 0 0
C=140, Node 5 0.003 0 0
Table 1.19.: Vying Proportions: Data and predictions from the Risk Averse Model
We refer to Player 4’s probability of vying for dominance facing one dominant node when
C = 110 as α ∈ [0, 1], Player 3’s probability of vying for dominance when C = 110 as
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β ∈ [0, 1]), and Player 3’s probability of vying for dominance when C = 140 as κ ∈ [0, 1].
The risk neutral version of the model corresponds to α = 1, β = 0, and κ = 1.
Not all possible combinations of α, β, and κ can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria
of given some population of utility functions. For example if α = 1, then we must have
β = 0, because then the myopic move for Player 3 in the C = 110 treatment would second
order stochastically dominate vying.
From the data, we estimate very different values: α˜ = 0.151, β˜ = 0.576, and κ˜ = 0.342.
While it is in general difficult to know exactly which combinations can be supported in
equilibrium by some population of utility functions, we do find that these moments can be
supported by a population of Modified CRRA utility functions. See Appendix A.4 for details
and construction.
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The predictions of the risk averse model are able to fit all the major moments of the data
to a first approximation. Risk aversion helps explain the data both on an individual choice
level and in the aggregate data through equilibrium predictions. We do consider alternative
behavioral models in Appendix B.5, but we do not find any of them to be promising as
alternative explanations of the data.
1.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a new network formation model that uses dynamics and forward
looking strategic agents to explore novel behaviors such as vying for dominance. Here vying
for dominance refers to a behavior whereby players make many connections in the present,
even when doing so is myopically detrimental, in order to potentially gain connections from
nodes joining in the future. The model predicts that the dominant players in the market
37Note that the shape of the utility function does matter a great deal. For example, if we only allowed
unmodified CRRA utility functions in the population, we would only be able to fit data where β > α > κ.
As a consequence, we would never be able to fit our data using our estimated risk parameters, regardless
of what those parameters were. This would not be useful to us, because in our data β > κ > α.
50
Vying for Dominance: An Experiment in Dynamic Network Formation
are not dominant only because of a difference in fundamentals or equilibrium selection; the
timing of a node’s entry into the network is a critical factor.
We previewed some general theoretical results from the model, finding parameter regions
where the star network and complete network are efficient and regions where these networks
form with certainty. We also found parameter regions where such outcomes cannot be
guaranteed. In general, finding solutions for the game can be difficult, but we find two ways
of simplifying the game for greater tractability: restricting player moves and focusing on
small networks.
In the Dominant Node Restricted Game, players are required to connect to at least one
dominant node as they enter the network. Under this restricted model, we predict that
players should vie for dominance periodically with the time intervals between vying players
increasing exponentially over time. See Chapter 2 for more details regarding the restricted
game.
In the latter part of the chapter we focus on the unrestricted game with five nodes. We solve
the game and use that solution to make predictions about player behavior in an experimental
test of the model. In equilibrium, Player 4 should vie for dominance in the low cost treatment
and take a myopic action in the high cost treatment. Player 3, on the other hand, should take
a myopic action in the low cost treatment and vie for dominance in the high cost treatment.
In the experiment, the predictions of subgame perfect equilibrium generally fit best for later
moves. Player 5 chose myopic moves most of the time, as predicted. The comparative statics
held for Player 4, but vying did not occur in large amounts even when predicted to do so.
The predictions for Player 3 were very far off in both the comparative and absolute sense.
In order to explain the observed behavioral deviations from theory, we examined the possi-
bility that players may have been risk averse. We elicited player risk preferences (as well as
player beliefs and personality characteristics). Risk preferences were found to have a signif-
icant relationship with vying behavior while other characteristics did not, in general, have
such a relationship in general. We also examined the equilibrium predictions of a general
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model of risk averse expected utility maximization. This flexible risk aversion model predicts
that vying for dominance should occur in only three situations. In the data, players vied for
dominance in those three predicted situations more than in any others.
Other explanations for the behavioral deviations were considered. QRE and Level-K models
were discussed qualitatively and found to miss certain key features of the data. Learning
appears to have very little impact on outcomes with no discernible time trends in behavior.
The results suggest that success and dominance in many systems can result from the com-
bination of entry timing and decision making characteristics. Entry timing can provide a
player an opportunity. Risk aversion determines whether the player takes it.
This conclusion suggests a natural next step: explore the role of entry timing and risk
aversion in a context of immediate economic interest. In both social networks within the
firm and production networks between firms we should see that the combination of good
timing and low risk aversion is essential to achieving network dominance.
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2. The Theory of Vying for Dominance
in Dynamic Network Formation
2.1. Introduction
In Chapter 1, we discussed how entry timing and node centrality can be related due to
complex strategic interactions that arise naturally in the network formation game. In that
chapter, we proposed a new dynamic model of network formation which predicts that in-
dividuals joining the network at certain key times will have the opportunity to attempt to
become central by using a move type we called “vying for dominance.” In this chapter, we
will explore the network formation model in more depth, offering proofs and corollaries for
the propositions in the first chapter and exploring the model’s placement in the space of
network formation models.
This Chapter begins with an Section 2.3, showing how vying for dominance can arise in the
simplest case. In Section 2.4 we establish network efficiency and solutions result, giving proofs
and corollaries for the basic results from Chapter 1. In general when the cost of connections
is high, the minimally connected network is efficient and tends to form. Conversely when the
cost of connections is low, the complete network is efficient and tends to form. However, the
thresholds do not line up well, so inefficient over-connection and inefficient under-connection
are both possible.
The basic model becomes quickly intractable as the number of nodes increases. However,
53
2.1 Introduction
surprisingly, we find that a simple and plausible restriction on the strategies simplifies the
problem dramatically, and allows us to characterize the SPE of the game for any arbitrary
finite number of nodes. Precisely, we find that if players are required to connect to at
least one dominant node as they join the network, then in equilibrium all players will either
connect to a subset of the dominant nodes (analogous to the myopic move) or all nodes
(vying for dominance). We discuss this restricted game in Part 2.6.
If we also put additional structure on the tie-break rule in the restricted game, we can char-
acterize the dynamic sequence with which the two strategies are chosen. If we assume that
players resolve indifferences in favor of connecting to newer node, the solution is character-
ized by individuals vying for dominance separated by periods of myopic play. Furthermore,
the length of the periods of myopic behavior increase exponentially as the game goes on.
For a vying move to be profitable, it must result in enough future connections to pay for
the additional immediate costs of making many links. As the network grows, vying becomes
more expensive, so more myopic actions are needed to support each vie for dominance.
Appendix Section D examines a number of modifications and extensions to the model. First
we address what happens to the results in the base game when we allow players to make
zero connections. This extension creates additional parameter regions of interest in which the
empty network forms and is efficient. Because this formulation allows for multiple connected
components, we also provide a result on how large various components of the network can
be. Next we discuss allowing for heterogeneity in connection benefits, and allowing players
to make additional connections after they first connect to the network. In general the main
results still hold, although there are some minor caveats and several propositions must be
rewritten to work in the new environments. Appendix Section briefly E considers how
extensions and generalizations impact the major results from the restricted game.
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2.2. Lit Review
There has been a great deal of work on network formation in the past, as was discussed
to some extent in Chapter 1, but existing models were not well suited to exploring some
of the dynamically strategic elements of the process. These models either lacked dynamics
entirely, used agents that were not fully forward looking, or used special setups in which the
set of possible solutions depends only on static features of the networks such as stability or
efficiency. In this review we again discuss existing models of network formation, but here we
place more emphasis on modeling differences and on some of the models which stray further
from the economic mainstream.
Early research on network formation did not include optimizing agents. Two papers in the
field are Yule (1925), mentioned previously with their preferential attachment, and Erdös
and Rényi (1960), with their small world networks. Both of these papers are dynamic
but connections occur based on mechanical processes with no utility or rationality laying a
role. As mentioned in the introduction, Yule (1925) introduced the concept of preferential
attachment whereby nodes with many current connections tend to gain more connections in
the future. This concept is an important factor contributing to vying for dominance.
While preferential was first observed in taxonomic networks by Yule (1925), it has since been
found to be a common feature of networks arising in transaction networks,1 social networks,2
online link networks,3 scientific collaboration networks,4 and citation networks.5 An extreme
form of preferential attachment whereby myopic players connect only to the most connected
nodes in the network does play a role in my model, but the entry mechanism also allows
players to gain connections on their own. If preferential attachment was the only force at
play, we would expect the earliest nodes to have the most connections rather than one that
entered near the middle.
1Kondor et al. (2014)
2House et al. (2015)
3Eiron and McCurley (2003) and Albert-László et al. (2000) although the evidence is somewhat indirect
4Newman (2004)
5Wang et al. (2008)
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, economic models of network formation have traditionally been
stability based with few dynamic features. For example Jackson andWolinsky (1996) propose
a model of cooperative network formation6 in which a network is stable if and only if every
player who is part of a connection wants to keep that connection and no two players who
are not connected want to connect. Note that this stability concept is cooperative because
players need to agree to make connections.
Recall that the payoff function we use is effectively the same as the one presented by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). This type of geometrically payoff function is fairly standard and is
used in both Watts (2001) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).7 This type of network payoff
is most relevant for systems in which some beneficial opportunity or information lands at a
random node and then disseminates throughout the network with value decaying over time.
It can also be applied as a useful approximation in any system where more central nodes
gain more benefits, as this measure of centrality is highly correlated with other measures of
centrality, especially in networks with low diameter.8
Bala and Goyal (2000) developed a model of non-cooperative network formation, leading to
another large branch in the literature.9. In non-cooperative models of network formation,
a network is stable if and only if every person who is sponsoring a connection wants to
maintain that connection and no player wants to sponsor a new connection. This model is
non-cooperative in the sense that players can make connections unilaterally. It should be
noted that Bala and Goyal (2000) did discuss a dynamic version of their model, but they
did not allow for forward looking strategic agents.
A great deal of work has been done introducing the concept of farsighted stability into the
domain of cooperative network formation in work by Page et al. (2003), Dutta et al. (2005),
and Herings et al. (2009). This work does, to some extent introduce a form of implied
6For an in depth look at this type of network see the book by Jackson (2008)
7Their payoff function is has Y = 0 and B = δ, but otherwise is identical.
8For an examination of correlation in measures of centrality in real world networks, see Valente et al.
(2008). The diameter of a network is the largest minimum distance between two nodes. We will discuss
the importance of low diameter networks in more detail in Part 2.6
9Note that they did consider dynamics in their original paper, although the solution concept was inherently
non-dynamic. For a more in depth look at this type of network see the book Goyal (2007)
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dynamics and simple foresight into the model, but the models do not have a formal dynamic
structure, and the agents are not forward looking in the subgame perfect sense.
Many recent models include dynamics in a more direct and formal manner10. However the
agents in these models are not forward looking. In Watts (2001), for example, players are
assumed to update their connections myopically without regard to future consequences. In
Kim and Jo (2009) players only receive payment as they are joining the network, so future
periods are irrelevant to the current mover.
There is one set of related models which includes both non-trivial dynamics and froward
looking strategic agents. 11 However, these models usually employ special setups in which
the feasibility of achieving a particular network depends only on static features of that
network. For example Song and van der Schaar (2015) also propose a model with a repeated
game-like structure, so all networks which produce more than min-max payoffs for all players
are feasible solutions. In Mutuswami and Winter (2002) and Currarini and Morelli (2000)
all efficient networks can be formed using centralized mechanisms.
There are are a few dynamic network formation models in which solutions do not depend
on static features of the networks, although additional simplifying assumptions are generally
used in these cases. In the model of Aumann and Myerson (1988), the payoff function
used guarantees that only complete connected components can form. In other words, all
nodes in a “group” must be connected to all other nodes in that group. Only the number
of nodes in a particular group matters, because only one structure is possible for a given
group size. This allows the network formation model to be reduced to a more standard
model of dynamic coalition formation. The model of Chowdhury (2008) is one of the most
similar to our own. Both models include sequential link formation and forward-looking
strategic agents. In addition, there is the possibility in Chowdhury (2008) for early movers
to make myopically sub-optimal moves in hopes of gaining future connections, which can be
thought of as loosely similar to the vying for dominance behavior of our model. However,
10Such as Watts (2001); Kim and Jo (2009); and Vazquez (2003)
11See Mutuswami and Winter (2002); Currarini and Morelli (2000); and Song and van der Schaar (2015)
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Chowdhury (2008) assumes that each node can only sponsor one connection, and thus rules
out by assumption the possibility of competing for centrality by making multiple connections.
The general features of our model should be familiar, borrowing elements from existing
models and puts them in a dynamic framework. We employ a sequential mechanism in
which players can form links unilaterally as in Bala and Goyal (2000) but which employs a
utility function based on the payoffs in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The growing set of
agents and history dependence are similar Yule (1925).
The combination of strategic agents and history dependence is an important one, because
it allows for a much greater depth and range of complex behaviors than either feature can
generate by itself. Players makes complex decisions which influence the incentives of later
players such as vying for dominance. Small changes near the beginning of the game can have
dramatic impacts on later play. Whereas, in the models previously mentioned small changes
in play tend to influence which players end up in which positions in the finished network (such
as which node will be the center of a star network, in this model early play can dramatically
influence the entire network structure. This leads to a number of mathematically interesting
results and improves the realism of the model. The addition of growing set of agents to the
model is important, because the set of agents is not stable in many interesting networks.12
New firms and consumers are always joining the market. Furthermore, creating new ties or
destroying old ones can be costly. Manufacturers do not immediately change their suppliers
in response to small shifts in demand. Our model captures these interesting dynamic features
which do not fit well with previous models.
2.3. An Example
We present an example with four nodes in order to help build intuition and demonstrate how
beliefs about the behavior of future players influence the behavior of earlier players. Nodes
12For an example seeMislove et al. (2013)
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1 and 2 have no decisions to make, so we shall ignore them. Assume C > B(1− δ). We solve
the SPE through backwards as normal.
Player 4 will always connect to exactly one of the most central nodes. Note that making
one connection to one of the most central nodes is always the best one connection move that
the last player can make. This comes from the fact that the centrality of the last player
connecting to one node is delta times the centrality of the node connected to plus one.
Connecting to one of the most central nodes always results in Player 4 being a distance of
two from the other nodes. Each additional connection would increase his cost by C with a
benefit of at most B(1− δ), the benefit of decreasing the distance to a single node from two
to one. Connecting to any number nodes that are not most central is strictly worse than
connecting to one of the most central nodes.
It seems then, that there is something important about the set of most connected nodes.
Definition. Dominant Nodes: The set of dominant nodes d(Gt) is defined by





In other words d(Gt) is the set most central nodes in Gt.d is always non-empty since the
network always contains a finite number of nodes with real valued centrality. d may or may
not be single valued.
We now consider the move of Player 3. Player 3 has three options for h3, h13 = {1},h23 =
{2},h33 = {1, 2}. Each one leads to a different G3 as illustrated in Figure 2.1
After h13, the only possible result would be G14, since there is only one element of d(G3) and
Player 4 will connect to exactly one element of d(G3) (see Figure 2.2).
We will ignore h23 since it is symmetric to h13. Depending on Player 4’s tie-breaking rule,
move h33 could eventually lead to G34 , G44, or G54 (see Figure 2.3). This means that Player
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Figure 2.1.: Immediate outcomes of the moves of Player 3
Figure 2.2.: Final result of player 3 choosing move h13.
3’s choice depends on his beliefs about Player 4’s tie-breaking rule.
If Player 3 believes that choosing h33 will lead to G34 or G44, Player 3 will not choose that
move, because the move costs C more than the other moves and results in being only one
jump closer to one other node at the end of the game. This change in distance confers a
benefit of at most B(1− δ) which is less than C.
If instead Player 3 believes that h33 will lead to G53, the decision is slightly more complicated.
h33 costs C more than the other two choices, but now the maximum benefit of 2B(1−δ) could
be enough to compensate that loss. This type of forward looking strategic consideration is
an important feature of the general game as well. If move h33 leads to outcome G53 with a
probability of P (G53), then Player 3 will choose h33 as long as B(1− δ)(1 + P (G53)) > C.
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Figure 2.3.: Possible final outcomes if player 3 chooses move h33.
In this example, only those who have many connections already can potentially receive a
connection from Player 4.13 The benefits of connecting to dominant nodes generate a form
of preferential attachment, which has important strategic ramifications.
Player 3 makes more connections than is myopically beneficial in order to gain the possi-
bility of future connections. This behavior is the “vying for dominance” mentioned in the
introduction.
This type of behavior will be very important throughout the discussion of the game. To some
extent, the existence of vying for dominance behavior can be thought of as endogenizing the
results of Akerlof and Holden (2016) in which players players bid early on for a resource
which allows them to become the center of a network that is formed later, but in this
case the investment itself is part of the network formation process. Players can invest in
connections early on in order to receive more connections later.
The early mover advantage also arises naturally in this example although in a very different
way. Consider what happens when Player 4 resolves indifferences in a uniform random
manner and 1B(1 − δ) < C < 43B(1 − δ). In this parameter range, Player 3 will make the
extra connection in order to get the one third chance at a future connection from Player 4.
13Because only the most connected nodes can receive a connection from Player 4, the effect is more exag-
gerated than what is seen in traditional preferential attachment models Yule (1925)
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The expected payoffs for each player are then
Player 1: u1 = 73B +
2
3δB
Player 2: u2 = 73B +
2
3δB − C
Player 3: u3 = 73 +
2
3δB − 2C+
Player 4: u4 = B + 2δB − C
The payoffs are ranked as follows u1 > u2 > u3 > u4. While early mover advantage is not
guaranteed in the game, it does tend to arise quite frequently. Earlier nodes have more
opportunities to receive direct connections from future players, and that translates into
higher payoffs.
2.4. Results
We now provide some results about which networks are efficient and which networks can form
in different parameter regions. These results are intuitive and are generally quite robust to
small changes in the assumptions of the model.14 These results also provide a basis for some
of the more novel results later in the chapter.
2.4.1. Efficiency Results
One important question is how efficient are the networks formed by this process? Results
on efficiency can provide important information for understanding the desirability of the
solutions explored in other sections. When C
B
> (1− δ) most of the outcomes are not Pareto
ranked, but we can find a most efficient network in the following sense
Definition: We say an outcome network GJ is efficient if it generates the highest possible
sum of utilities of all feasible outcome networks for given parameters.
Proposition 1:
14See Part II and the Appendix Section D for examples of ways that the results can be generalized
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• If C
B
< 2(1− δ), then the efficient network is the complete network.
• If C
B
> 2(1− δ), then the efficient network is the star network (on Node 1 or Node 2)
• If C
B
= 2(1− δ), then all feasible networks which contain stars are efficient
Proof of Proposition 1: To begin, note that all networks have at least J − 1 connections,
because all players after the first must make at least one connect. Next, note that the most
efficient network with any fixed number of connections N ≥ J − 1 must contain a star (if
the network has fewer than J − 1 connections it cannot contain a star). A network with N
connections containing a star has 2N minimum paths of length one, and all other minimum
paths are of length two. It is impossible to have more minimum paths of length one than
2N minimum paths of length one, so no configuration can produce higher centrality benefits.
All networks with N connections produce a total connection cost of C ∗N
Given that the efficient network must contain a star, every additional increases the total
centrality benefit of the network by 2B(1−δ), because each connection moves two nodes from
a distance of two to a distance of one. The social cost of connections is C, so when 2B(1−δ) <
C, the feasible network containing a star with the minimum number of connections is socially
optimal. The two networks that fit that criterion are the star network centered on Node
1 and the star network centered on Node 2. Similarly, when 2B(1 − δ) > C, the feasible
network containing a star with the maximum number of connections is socially optimal. The
network which fits this criterion is the complete network.
Note that, while the sequential nature of the game does impose limits on the set of feasible
networks, it does not impose strong limits on the structure of the set work in the following
sense: given any connected network of un-indexed nodes, we can find an indexing under which
the network can feasibly be formed. To find such an indexing, simply pick an arbitrary node
as Node 1 and then pick nodes to index in order with the only requirement being that the
node you pick must be directly connected to at least one already indexed node. Once all the




If each player takes a strategy whereby they connect to all older nodes that the node corre-
sponding to their index is connected to in the indexed version of the original network, they
will reproduce that network perfectly. Due to our indexing method, no player will ever be
required to make an empty and hence illegal move.
This result is quite similar to the result on efficiency from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) with
a few key differences. First, the empty network is never efficient, because it is never feasible
in this game. The second key difference comes from the fact that the cost of each connection
is only paid once by the player which makes it. In the cooperative game, the connection
is costly to both parties. As such connections must be twice as costly in our game before
they become socially inefficient. The efficiency threshold in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is
C/B = 1− δ.
2.4.2. Solutions
Having established efficiency, we now examine the types of networks that can form in different
parameter regions.
Proposition 2: If C
B
< (1− δ) then the complete network is the unique network which can
form in SPEs of the game.
Proof of Proposition 2: We work by backwards induction.
Player J will always connect to every other player. To see this note that if J is not connected
to every player, adding a new connection will increase his utility by at least B(1−δ)−C > 0.
If all future players will connect to every available player, so will player J − k. Suppose not,
then at the end of the game he will be a distance one from all nodes he connects to (and all
nodes that come after him) and a distance of at least two from from the nodes he doesn’t
connect to. This means that player J − k can always increase his utility by connecting to
an addition node if more connections are possible, since the gain, B(1 − δ), is greater than
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the cost, C. Therefore player J − k will connect to all available nodes when he joins the
network.
By induction, all players will connect to all available nodes when they join the network. This
leads to the formation of a complete network.
This proposition is similar to a result from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In many network
formation models, the complete network tends to form when the cost of connections is low.
Note on Proposition 2: This proposition is tight in a strong sense. If C
B
> (1− δ), then
the complete network is no longer a possible outcome of any SPE at all. To see this consider
the move of Player J . This player cannot connect to all other nodes in any SPE of the game.
If he was connected to all other nodes but one, then the additional benefit from connecting
to the last node would be B(1− δ). This marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost of
C. Since Player J must choose a myopically optimal move in any SPE, he cannot choose to
connect to all nodes.
Proposition 3: If C
B
> (J − 1) − 1−δJ−31−δ , then the star networks centered on Node 1 and
Node 2 are the only networks which can be formed in SPEs of the game.
Proof of Proposition 3: The greatest benefit that a player can receive for making a one
additional connection is the benefit Player 3 gets when, if Player 3 makes one connection,
all future players connect in a chain moving away from Player 3, but when Player 3 makes
two connections, all future Players connect directly to Player 3. A chain leading away from
Node i is the worst possible network for Node i and a star centered on Node i is tied for the
best. If Player 3’s choice in this case selects between these two outcomes, Player 3’s gain
from making the extra connection is the difference B((J − 1)−∑J−1i=1 δi−1)
Simplifying and rearranging we get B
(
(J − 1) − 1−δJ−31−δ
)
. If this is the maximum possible
benefit that any player can get from making an additional connection under any strategy
profile. We now employ backwards induction to arrive at the result.
Player J will connect to an i ∈ d(GJ−1). To see this, note that once Player J has made
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one connection, the benefit of each additional connection is always going to be less than the
maximum possible benefit from a connection, which is less than C. The best node to make
a single connection to in this case is a dominant node by the definition of dominant nodes
and assumes utility function.
Now consider Player J − 1. This player will also prefer every outcome where he make only
one connection to every outcome where he must make multiple connections. If Player J−1 is
going to make one connection, it is optimal for him to connect to a dominant node, knowing
that Player J will then connect to that same dominant node. If a player connects to one
dominant node, that node will be the only dominant node in the next period.
Now consider the move of Player J − k ≥ 3. By similar logic, Player J − k will always
connect only to one node. Knowing that all future players will each connect to a dominant
node, Player J − k will also connect to a single dominant node.
Player 3 will connect to either Node 2 or Node 1 since both are dominant nodes in G2.
Players 1 and 2 do not have any choices. Therefore all nodes will connect either to Node 1
or Node 2.
This proposition is a major deviation from previous literature. The ability of earlier moves
to effect the incentives of later players means that the potential benefits of additional con-
nections are much higher than in a one shot model.
Notes on Proposition 3: First, note that as δ approaches one, the condition for the
proposition approaches C
B
> 1. Conversely, as δ approaches zero, the condition approaches
C
B
> J − 2. Also, note that the right hand side of the condition, is increasing in J , so the
condition is more restrictive in large networks. Intuitively, this means that it is easier to
generate non-star networks when the number of players is large and when the geometric
discount factor is large.
Corollary 3.1: Proposition 3 is tight as long as δ is small in the following sense: If C
B
< J−2
then if δ is sufficiently small there exists a SPE of the game which does not always generate
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a star network.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Assume C
B
≥ 1, because if the alternative is true and δ is suf-
ficiently small, then the result is handled by Proposition 2. We being with the following
conjecture
Lemma 3.1.1 - there exists a Player j, who satisfies the following conditions:
(1) (J − 1)B − (j − 1)C ≥ B − C
and
(2) (J − 2)B − (j − 1)C ≤ B − C
If C
B
< J − 2 by the assumption that C
B
> 1 we know ∃jˆ ∈ [3, J) satisfying (1).









from the fact that Player j + 1 does not. Now assume that (2) does not hold
















which contradicts j < J . As such, (2) must hold for j.
Consider the move of Player j from Lemma 3.1.1 in the equilibrium in which players break
ties in favor of connecting to newer nodes. If Player j connects to all existing players, he
will receive connections from all future nodes. We can show by backwards induction that no
future player will strictly prefer to make multiple connections if Player j does has connected
to all existing nodes if δ is sufficiently small.
Player J will connect to the newest dominant node under this tie breaking scheme. Given
that all players after Player J − k will connect to the newest dominant node, Player J − k
will either connect to the newest dominant node or become the newest dominant node. All
other moves are strictly worse as long as δ is small, because the benefit of any move which
does not generate future free connections converges to N(B −C) as δ goes to zero where N
is the number of connections made. Given C > B, N(B − C) is decreasing in N
67
2.4 Results
The minimum number of connections required to become a dominant node is non-decreasing
as the game progresses when δ is small. A player must connect to at least as many nodes as
the current dominant node is connected to in order to become dominant if δ is near zero.
Because Player J − k is moving after Player j already connected to all nodes, the best
possible gain (and the lowest possible costs) that a Player J − k > j can get from becoming
a dominant node is gained by Player J − k = j + 1 connecting to all nodes that Player
j connected to.By doing this, Player j + 1 gets (J − 2)B − (j − 1)C + δB. By making
a single connection to Player j, a Player J − k > j can get B − C + g(δ,GJ−k)B where
g(δ,GJ−k)B is some function representing gains from indirect connections to other nodes.
Notably g(δ,GJ−k) ≥ δ. As such, thanks to condition (2), Player J − k > j will always
connect to a single dominant node rather than becoming a dominant node
It is better for Player j to connect to all nodes and gain direct connection from all future
players instead of connecting to a single dominant node that all future players will connect
to if (J − 1)B− (j− 1)C > B+ (J − 2)δB−C. This condition always holds if (1) holds and
δ is sufficiently small. Therefore if δ is sufficiently small, then the SPE of the game in which
players break ties in favor of connecting to the newest node can not form a star network
with certainty. Otherwise Player j would deviate.
Corollary 3.2: If δ is sufficiently small and C
B
> J − i + 1 then all players after Player i
will connect to the same dominant node.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: Consider the move of Player i+ 1. The maximum future benefit
that Player i+1 can gain from making an extra connection is less than the benefit of moving
all future nodes from an being an infinite distance away to being directly connected and all
current nodes from an infinite distance away to a distance of two away, (J−i)B+(i−1)δB.15
The total benefit from an extra connection is then less than B(J−i+1+g(δ,Gi)+(i−1)δB).
This means that if C
B
> J − i + 1 and δ is sufficiently small, then it will never be beneficial
for Player i+ 1 to make multiple connections.
15Player i will never be directly connected to any nodes he is not already directly connected to.
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Similar logic applies to all players after Player i + 1 as well, who all have strictly lower
possible future benefits. Therefore, no player after Player i will make multiple connections.
Given that no players after i will make multiple connections, we can show by backwards
induction that it is the optimal for all players after Player i to connect to the same dominant
node. Player J will connect to a single dominant node since that is myopically optimal. If all
future players will make a single connection to a dominant node regardless of Player J − k’s
move, and Player J−k cannot profitably make more than one connection, then it is optimal
for him to connect to a single dominant node regardless of the current network state.
If Player J − k connects to a dominant node, it will become the only dominant node. As
such all future players will connect to it, which provides as much benefit as Player J − k can
receive from future nodes without receiving direct connections from those players. Receiving
direct connections is not possible, given that all future players will connect to a dominant
node, and it is impossible for any Player after Player 2 to become dominant by making one
connection.
This logic can apply to any J − k > i, so after Player i all players connect to a single
dominant node.16
2.5. Summary of Results
The results of the previous sections are summarized in Figure 2.4.
There are parameter regions where the star network is formed as the unique SPE outcome
and regions where the complete network is formed as the unique SPE outcome as well as
regions where both networks are efficient. Furthermore, there is an intermediate region where
we cannot guarantee either the star or the complete network. The size of this unknown region
is increasing in the number of players, meaning that larger networks will more often have
non-degenerate structures, because in larger networks early moves can have larger potential
16If there are multiple dominant nodes before this type of play begins, the first single connection player will
select which one becomes the unique dominant nodes based on their tie-breaking rule.
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Figure 2.4.: Visualization of parameter regions of interest. Note that the (J − 2− f(J, δ))
line can be either to the left or the right of the 2(1− δ) line depending on
parameters.f(J, δ) = δ−δJ−31−δ .
future benefits. Note that the complete network cannot form in the yellow region, the
complete network cannot form. The star network may form in the yellow region, but it is
not guaranteed to be a solution, and as discussed in Corollary 3.1, it is never the unique
SPE outcome as long as δ is small.
Because the threshold determining efficiency and solutions do not align, it is possible that
both inefficiently under-connected and inefficiently over-connected networks can arise in
subgame perfect equilibria.Inefficient under-connection arises when (1− δ) < C
B
< 2(1− δ),
and inefficient over-connection can arise when (J − 1) − 1−δJ−31−δ > CB > 2(1 − δ). This
feature means that it is imperative that anyone regulating this type of system pay very close
attention to the fundamentals of the system in order to know what type of adjustments are
appropriate.
We can briefly contrast these results to similar ones found in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
and Watts (2001) in order to establish which features drive several features of these results.
The fact that we are requiring non-empty connections eliminates the potential for an empty
network. As such parameter regions where the empty network might be the unique solution
or the efficient network in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) are rolled into regions corresponding
to the star network.
The fact that we are using non-cooperative network formation shifts the efficiency threshold
from C
B
= 1− δ to C
B
= 2(1− δ). Since the region where the complete network is guaranteed
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does not shift, this change allows for the possibility of inefficient under-connection.
While there is an intermediate parameter region in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) where non-
degenerate networks can form, our model generates very different types of networks and
behavior. The stable networks in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) are always locally efficient in
the sense that changing them by adding or removing one connection will decrease welfare.
Inefficiency in their model is driven by the difference between global and local optimum.
In our model, on the other hand, local optimality is not guaranteed. Inefficiency is instead
driven by the existence of positive and negative externalities. Nodes create positive exter-
nalities whenever they connect to another node. Vying for dominance, however, can produce
negative externalities by taking future connections away from players who would otherwise
be receive them.
The region in which non-degenerate networks can form very large. It is possible to have
networks in this our model wherein players make multiple connections for much higher values
of C/B especially when δ is small. While Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) do not establish a
bound above which only empty networks can form, this bound would need to be less than
C/B = 1+δ(J−2), because B+δB(J−2) is the largest possible benefit a player can receive
from maintaining a connection in their model. Contrast that with our model in which players
can theoretically gain upwards of (J − 2)B(1− δ) from a single connection.
2.5.1. Restoring Efficiency with a Centralized Tax/Subsidy Mechanism
While the game can generate inefficiency in its natural operation, achieving efficiency through
a centralized mechanism is actually fairly trivial. If C
B
< 2(1− δ) then the planner can add
a subsidy of C − B(1 − δ) +  per connection. The effective cost of connections is reduced
below B(1− δ) so the complete network forms. Since a total of J(J − 1)/2 connections will
be made in SPE for this effective cost level, the subsidy can be offset by a total lump sum
tax of (C−B(1−δ))J(J−1)2 divided in some way between participants. If the average number
of connections made without the subsidy is K the total welfare gain from such a scheme will
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always be at least (2B(1− δ)− C)(J(J−1)2 −K)
If C
B
> 2(1 − δ), the planner should instead impose a tax of (J − 1)B − C per connection.
The effective cost of connections would then be increased to (J − 1)B which is high enough
that only the star network will form. A total of J − 1 connections will be made, leading to a
total revenue of ((J − 1)B −C)(J − 1). If the average number of connections made without
the tax is K then the efficiency gain from the tax is at least to (C−2B(1− δ))(K− (J−1)).
2.5.2. Tractability
The question naturally arises of what happens in the non-degenerate region (yellow) region.
This question is, in general, very difficult to answer. It is important to note that the equi-
libria in the yellow region are not, in general, unique and tie-breaking rules play a role in
determining the outcome.
While we can solve the game for small networks (up to around 6 nodes in size), solving larger
games is very difficult. Brute force backwards induction in a J node network would require
looking at the payoffs associated with (J − 1)! 2J2−J possible networks. It may be possible
that some simplifications may be made which reduce the computational complexity, but in
general, the range and sophistication of strategic behaviors grows rapidly in complexity with
the size of the network. Once networks get larger than five nodes, more we start to see players
using types of behaviors that are neither taking a myopic action nor vying for dominance.
A six node example is provided in the next section to show the types of strategic complexity
that can arise in larger networks. We can take a number of approaches to exploring the
game in the unknown region, all of which will be explored at various points in the chapter.
In Part 2.6 we consider a more tractable modified version of the game. In the restricted
game, players are required to connect to at least one dominant node as part of their move.
Surprisingly, this restriction is enough to get us tractability and allow us to pin down precisely
the critical times at which nodes should vie and become dominant. We also provide another
tractable version of the game in which players join and leave the network continually in the
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Appendix. This type of Continual Game allows us to employ some of the techniques used
to study repeated games.
2.5.3. Strategic Behaviors Example
This example demonstrates two counter-intuitive properties which can make finding solutions
difficult in larger networks. The first property is that nodes do not always move myopically
or vie for dominance. While in the small example discussed before, these are always the best
options, in larger networks, more complex behaviors can arise. The second property is that
it is not always possible to support a star network by using a tie-breaking rule which favors
older nodes. Again. in the previous example, if players break ties in favor of earlier nodes,
only the star network can form, but this is not always the case.
Example: Consider what happens in the case where J = 6, B = 1, δ = 0.05, C = 1.1, and
all players break ties in favor of connecting to the set of nodes with the greatest total age.
Player 6 will connect to the oldest dominant node, since the gain from a second connection
can never compensate for the cost, and he breaks ties in favor of older nodes.
Player 5 will connect to all existing nodes if doing so will make him the only dominant node.
Otherwise, he will connect to a single dominant node as well, because if he is not the only
dominant node, he will not receive a connection from Player 6. If Player 5 cannot receive
a future connection, a myopic move is his best choice. Player 5 can only become the sole
dominant node if he is facing a chain or a box.
Player 4 knows this, so he will create the chain if available, since doing so requires only one
connection and gets him a future connection from Player 5. Creating the box also provides a
future connection but requires Player 4 to purchase one more connection, which is not worth
the cost. No other moves provide a future connection for him. By the tie-breaking method,
Player 4 will always connect to the oldest node of any three node chain he faces to create
the longer chain (which will always be Node 1 or Node 2).
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If he can not forming a chain (since he is facing a complete network), Player 4 will connect
to the oldest dominant node, which can never be Node 3.
Player 3, then will just connect to one node, since doing so will have minimal cost and
provide one future connection from Player 5. Connecting to two nodes will provide no future
connections. As such, by tie-breaking rule, Player 3 will connect to Node 1, Player 4 will
connect to Node 2, Player 5 will connect to all existing nodes, and Player 6 will connect to
Node 5 (see 2.5).
Figure 2.5.: Graph generated by stability seeking tie-breaking rule when
B = 1, δ = 0.05, C = 1.1.
Note that Player 4 in this case is not choosing a myopic move or vying for dominance. In
addition, the star network does not form even though players are using a tie-breaking rule
which favors older nodes. In Part 2.6 we examine a slightly modified version of the game in
which these phenomena do not arise.
2.6. The Dominant Node Restricted Game
In this section we present a model which is a more tractable variant of the base game.
This model could be used to represent a system in which the diameter of the network is
intentionally kept very small or in which there is strong incentive to connect directly to the
current dominant node. As we shall show, the dynamics of this game are very similar to the
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dynamics of small networks for the unrestricted game. Even in systems that do not satisfy
the restriction, it is likely that the simpler dynamics of this game can teach us about the
behaviors of cognitively limited agents who are unable to solve the more complex version of
the game or systems with many myopically motivated agents who do not care about future
play.
2.6.1. Restriction
In order to allow the model to be tractable we make the following assumption
Dominant Node Restriction (DNR): We require that ∀ht, Gt∃i such that (i, t) ∈ ht and
i ∈ d(Gt). In other words, every player must connect to at least one dominant node as they
join the network.
The power of this assumption comes from the fact that it guarantees that there will always
be one dominant node connected to all other nodes, which simplifies the nature of vying and
myopic moves substantially.
This assumption is primarily valuable in how is improves the tractability of the game without
eliminating important strategic features. The restriction may be more realistic in environ-
ments in which agents are cognitively limited or in which there are strong incentives to
maintain a low diameter in the network. The restriction keeps the diameter of the network
to two. A group that wished to guarantee that their network maintained a low diameter may
choose to enforce this rule on new entrants. One could also the restriction as being related
to accessibility with Players having to essentially “enter” the network through the dominant
node before connecting to others.
It should be noted that in small networks such as the example in Section 2.3, players will
naturally choose moves which satisfy the restriction without being required to do so. Players
generally want to connect to better connected nodes at least in a myopic sense. Results only
diverge for larger networks where more complex strategic concerns can come into play.
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2.6.2. A Note on Parameters
One important feature of the DNR is that it guarantees that nodes are never more than
a distance of two away. This can be shown through a simple induction. If all nodes are
currently connected to the most connected nodes, and the current player must connect to
at least one of the most connected nodes, then at the end of the current turn, all players
will still be connected to the most connected nodes. Thus, players will always either be a
distance of two from each other or directly connected. The directly connected players confer
a benefit of B while the distance two players provide δB. As such we can rewrite the utility
function as
ui = Y − C· |hi|+B(1− δ)·
∑
j 6=i
(dij(GJ) = 1) + δB(J − 1)
We can then define Y˜ = Y + δB(J − 1) since δB(J − 1) is fixed and β = B(1− δ). We then
rewrite the utility function as:




We will primarily be using this formulation in this section.
2.6.3. Analogous Results from the Base Game
Most of the results from the base game still apply essentially without modification with the
reasoning behind them being unchanged. We provide the modified propositions below.
Proposition DNR 1:
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• If C/β < 2, then the complete network is the efficient equilibrium that can be formed
in the DNR game.
• If C/β > 2, then the star network (on Node 1 or Node 2) is the efficient network that
can be formed in the DNR game.
• If C/β = 2, then all feasible networks are efficient
Note that all feasible networks in the DNR contain a star.
Proposition DNR 2: If C/β < 1 then the complete network is only network which can be
formed by SPE of the DNR game.
Proposition DNR 3 If C/β > (J − 1), then the star networks centered on Node 1 and
Node 2 are the only networks which can be formed in SPE of the DNR game.
So far we have not gained much of anything from the DNR that we did not have before. The
real gains in terms of tractability come in the previously unknown region where 1 < C/β <
J − 1
2.6.4. Markov Perfection
In general, the SPEs of the game are not well behaved for intermediate values of C/β due
to the possibility of sunspots. However, by refining our solution concept, we can get rid of
most types of sunspot behavior . To that end, we will be using Markov Perfect Equilibrium
as our primary solution concept for the remainder of this Part of the chapter.
Simply stated, Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) requires that each player in equilibrium
conditions their moves on the “coarsest” possible partition of game histories, with the added
requirement that the partition on which players are conditioning cannot be any coarser than
the partition where all histories which lead to the same set of available moves are in the
same element of the partition.17 In our game we do not have to worry about the definition
17Maskin and Tirole (2001)
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of “coarseness”, because it is actually possible to construct an equilibrium where each move
depends only the set of available moves.18
It should be noted that most intuitive tie-breaking rules generate a MPE of the game. For
example, breaking ties in favor of moves with low total age, breaking ties in favor of moves
with high total age, and breaking ties uniformly at random all generate MPE’s of this game.
The following result allows uses the solution concept of Markov Perfect Equilibria in order
to reduce the set of moves that players will make in equilibrium and therefore the set of
possible networks that can be formed. The remaining rational moves fall into two easy to
interpret categories with natural parallels in real world systems. This result is also critical
to solving of the restricted game and result will also allow us to characterize several specific
solutions which we will do later in the section.
Proposition DNR 4: If C 6= β then, in all Markov Perfect Equilibria of the DNR game,
∀t ht(Gt) ⊆ d(Gt) (a Type A Move) or ht(Gt) = {1, 2, ..., t− 1} (Move B).
In other words every node will either only connect to a subset of the dominant nodes or
connect to every node in the network. Players will not, for example, connect to one dominant
node and one non-dominant node. In most situations, the vast majority of feasible moves
involve connecting to a single dominant node and then some other subset of non-dominant
nodes, so this reduction in rational moves is quite substantial.
Proof of Proposition DNR 4: The case where C < β has already been covered, so we
will assume C > β. We begin by showing that Player J must always choose a Type A Move,
and that his choice among Type A Moves depends on the network only through the set of
dominant nodes. We then show that if all future players choose either a Type A Move or
Move B, and that the choices among these moves do not depend on the current network
except through the current set of dominant nodes, then it is optimal for the current node to
do the same (and no other moves are optimal). Note that there is a one to one correspondence
18It is actually possible to create equilibria using even coarser partitions of this game, but the standard
definition of Markov Perfection we are using does not allow this.
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between the set of dominant nodes and the set of possible actions, so conditioning on one is
the same as conditioning on the other.
Player J We begin the backwards induction by considering the move of Player J . We want
to show that Player J will always only connect to bJ−1 ∈ d(GJ−1) (Type A Move). Player J
will always connect to some bJ−1, by the DNR. Any additional connection can only provide
Player J benefit of B. The marginal utility of each additional connection would be B−C < 0.
All other possible moves are strictly worse than hJ = bJ−1 ∈ d(GJ−1) (Type A Move).
Player J is indifferent between all singleton Type A Moves, as such, by Markov Perfection,
he can only condition his move on the set of dominant nodes d(GJ−1)
Player J − k In examining the move of Player J − k’s move, we will assume the following
conjecture.
Conjecture DNR 4.1- All future players play a Type A Move or Move B, and their behavior
depends only on the set d(Gt−1).
Note that in this conjecture, we are not requiring that the sequence of future moves includes
both types of move. If the future sequence of moves must include only Type A Moves, the
conjecture is still satisfied.
If Player J is the only remaining player then this conjecture is satisfied since we have already
shown that Player J ’s behavior meets this criterion. If we can show that under Conjecture
MPE 1 Player J −k will also only choose a Type A Move or Move B and his choice will only
depend the on the network state through d(GJ−k−1), then we are done by induction.
We prove this using two lemmas
Lemma 4.1.1- Given conjecture DNR 4.1 A Type A Move or Move B will always be a strictly
better option than any other type of move. This proves that Player J −k will always choose
Move A or Move B.
Lemma 4.1.2- Given conjecture DNR 4.1 The expected value and feasibility of the Type A
Moves and Move B depends only on d(GJ−k−1)
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Proof of Lemma 4.1.1 : The lemma follows from the fact that the game is future dependent
in the sense that the utility that Player J − k receives depends only on the myopic utility
of his action (net loss from making current connections) and the behavior of future players
(gain from future connections) and the fact that these components are additively separable.
Since the probability of any set of future actions depends only on d(GJ−k), any optimal
action by Player J − k must be the myopically best way of achieving the resulting d(GJ−k).
Let us then consider the different possible moves. Every dominant node that Player J − k
connects to is going to remain a dominant node. No other node that Player J − k connects
to will become a dominant node. Player J − k can only become a dominant node by con-
necting to all players, since the current dominant node is connected to all players. Since new
connections are myopically harmful, Player J − k wants to choose the move with the fewest
possible connections to achieve a given d(GJ−k). That means Player J − k will connect to
all nodes (Move B, if he wants to add his own node to d(GJ−k)) or just another a subset
of the current dominant nodes (a Type A Move, if he wants that subset to be in d(GJ−k)).
No other moves can achieve different d(GJ−k) or the same d(GJ−k) with fewer connections.
Proof of Lemma 4.1.2 : We first show that the feasibility of each Type A Move and move
B depends only on d(GJ−k−1). The set of feasible Type A Moves is the set of subsets of
d(GJ−k−1) and Move B is always possible. The expected value of each of these moves can
again be decomposed into myopic and future portions. The myopic utilities from each move
are fixed since they depend only on the number of connections made. The future benefits
from all Type A Moves are similarly fixed, since each Type A Move will always produce the
same d(GJ−k) with d(GJ−k) equal to the nodes Player J − k connected to regardless of the
current network structure conditional on that move being a Type A Move. Whether or not
a given move is a Type A Move depends only on d(GJ−k) by definition. The future benefits
of Move B depend only on d(GJ−k−1) since after Move B d(GJ−k) = d(GJ−k−1) ∩ J − k.
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These results, combined with the requirements of MPE, prove that Player J − k’s choice
among Type A Moves and Move B only depends on d(GJ−k−1). Because Player J − k can
optimally condition his action on d(GJ−k−1), and there is a direct one to one mapping from
d(GJ−k−1) to available actions, Player J − k must condition his move on d(GJ−k−1) in any
MPE. All that remains is proving the lemmas
Note that if C = β then all players randomizing among all feasible moves constitutes Markov
Perfect Equilibria. Such an equilibrium generates all feasible networks with positive proba-
bility.
While the exact impact of Proposition DNR 4 on the state space is hard to determine, since
the number of dominant nodes at each step is highly path dependent, this result is very
strong in the sense that it eliminates a tremendous number of possible moves. Player i who
is facing a network with k dominant nodes will have 2i − i+ k possible moves. Proposition
DNR 4 eliminates all but 2k + 1 of those moves.19
Consider an example in which Player 5 is moving. All existing nodes are connected only
to Node 1. Node 1 is the only dominant node in this case, so Player 5 can connect to
any combination of nodes as long as he connects to Node 1. In this case there are seven
such combinations, but due to Proposition DNR 4, Player 5 will only ever choose one of
two moves: he will connect to Node 1 only, or he will connect to all existing nodes. The
reduction in the set of potential moves can be even greater for later nodes.
2.6.4.1. Interpretation of Proposition DNR 4
This result has a number of interesting consequence. It guarantees that the “rich get richer”
in the sense that only the most connected nodes can ever become relatively more connected
than another node. Every time a player chooses Move B every previous node gains a con-
nection. Every time a Player chooses a Type A Move some subset of the dominant nodes
gain connections. If Player i gains a connection when Player j does not, Player i must be
19Unless k = i in which case it does not eliminate any moves.
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a dominant node, because whenever nodes are being selective about who they connect to,
they will want to connect to dominant nodes only. Connecting to dominant nodes provides
the greatest myopic benefit and provides the only method of manipulating future play.
Given this result it is also easy to see how early mover advantage in payoffs can easily arise,
although it is not guaranteed. A Player i who chooses to take a Type A Move by making
one connection will gain β−C+β∑Jj=i+1(hj = {1, 2, 3, ..., j−1}). In other words this player
makes their myopic payoff plus β for every future player making a B move. An earlier player
will have more Move B’s following their move, meaning they will be better off. Also note that
by optimality, players who choose to make Move B will always do better in expectation than
a player in the same position choosing a Type A Move. As such, the early mover advantage
of Type A players implies that Players choosing Move B will also generally have an early
mover advantage in the sens that there is a lower bound on the payoffs of Move B players
which is higher near the start of the network.
We will say more about early move advantage when we discuss an example in Section 2.6.5.
2.6.4.2. Importance and Limitations of Markov Perfection
Markov perfection prevents certain types of unusual sunspot equilibria where players condi-
tion the way that they resolve indifferences on payoff irrelevant features of the game history.
Consider an example where Player 6 will never connect to Player 5 unless Player 4 connects
only to Player 1 and Player 2 (an alternative move that is neither a Type A Move nor Move
B). If Player 4 makes that specific move, Player 6 will always connect to node 5 if node 5 is
red. Player 6 is indifferent, so he can freely condition his moves this way. Other Players will
always resolve indifferences in favor of connecting to Player 1. Assume C = β + .
Most moves Player 4 can choose will lead to no future connections. However, if Player 4
makes the specified move, he can change the incentives of Player 5 such that is is now in
Player 5’s interest to choose Move B. This means that Player 4 will get an extra future
connection from this alternative move relative to all other moves, which makes it worth the
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extra cost relative to just connecting to one dominant node. This unusual move does not
influence the payoffs of any move for Players 5 and 6. A move that is payoff irrelevant can
change the behavior of future players by changing the way that other players even further
down the line resolve indifferences.
It may seem unusual that Type A Moves involve connecting to a subset of dominant nodes
rather than a single dominant node. The reason for this is two fold. First, Markov Perfection
does not prevent sunspots which depend on the set of dominant nodes. This is due to the
fact that under the definition used in Maskin and Tirole (2001), the partition of histories
on which players may condition their moves can be no coarser than the partition which
determines the set of available moves to the player. In this game the set of dominant nodes
maps one to one with the set of available moves. 20
Even if we eliminate all sunspots, however, there can still be unusual combination of tie-
breaking behaviors which lead to a non-singleton Type A Moves being optimal. An example
is provided in the Appendix (Section F.1). The example is fairly complex, but the basic
idea is that sometimes it is a good idea to keep more dominant nodes in the set of dominant
nodes to prevent a particular node from vying for dominance, since that node’s vying for
dominance discourages several nodes from vying for dominance in the future.
2.6.5. Exponential Slowdown and Novelty Seeking Tie-Breaking Rules
We will now use Proposition DNR 4 in order to pin down the exact critical times in which
nodes should vie for dominance, In this game, even Markov Perfection is not enough to give us
uniqueness. How players resolve indifferences can have a substantial impact on the network
that forms even within the class of Markov Perfect tie-breaking strategies.For example, if
all players break indifferences in favor of connecting to older nodes (a Markov Perfect tie-
20Eliminating this minimally coarse partition requirement is also not particularly satisfying, because doing
so eliminates random tie-breaking. The equilibrium in which all players break ties in favor of connecting
to the oldest dominant node is defined by the partition determined by the current oldest dominant node.
That partition is coarser than the partition defined by the set of dominant nodes, which is the partition
upon which players condition in in the random tie-breaking rule equilibrium.
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breaking rule), the only possible network that can form is the star network centered on Node
1.21 The dynamics of this network are not particularly interesting. Dynamics are more
interesting when players break ties at random (another Markov Perfect tie-breaking rule),
but they are not particularly clean. We analyze instead what happens when players break
ties in favor of newer nodes, because the dynamics of the resulting MPE’s are both clean
and non-trivia.
Definition: We define the novelty seeking tie-breaking rule as follows. When a player is
indifferent between Type A moves, they will always choose the move with the lowest total
age. Total age of a move is the sum of the ages of all nodes connected to in that move.
This tie-breaking rule generates a MPE of the game in which there are periods of Type A
play separated by instances of Move B play, and number of Type A Moves between Move
B’s follows a predictable pattern.
Proposition DNR 5: If we assume novelty seeking tie-breaking β < C, and we ignore the
integer constraints of node indexing, then in the unique solution to the DNR Game, the time
between Move B’s grows exponentially.
Proof of Proposition DNR 5: We begin by characterizing the equilibrium in a manner
that is slightly stricter that the equilibria described in Proposition MPE 1. We already
satisfy the conditions of Proposition MPE 1, because if players always break ties according
to novelty seeking tie-breaking, then their moves depend only on the set of optimal moves,
which, as we showed in the proof of Proposition MPE 1, is enough to guarantee a MPE of
this game.
Lemma DNR 5.1- Under the novelty seeking tie-breaking approach all players will choose
Move B or connect to the node in d(Gt−1) that joined the network most recently which we
denote to b∗t−1 (Move A’), and which they pick does not depend on the current network state.
Proof of Lemma DNR 5.1: As before, we show this by induction.
21Note that this is not the case in the base game. See 2.5.3 for the counter-example
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Player J : As we saw in the proof of Proposition MPE 1, player J will connect to a single
bJ−1 ∈ d(GJ−1). Furthermore, player J will be indifferent between all members of d(GJ−1),
so by our assumption of novelty seeking tie-breaking strategies, player J will choose move
A’. By connecting to any element of d(GJ−1), Player J will be a distance 1 from the node
he connects to and a distance 2 from everyone else leading to a payoff of B − C.
Player J − k: We begin by defining a induction conjecture.
Conjecture DNR 5.1 - All future nodes will choose Move B or Move A’ and this decision does
not depend on the current network.
Now we want to show that, given Conjecture DNR 5.1, Player J − k will choose Move B or
Move A’, and this decision does not depend on the current network. We do this by showing
that it is weakly optimal for player J − k to choose move A’ or strictly optimal for player
J−k to choose move B, and which possibility is true does not depend on the current network.
Showing this will guarantee our result, since when move A’ is weakly optimal, it will always
be selected by novelty seeking tie-breaking.
Under Conjecture DNR 5.1, a player will get a fixed number of future connections for any
move that does not put him in d(GJ−k) since all future B movers will connect to him and
all future A’ movers will not. It is immediate that if node j is not in d(Gj) he will never
be in d(Gt), since the dominant nodes are always connected to all other nodes, and Player
j cannot become connected to the nodes he is currently not connected to. We have also
established that the only move that will result in node j being part of d(Gj) is move B.
By the DNR a player must connect to at least one bt−1 ∈ d(Gt−1). Adding any connection
to a move will always make the move worse as long as that change does not make that move
into move B, because doing so increases the connection cost by C and decreases network loss
by only B without changing future moves. As such the best move must always be connecting
to a single bt−1 or move B. Since the set of future connections is fixed for all non-B moves
and move A’ involves connecting to a single bt−1, move A’ is always tied for maximum utility
for all non-B moves. All that remains is to show that whether move B is strictly better does
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not depend on the current network. Since we have already shown that the payoff for move
A’ does not depend on the network, we must now show that move B payoffs are similarly
fixed.
Since the connection cost of move B is already fixed and the network loss from previous
nodes is as well we must show that the set of future direct connections to J − k under move
B does not depend on the network. By Conjecture DNR 5.1, we know that the order of
future A’ and B moves is predetermined. Consider the player after J − k if he uses move
B. If the next player is a Move A’ player, they will connect to node J − k by the novelty
seeking preferences assumption.
If player J − k chooses move B every move A’ player will connect to player J − k until
another player uses move B. We will use this feature again in the second half of this proof.
After that, all move B players will connect to J − k and all move A’ players will not (since
they will be connecting to the most recent Move B player instead). The sequence of future
connections if player J − k uses move B, then, does not depend on the current network.
By induction all players will use move A’ or move B and this choice does not depend on the
network.
Exponential Growth: Having characterized the equilibrium in general terms, we now deter-
mine which players will choose move A’ and which will choose move B.
Consider J sufficiently large as to ensure that all the node indices referenced are positive.
As before we work through backwards induction.
Player J : Begin by considering the move of Player J . His expected utility from move A’ is
−C−β−2β(J−2), because he will be directly connected to a single node in d(GJ−1) and two
jumps from all other nodes. Player J ’s expected utility from move B is −(J−1)C− (J−1)β
which is always, because C > β.
Player J − k: We now consider Player J − k such all nodes after J − k will choose move A’.
By Lemma DNR 5.1 we do not have to worry about Player J − k influencing the choice of
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future players. If Player J − k chooses Move B, Player J − k + 1 will directly connect to
Node J −k since Node J −k will be the newest node in d(GJ −k). All nodes after J −k+ 1
will connect to node J − k, because by then J − k will be the only node in d(Gt).
Player J − k will receive of −C−β− (J − 2)2β from move A’ and −(J − k− 1)C− (J − k−
1)β− kβ from move B. In both cases the first term (of the form ...C) represents the costs of
connections. The second term (of the form ...β) is the myopic gain from connections. The
last term (also of the form ...β) represents the gain from future connections.
Player J − k will then choose move B if
(J − 2)(1− β/C) < k
If this relation is not satisfied when k = J − 3, then no nodes will select move B, and the
resulting network will be a star on Node 2. We call the first node that satisfies the condition
for move B optimality v1. Call the set of all nodes choosing move B, v.
Player vj − k: Consider now a Player vj − k who moves k moves before the next move B
(vj).
This time we will write the choice in terms of the gains and costs of Move B relative to Move
A’ to reduce extraneous terms. The extra cost (net gains from the immediate connections)
is: (vj − k − 2)(C − β) = γvj−k.
The relative benefit of Move B from future direct connections will be (k − 1)β = ρvj−k.
Player vj − k will choose move B if the gains are greater than the costs. As the time until
the next platform increases and ρi increases, and as we move backwards towards the first
move, γi decreases. This means that, given a fixed next Move B player, Player vj, we can
find the previous Move B player by going backwards until we find a node such that γi < ρi.
Define kj as the lowest value of k such that γvj−kj < ρvj−kj , and then say vj − kj = vj+1. See
Figure 2.6 for a visualization of this relationship.
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Figure 2.6.: This figure demonstrates how, given vj we may find vj+1 by going backwards
in time until we find a node where optimality is satisfied.
Now we ignore the integer constraints on node indices and say that a node will choose move
B when the costs equal the benefits. In other words, we assume vj satisfiesγvj = βvj∀j.
We can see the kind of errors that are introduced by this approximation by comparing the
dotted line and the dashed line in Figure 2.6. The dotted line shows where the relative costs
and benefits are equal, while the dashed line shows gives the actual index of Player vj+1.
The difference between the dashed line and the dotted line will always be less than one. We
discuss the issue of approximation in more detail in the next section.
Recall that γvj = (C − β)vj and ρvj = (kj−1 − 1)β by construction.
Node vj+1 will have kj fewer nodes to connect to for move B, so
γj+1 = γj − (C − β) ∗ kj
Since ρvj = γvj for each vj this gives us
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ρj+1 = ρj − (C − β) ∗ kj
Which, after substitution and simplification gives us
kj = kj−1(β/C)
Combine this with the condition for node v1 derived above, k1 = (J − 2)(1− β/C), to get
kj = (J − 2)(1− β/C) ∗ (β/C)j−1
Recall that β/C < 1, so as j increases, kj shrinks exponentially.
Figure 2.7 shows graphically how this geometric relationship arises.
Figure 2.7.: This figure shows how the behavior of the costs and benefits of move B
determines when such moves occur.
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2.6.6. Quality of Approximation
It is important to determine just how large the errors introduced by our decision to ignore
integer constraints might be. Define the true Move B players between the true v¯j and the
approximate vj derived by ignoring integer node indexing constraints will always be less
than one. We also define k¯j by v¯j = v¯j−1 − k¯j Begin by noting that v¯1 will be less than 1
away from the approximate v1, because v1 = J − (J − 2)1−βC , and v¯1 = J − roundup((J −
2)1−β
C
, 1)(see Figure 2.6 for a visualization of the relationship between the true value and the
approximation).
In other words|v¯1 − v1|< 1. In addition, note that v1 ≥ v¯
Now take as given a true value v¯j with the approximation vj and assume vj ≥ v¯j. Then
we have (kj+1 − 1)β = (vj − kj+1 − 2)(C − β) or kj+1 = (vj − 2)(1 − βC ) + βC . Similarly,
k¯j+1 = roundup((v¯j − 2)(1− βC ) + βC , 1). As such we must have k¯j+1 ≤ kj+1 + 1.





and v¯j+1 = v¯j− roundup((v¯j−2)(1− βC )+ βC , 1) which combined with vj ≥ v¯j implies
vj+1 ≥ v¯j+1
These two results imply that |v¯j − vj|< 1 + |v¯j−1 − vj−1| by induction.
This combined with the result from v1 gives us |vj − v˜j|< j which means that the result of
Proposition DNR 5 is strong in the later stages of the game, but it may be an inaccurate
description of what happens near the beginning of the game.
2.7. Conclusion
In this chapter we explore the theory of how entry timing can influence the structure of a
network, and in particular, which nodes become central. To this end, we further analyze a
model of network growth with history dependence and strategic agents introduced in the first
chapter. The model combines a number of features which are endemic to real world systems
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in a novel way. The unique combination of features opens up a wide range of interesting
dynamics and behaviors including “vying for dominance” in which a player invests heavily
in connections, facing a myopic loss, in order to try to supplant the incumbent dominant
node and receive connections from future players.
For this new game we proved several results analogous to those in the traditional network
formation literature.We also showed that the strategic nature of the game creates a parameter
region where the simple results do not hold. In this region, results are often intractable.
To deal with this problem, without eliminating the interesting dynamics of the game, we
proposed the dominant node restricted model. Under the DNR model, we proved that
Players will always connect to a a subset of the dominant nodes or connect to all nodes in
hopes of becoming dominant themselves. We examined the solution to the DNR defined
by novelty seeking tie-breaking and found that the number of players between those who
vie for dominance increases exponentially as the game progresses. As the network grows, it
becomes more expensive to vie for dominance, and so the rewards for each new vying player
must grow as well.
Some related work has been done which was not included in the main body of the text. We
covered several extensions to the both the base game and the DNR game in the Appendix
Sections D and E looking at what happens when certain key assumptions of the model
are loosened. We examine how results change when we do not require players to make a
connection, connections have heterogeneous costs, players may own multiple nodes, or when
we loosen the rigid move order in the game.
There remains a great deal of work to be done, however. We still have very little understand-
ing of how SPEs of the base game function for large networks in the intermediate parameter
region. In particular, there is more work to be done exploring the complex strategic inter-
actions that go beyond vying for dominance as seen in Section2.5.3.In addition, there is a
great deal more to explore in the variants of this game. Continual games with nodes being




Finally, in its current form, this game cannot be easily applied to many real world settings,
because the size of the existing networks would make the game intractable for those systems.
Simplifications and modifications are needed before this model of network growth can be
applied to specific real world settings.
Overall, the study of network growth with history dependence and forward looking strategic
agents provides a rich avenue for research with the potential to better understand and pre-
dict many economic structures of importance. This chapter serves to provide an example for
future theoretical work, showing how by taking the dynamic and strategic elements of net-
work formation serious, we can generate intuitive and novel predictions about the evolution
of important systems in our world.
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3. Estimating Information Cost
Functions in Models of Rational
Inattention
This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Ambuj Dewan
3.1. Introduction
It has been observed in many settings that people have a limited capacity for attention,
and this has a strong impact on their decision-making. For example, Chetty et al. (2009)
demonstrate that consumers underreact to non-salient sales taxes; De los Santos et al. (2012)
show that people only visit a small number of websites before making online purchases;
and Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) provide evidence that people do not fully account for
energy efficiency when making purchasing decisions about light bulbs.1 Several laboratory
experiments have demonstrated evidence of limited attention, including Gabaix et al. (2006),
Caplin and Martin (2013), and Caplin and Dean (2014).
A common explanation for this phenomenon is the theory of rational inattention (Sims,
2003; Sims, 2006; Caplin and Dean, 2015; Matějka and McKay, 2015). This theory posits
that people rationally choose the information to which they attend, trading off the costs of
1For a survey that discusses many more similar field studies, see DellaVigna (2009).
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paying more attention with the ensuing benefits of better decisions. This decision-making
process occurs in two stages. In the first stage, the decision-maker chooses what information
to acquire and pays costs accordingly. In the second stage, the decision-maker uses the infor-
mation she acquired to make decisions. Typically, in economic analysis, a specific functional
form for the first-stage costs is assumed; however, little is known about what form these
costs take in reality, and different assumptions on these costs can lead to starkly different
predictions.
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to characterize these first-stage information
costs,2 a crucial input for models of rational inattention. Subjects complete a series of
perceptual tasks with fine-grained variation in the levels of potential rewards. For each
reward level, we observe both the correct answer and the subject’s response. We interrogate
these data in two ways: (1) testing various properties of cost functions; (2) determining
which functional forms for information costs are most consistent with observed behavior.
The cost function properties of greatest interest to us are continuity, convexity, and per-
ceptual distance, the last of which refers to nearby states being harder to distinguish from
each other than distant ones. The presence or absence of each of these properties can have
profound impacts on the predictions of a model of rational inattention.
Continuity and convexity are important characteristics of many cost functions and are often
assumed in economic analysis. The convexity3 of an information cost function can greatly
affect model predictions. For example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) study a
portfolio choice problem in which investors choose which assets to learn about and how
much to learn about each of them. Depending on the convexity of the investor’s utility
and cost functions, it can be optimal for the investor to learn about all available assets
or to simply concentrate their attention on a single asset; utility and cost functions that
imply concave objective functions result in generalized learning, whereas those that imply
convex objective functions result in specialized learning. Convexity also has implications for
2We also conducted an online experiment, the results of which we report in Appendix C.
3Note that a finite, convex function is continuous on the interior of the space on which it is defined; in most
cases of interest, continuity will be a necessary condition for convexity.
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comparative statics in models of rational inattention. As we prove in this paper, continuity
and a specific form of convexity4 together imply that gross payoffs (excluding information
costs) change continuously in incentives.
Whether or not an information cost function embeds some notion of perceptual distance
— the idea that similar states are harder to distinguish than dissimilar ones — can also
have an effect on model predictions. Yang (2015) studies a global game of regime change
where players acquire information at a cost. Nearby states of the world are equally as
easy to distinguish from each other as distant ones, and the game has multiple equilibria.
By contrast, Morris and Yang (2016) show that if nearby states are sufficiently costlier
to distinguish from each other as compared to distant ones, then the game has a unique
equilibrium.
In our experiment, we find that roughly one-third of responsive subjects (those whose per-
formance on the tasks improves with increasing potential rewards) have behavior that is
consistent with “well-behaved” (i.e. continuous, convex) cost functions. Roughly 60% of the
responsive subjects have behavior consistent with a cost function that embeds some notion
of perceptual distance, in contrast to the mutual information cost function, which does not
embed such a notion.
The second important set of analyses in our paper fits various classes of cost functions to
our subjects’ data and selects the best fit for each subject. From the accuracy of subjects’
responses for each reward level, we infer how their performance in the experimental tasks
changes with potential rewards; put differently, we estimate a performance function that
traces out the relationship between the potential reward and the probability of success. We
compare the subjects’ performance functions to those predicted by different information cost
functions in order to find the best fit for each individual.
Of particular interest to us are cost functions that have commonly been used in the eco-
nomic literature: the commonly-used mutual information (cf. Sims, 2003; Matějka and
4We call this form of convexity “almost strict convexity.” It is formally defined in Section 3.3.
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McKay, 2015), which measures the expected reduction in entropy from a decision-maker’s
prior beliefs to their posterior beliefs; fixed costs for information acquisition (e.g. Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980; Barlevy and Veronesi, 2000; Hellwig et al., 2012); and costs for increasing
the precision of normally distributed signals (e.g. Verrecchia, 1982; Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2010). The first implies a logistic performance function, the second implies a
binary performance function with two levels of performance, and the third implies a concave
performance function. Of the set of models we estimate, we find that the data of the sub-
jects who are responsive to incentives are best fit by one of these three models, with roughly
two-thirds of subjects best fit by the first model, a quarter of subjects best fit by the second
model, and one-seventh of subjects best fit by the third model. Thus, while there is some
heterogeneity in the population with respect to which cost functions best reflect human be-
havior, the set of potential cost functions that we need to consider can be reduced to three
of the cost functions commonly found in the literature.
Finally, we apply these cost functions to a simple principal-agent model of investment del-
egation and find that they imply starkly different comparative statics results. Fixed costs
for information acquisition imply payment structures that are discontinuous in potential re-
turns, whereas mutual information and normally distributed signals imply continuous pay-
ment structures. In a population consisting of a mixture of the three types, the optimal
payment scheme is piecewise continuous with a region of strict increase in potential returns.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to use an experiment with fine-grained variation
in incentives to infer properties of information cost functions. This fine-grained variation
is crucial for testing the continuity and convexity of cost functions and for estimating sub-
jects’ performance functions, which is crucial for our model-fitting exercise. Although several
papers have examined competing hypotheses of dynamic evidence accumulation using per-
ceptual data,5 ours is the first to run a “horse race” between a large number of types of cost
functions in a static model of rational inattention.6
5We discuss some of this literature in the following section.
6Cheremukhin et al. (2015) use a “horse race” approach to select between probability weighting functions
while assuming a specific but flexible functional form for information costs; their comparison is not
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews various experimental
approaches to limited attention in the literature. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical frame-
work that we use in this paper. Section 3.4 introduces the type of task that we implement
in our experiment and situates it within our theoretical framework. Section 3.5 introduces
various models of cost functions and applies them to the tasks of our experiment. Section
3.6 presents our experimental design and compares it to previous experiments about lim-
ited attention. Section 3.7 presents and discusses basic experimental results and categorizes
subjects according to the behaviors they exhibit. Section 3.8 fits various models of cost
functions to the subjects’ data and runs a “horse race” to determine which is the best fit
for each subject. Section 3.9 presents additional results relating to subjects’ reaction times.
Section 3.10 presents an application of our results to the delegation of investment. Section
3.11 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Additional experimental results
are reported in Appendices B, C, D, and E. Appendix F presents some additional theoretical
results.
3.2. Related Literature
Several previous experimental studies have examined limited attention by giving subjects a
series of perceptual and/or cognitive tasks and observing their responses. This technique is
used to test implications and fit parameters of models of limited attention. Caplin and Dean
(2014) use a task involving the counting of differently-colored balls to test the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a model of rational inattention with discrete choices where
information acquisition is modeled as a static process. Caplin and Dean (2013) use that
same task to estimate subjects’ cost parameters in a mutual information cost function. Shaw
and Shaw (1977) employ a protocol where stimuli are presented at random locations on a
tachistoscope.7 Using the data they obtained, they estimate how much attention the subjects
between different information cost functions.
7A tachistoscope is a device used to present visual stimuli for a controlled duration. It has become much
less common in behavioral research since the advent of personal computers.
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allocated to those locations on their visual field. Gabaix et al. (2006) use an experiment
involving the comparison of multi-attribute choices to calibrate a model of myopic search.
This parameter-fitting approach has also been extended outside of the domain of visual
perception to the domain of relative value assessment. Pinkovskiy (2009) and Cheremukhin
et al. (2015) fit experimental data on choice over gambles to models of limited attention.
Krajbich et al. (2010) ask subjects to choose between pairs of snack food items that the
subjects have rated on a numerical preference scale, and using choice and reaction-time
data, they estimate the parameters of a drift-diffusion model (DDM), where information
acquisition is modeled as a dynamic process.
There is a large literature that uses choice and reaction-time data to compare models of
evidence accumulation. For example, Woodford (2014) presents a model of dynamic evi-
dence accumulation with mutual-information costs and uses Krajbich et al.’s (2010) data to
compare the fit of his optimizing model to the DDM, and Ratcliff and Smith (2004) use data
from several experiments to compare the fits of four different dynamic evidence accumulation
models.
The present paper synthesizes the model-testing and model-fitting approaches. Using choice
data from an experiment with perceptual tasks, we test hypotheses about behavior, includ-
ing necessary and sufficient conditions for rational inattention, convexity and continuity of
cost functions, and whether subjects evince the perception of distance. We also estimate
parameters of various models of rational inattention and then compare their fits to each
other.
The tasks in our experiment involve the perception of numerosity, a long-standing area of
research in perceptual psychology. Our tasks are similar to those implemented by Saltzman
and Garner (1948) and Kaufman et al. (1949), who present subjects with fields of randomly
arranged dots whose numerosity they have to judge. More recently, the ball-counting tasks
of Caplin and Dean (2014) and Dean and Neligh (2017) have also involved the perception of
numerosity.
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3.3. Theoretical Framework
Various models of limited attention and imperfect perception have been proposed in the
literature. These models can be classified along two axes: optimizing vs. non-optimizing;
and static vs. dynamic.
In optimizing models, the information acquired by a decision-maker depends on an explicit
choice that is made optimally given their cost and/or constraints. As a result, any “errors”
observed in their decisions can be considered rational. By contrast, in non-optimizing models,
errors in decisions or perception are the result of some exogenous process that is not chosen
by the decision-maker; the choice of information is not explicitly modeled or is assumed to
be out of the decision-maker’s control.
Models of limited attention and imperfect perception can also be classified according to
whether they are static or dynamic. In static models, information acquisition is modeled
as a one-time occurrence; either the decision-maker makes a single information-acquisition
choice, or information is modeled as if it is delivered to the decision-maker all at once. On
the other hand, in dynamic models, information is accumulated over time. That is not to
say that static models cannot be applied to situations where information acquisition is a
dynamic process; static models simply restrict their scope to the outcome of such a process,
not the process itself.
We refer to the class of optimizing models as models of rational inattention. In particular,
this paper considers a general static model of rational inattention with finite state and action
spaces and additively separable costs. Such a model is the focus of Caplin and Dean (2015)
(henceforth CD15), who derive necessary and sufficient conditions for observed behavior to
be consistent with it. Other papers have considered static rational inattention models with
specific cost functions. For example, Matějka and McKay (2015) derive the implications of
the mutual-information cost function, and Woodford (2012) considers the prior-independent
channel-capacity cost function.
There are also several static, non-optimizing models of limited attention and imperfect per-
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ception. In perceptual psychology, signal detection theory (cf. Chapter 12 of Frisby and
Stone, 2010) provides an important theoretical framework for studying imperfect percep-
tion. In this framework, states of the world are observed with exogenously given noise, and
the decision-maker must determine what the most likely state was given their observations.
We implement a task of this nature in our experiment; however, we model the noise process
as an endogenous choice. There is also a class of papers in consumer choice that studies
the imperfect perception of attributes of multi-attribute choices and introduces distortions
to those attributes that depend on the set of available choices (e.g. Bordalo et al., 2013;
Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013; Bushong et al., 2014). These distortions are exogenously imposed;
they are not chosen by the decision-maker. The size and extent of these distortions can be
seen as a measure of the consumer’s inattention.
Dynamic models of evidence accumulation have a long tradition in mathematical psychology.
In drift-diffusion models (DDMs) (e.g. Ratcliff, 1978; Diederich, 1997), evidence is modeled
as a stochastic process that evolves according to a diffusion process (Smith, 2000), such as
Brownian motion. The decision-maker stops gathering evidence and makes a decision when
this process hits some (possibly time-dependent) boundary. This boundary is often exoge-
nously given, as in Ratcliff (1978), implying a non-optimizing modeling approach. However,
under some conditions, the boundary can be derived as the result of an optimal stopping
problem (e.g. Fudenberg et al., 2015; Tajima et al., 2016). Other optimizing approaches
consider the optimal selection of the intensity of evidence accumulation when the stopping
rule is exogenously given (e.g. Woodford, 2014) or the optimal selection of both evidence ac-
cumulation intensity and stopping rule (e.g. Moscarini and Smith, 2001). The vast majority
of these dynamic evidence accumulation models restrict their focus to situations where the
decision-maker must choose between two options, though Moscarini and Smith extend their
model to consider situations with multiple discrete choice alternatives.
In this paper, we adopt a static framework that allows us to consider any finite number of
options for the decision-maker as well as a flexible choice of information-acquisition tech-
nologies.
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3.3.1. General Model
In remainder of this section, we present a general framework for analyzing problems of
rational inattention. In this framework, there is an unknown state of the world about which
an decision-maker (DM) can choose to acquire information. This information affects her
beliefs about the state of the world. After obtaining this information, she makes a decision
that maximizes her payoff given her beliefs.
We model information as a collection of probabilistic mappings from states of the world to
a set of subjective signals. We define an information structure to be a set of conditional
distributions of signals given states. Given a prior belief, observing a signal generates a
corresponding posterior belief over states, and given this posterior belief, the DM maximizes
her payoff by selecting an optimal action. Each information structure has a cost associated
with it.
We remain agnostic about what the exact source of information costs is. Information costs
could represent cognitive or physical effort exerted in learning about the true state, as well
as the opportunity cost of time spent doing so.
This framework has several beneficial features. Firstly, it has the same behavioral implica-
tions as the model of CD15, which means we can apply their necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for models of rational inattention to the problems we study. Secondly, it expresses
information structures as stochastic matrices, which as demonstrated later in the paper, will
permit us to easily compare information structures and to define a simple geometric notion
of convexity of information costs.
Let Θ = {θi}|Θ|i=1 be a finite state space, let M = {mi}|M |i=1 be a finite signal space,8 and let
8 Given that the state space is finite, the finiteness of the signal space is not a substantive restriction. In
fact, if we assume that more informative information structures are costlier (our Restriction D, presented
later in the paper), it can be shown that given a finite state space, a DM never need use more than a
finite number of signals. This follows from Proposition 4 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2010). They study
a game where the information structure and the action are chosen by different players, but if we assume
those players’ preferences are perfectly aligned, then ignoring information costs, our framework maps
onto theirs. By their Proposition 4, if a DM employs an information structure with an infinite number of
signals, then ignoring information costs, she could have done at least as well with an information structure
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A = {ai}|A|i=1 be a finite action space, with |M | ≥ |A| so that there are at least as many
signals as there are actions. Let pi = (pii)ni=1 ∈ ∆(Θ), where n := |Θ|, be the DM’s prior over






where Q is an information structure (a collection of conditional signal probabilities, given
states), γpiQ is the distribution of posterior beliefs it induces given the prior pi, and 〈pi|m〉 is
the posterior belief associated with signal m.
As explained above, the DM’s problem has two stages. First, she selects an information
structure Q. She then observes a signal m according to that information structure, which
gives her a posterior belief 〈pi|m〉, derived by Bayes’ rule. Second, given this posterior belief,
she chooses an action a to maximize her expected payoff.
We can express this problem more formally using matrix notation. Let Π = diag(pi).9 Let
U ∈ M|A|×|Θ|(R) be a matrix with entries ui,j := u(ai, θj), i.e. the utility of taking action i
in state j. We refer to U as the payoff matrix.
Let Q be the space of right-stochastic matrices of dimension |Θ| × |M |, and let D be the
space of right-stochastic matrices of dimension |M | × |A|.10 C : ∆(Θ)×Q −→ R¯ gives the
cost11 of selecting an information structure from Q, given a prior in ∆(Θ).12
with a finite number of signals. Moreover, since the former information structure is more informative
than the latter, it is costlier. Therefore, the DM will choose to use a finite number of signals.
9diag(x) is the square matrix that has the entries of x in order on its diagonal and zeroes elsewhere.
10Some authors require that a stochastic matrix be square. We allow for a stochastic matrix to have different
numbers of rows and columns, provided that all its entries are non-negative and each of its rows sums to
1.
11 R¯ := R ∪ {−∞,∞} is the set of extended reals. If for some p˜i and Q˜, C(p˜i, Q˜) =∞, then the cost of the
information structure Q˜ given p˜i is infinite, and the DM will never select it, provided there is at least one
information structure available at a finite cost.
12In principle, though the cost-function approach implies flexibility in the selection of information structures,
it can accommodate restrictions on the space of available information structures as well. For example, if
Qˆ is the set of admissible structures, then C(pi,Q) is finite if Q ∈ Qˆ and infinite otherwise. If a modeler
wishes to impose an exogenous process of information acquisition, then he may simply set Qˆ to be a
singleton.
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where the entries of Q are qi,j = Pr(mj|θi), i.e. the probably of signal mj in state θi,
and the entries of D are di,j = Pr(aj|mi), i.e. the probability of selecting action aj given
signal mi. We denote the distribution of posteriors (with finite support) that Q induces by
γQ ∈ ∆(∆(Θ)). The i-th row of Q represents the conditional distribution of signals given
state θi, and so Q can be seen as a collection of signal distributions given states. We refer
to D as the decision matrix.
We refer to the maximand in (3.2) as the net payoff and its first component as the ex-ante
gross payoff. Specific realizations of this payoff are called the ex-post gross payoff. Where it
will not cause confusion, we will drop the “ex-ante” and “ex-post.”
This setup allows us to index decision problems of the form of (3.2) by (pi, U). In this paper,
we will hold pi fixed, and thus we will simply index decision problems by U where it will
cause no confusion. If we give a DM a finite sequence of decision problems {Ui}, then we
can observe the true state θi chosen by nature and action ai chosen by the DM for each
decision problem. Using the data set {(Ui, θi, ai)} will allow us to infer the properties of
C(·, ·). Following CD15, we refer to a data set of this type as state-dependent stochastic
choice data.













This version of the DM’s problem allows us to see how the ex-ante gross payoff is constructed.
For each (i, j),
|M |∑
k=1
qi,kdk,j = Pr(aj|θi) is the probability of taking action j in state i. Summing









13tr(X) denotes the trace of X, the sum of its diagonal entries.
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expected utility in state i, given the subject’s choice of information structure and decision
matrix. Summing these expected utilities and weighting by the probability of each state












In this setup, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}, pii and uj,i, are exogenous
parameters. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , |M |}, qi,k and dk,j are
chosen by subjects. Though one cannot observe qi,k and dk,j separately, one can estimate
the products qi,kdk,j; if a DM solves the same decision problem repeatedly, one can observe
how often each action is chosen in each state.
3.3.2. Cost Equivalence
The model of the preceding subsection defines costs jointly on the DM’s prior belief and
information structures as conditional distributions of signals, given states. Defining infor-
mation structures in this manner is the approach taken by McGuire (1972) and Leshno and
Spector (1992), among others. From the ex-ante perspective (i.e. before signals are realized),
each information structure corresponds to a distribution of posterior beliefs; each potential
signal has a posterior belief associated with it, and the likelihood of each of these posterior
beliefs is the likelihood of receiving the signal associated with it. If pi is a prior belief on
Θ and Q is an information structure that generates signals in M , then the distribution of







where PrpiQ(·) denotes the probability of its argument, given prior pi and information structure
Q, x is an element of ∆(Θ), ◦ denotes the Hadamard (component-wise) matrix product,
and empty sums are taken to be zero. Several authors, including Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) and CD15, choose to work directly with these distributions of posteriors. From the
perspective of pure Bayesian expected utility maximization (cf. Caplin and Martin, 2015),
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the two approaches are clearly equivalent in terms of the behaviors they imply.
From the perspective of rational inattention, however, when information structures have
costs associated with them, this equivalence is less readily established. The cost of a par-
ticular distribution of posteriors may not just depend on the distribution itself, but also
on how it was generated. Consider the following examples. Let Θ = {X, Y } and M =
{x, y, z}, both indexed in those orders. Let pi = (0.5, 0.5), and let Q1 =




 0.2 0.8 0
0.8 0.2 0
, and Q3 =
 0.8 0.1 0.1
0.2 0.4 0.4
. It is easily verified that each of these
information structures generates the same distribution of posteriors. Under Q1, x was most
likely generated by X, and y was most likely generated by Y . Thus, the signals can be
seen as a “natural” interpretation of the states. By contrast, under Q2, x was most likely
generated by Y , and y was most likely generated by X. This interpretation is “unnatural”
and consequently may be more mentally costly for a DM to process. Now, consider Q3,
where again x was most likely generated by X, and y was most likely generated by Y , but
there is also a third signal z generated with positive probability that is most likely to have
been generated by Y . Though y and z both correspond to the same posterior belief, having
to keep track of three signals may be more mentally taxing than keeping track of two, and
so Q3 might be costlier than Q1. These examples serve to illustrate that assigning signals
to states is not merely a matter of indexing when considering information costs; costs may
depend on the interpretability of and meaning implied by an information structure.
This of course raises the question of whether our model implies the potential to accommo-
date behaviors that would not be feasible under the posterior-based approach to rational
inattention. Assuming a finite set of actions, allowing costs to depend on how distributions
of posteriors are generated generalizes CD15; put differently, a version of their model with a
finite number of actions is equivalent to ours with the following assumption.
Assumption A. Cost equivalence. For all priors pi, C(pi,Q1) = C(pi,Q2) whenever Q1
105
3.3 Theoretical Framework
and Q2 induce the same distribution of posteriors.14
However, as we show below, any behavior that can be rationalized by our model can also be
rationalized by CD15; cost equivalence imposes no additional behavioral restrictions. This
result allows us to apply CD15’s necessary and sufficient conditions for rational inattention
to our framework without imposing any additional conditions.
Proposition 1. Stochastic choice data are consistent with (3.2) iff they are consistent with
CD15.15
To outline the proof, the ‘if’ direction is obvious, since our model generalizes CD15. To see
the ‘only if’ direction, suppose that {(Ui, θi, ai)} can be rationalized by (3.2) with some cost
function C(pi,Q). DefineQγpiQ to be set of information structures that induce the distribution
γpiQ over posteriors, and define C˜(pi,Q) := min
R∈Qγpi
Q
C(pi,R). It is obvious that C˜ satisfies cost
equivalence. Moreover, since a given posterior distribution always induces the same ex-ante
gross payoff, the DM should always choose the lowest-cost way of inducing that posterior
distribution. Thus, the proof boils down to showing that this minimum is well-defined.
Details are in Appendix A.
3.3.3. Testing for Rational Inattention
As CD15 demonstrate, observed behavior is consistent with their model if and only if it
satisfies their “no improving attention cycles” (NIAC) and “no improving action switches”
(NIAS) conditions.16 Their NIAC condition ensures that improvements to gross payoffs
cannot be made by reallocating attention cyclically across decision problems, and their NIAS
condition ensures that the DM’s actions are optimal given the beliefs induced by her chosen
14Appendix F provides an algebraic characterization of stochastic matrices that induce the same distribution
of posteriors.
15Though we have assumed a finite action space in our paper, the proof of Proposition 1 does not rely
on this. Therefore, the use of decision matrices mapping signals to actions can be seen as a notational
convenience for the applications contained in this paper rather than a fundamental part of the model.
16The NIAS condition is due to Caplin and Martin (2015). It is the key condition that characterizes their
Bayesian expected utility model.
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information structure. Because our model is behaviorally equivalent to theirs, NIAC and
NIAS are necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice data to satisfy our model.
Put differently, the DM fails to fulfill either of those two conditions if and only if there does
not exist a cost function that rationalizes her stochastic choice data.
In our notation, the NIAC condition can be expressed as follows. Assume a fixed prior pi,
and let U0, U1, . . . , UJ−1 be any set of two or more payoff matrices. Let Q0, Q‘, . . . , QJ−1 and
D0, D1, . . . , DJ−1 be the corresponding information structures and decision matrices selected
by the DM, and let Dji be a decision matrix that maximizes the gross payoff given payoff













The NIAS condition can be expressed as follows. Assume a fixed prior pi. Then for any
payoff matrix U , let Q∗ be the information structure and D∗ be the decision matrix chosen
by the DM. Then the NIAS condition states that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|} such that the k-th
column of D∗ (denoted by d∗•,k) has at least one nonzero entry and any l ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}:
uk,•ΠQ∗d∗•,k ≥ ul,•ΠQ∗d∗•,k (3.6)
where uk,• and ul,• are the k-th and l-th rows of U , respectively.
Proposition 2. NIAC and NIAS are necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice
data to satisfy (3.2).





A set of behaviors that is trivially consistent with rational inattention is one where the DM’s
behavior is consistent with their posterior beliefs not changing across decision problems;
regardless of the decision problem, she chooses the same information structure. This is
consistent with models such as signal detection theory, where the DM’s information structure
is exogenously given. In particular, it does not become more informative if the DM’s gross
reward from choosing an optimal action increases. In those cases, the DM simply does not
respond to changes in the level of incentives across decision problems. More interesting
are cases where the DM does modify her behavior in response to changes in the level of
incentives.
Definition 1. Suppose that a DM is given a set of decision problems U = {U1, U2, . . . UJ}.
Further suppose that ∃U, U˜ ∈ U satisfying the following: for each i ∈ {1, . . . n}, let τi ∈
argmax
j∈{1,...,|A|}
ui,j; ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . n}, u˜i,j ≥ ui,j if j = τi and u˜i,j ≤ ui,j if j 6= τi, with at least one
strict inequality. Then we say the DM is responsive (to incentives), or exhibits responsiveness,













Put differently, a DM is responsive to incentives if for some pair of decision problems, her
probability of taking a (gross) payoff-maximizing action increases when the utility associ-
ated with payoff-maximizing actions increases and the utility associated with non-payoff-
maximizing actions decreases.
Responsiveness is a fairly intuitive condition for human behavior to fulfill. Roughly speaking,
it says that people perform better (by choosing the best option more often) when the stakes
are higher.
3.3.5. Continuity and Convexity
In this subsection, we establish sufficient conditions for a continuous relationship between
gross payoffs and incentives in general rational inattention problems. Roughly speaking, con-
108
Estimating Information Cost Functions in Models of Rational Inattention
tinuity and convexity of the information cost function imply gross payoffs that are continuous
in incentives.
Assumption B. Continuity. C(pi,Q) is continuous in its second argument.17
Continuity is a typical assumption in much of economic analysis. In this case, it implies that
gathering a small amount of additional information increases the total cost of information
by only a small amount. This may seem like a fairly innocuous assumption, but it precludes
some plausible cost functions, such as those with fixed costs for information acquisition, as
will be seen in Section 3.5.
Assumption C. Almost strict convexity. ∀pi ∈ ∆(Θ), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1),∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q,
C(pi, λQ1 + (1− λ)Q2) ≤ λC(pi,Q1) + (1− λ)C(pi,Q2), where the inequality is strict except
possibly if Q1 and Q2 induce the same distribution of posteriors.
This notion of convexity can be contrasted with CD15’s. CD15 define a notion of convexity
over the space of distribution of posteriors called “mixture feasibility”;18 however it is not
testable. In our framework, cost functions are defined over signal structures instead of
the distributions of posteriors they induce. Since the space of stochastic matrices can be
identified with a subset of Euclidean space, Assumption C gives us a easily interpretable
“geometric” notion of convexity. Moreover, Assumption C has testable implications.
It is clear that Assumption C is a special case of weak convexity. Assumption C is also a slight
relaxation of strict convexity. We employ this slight relaxation because strict convexity would











In all three of these information structures, a given signal is induced by each state with
17Because R¯ is not metrizable with the standard Euclidean topology, we are implicitly assuming here that
C maps to R, i.e. it is nowhere infinite.
18Assumption C involves mixtures of conditional signal probabilities, which could yield posteriors not gen-
erated by either information structure in the mixture, whereas mixture feasibility involves mixtures of
distributions of posteriors whose support is the union of the supports of the distributions in the mixture.
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the same probability. Therefore, the distribution of posteriors each one generates is the
degenerate distribution on the prior, and by cost equivalence, all three information structures
should have the same cost. However, Q3 is a convex combination of Q1 and Q2, and so if
the cost function were strictly convex it would have to have a strictly lower cost than Q1
or Q2. Thus, Assumption A is incompatible with strict convexity. However, under almost
strict convexity, Q3 would be permitted to have the same cost as Q1 and Q2.
In order to ensure that continuity and almost strict convexity imply continuous gross payoffs,
we require two additional conditions.
Assumption D. Monotonicity of information. Let R be a right-stochastic matrix of
dimension |M | × |M |, which we refer to as a garbling matrix. Then for any pi ∈ ∆(Θ) and
Q ∈ Q, C(pi,Q) ≥ C(pi,QR).
Assumption D is equivalent to Condition K1 of CD15. If Q is an information structure and
R is a garbling matrix, then Q can be thought of as containing all the information contained
in QR, i.e. QR simply adds noise to Q. In this case, we shall say that Q Blackwell-dominates
QR. As shown by Blackwell (1953), Q yields a (weakly) higher gross payoff than QR for any
decision problem, given an optimal selection of decision matrices. Therefore, Assumption D
implies that if one information structure is more informative than another, then it is also
costlier. This assumption does not provide a complete order on information costs, since it is
possible that two experiments are not ranked in the Blackwell sense. In other words, if Q1
and Q2 are information structures of the same dimension, there does not necessarily exist R
of appropriate dimension such that Q1R = Q2 or Q2R = Q1.
CD15 show that this assumption is not testable; any stochastic choice data set that is
consistent with some cost function C is also consistent with some cost function C˜ that
satisfies Assumption D. Therefore, requiring it does not eliminate any additional sets of
stochastic choice data from being consistent with a model of rational inattention.
The final assumption can be seen as a slight relaxation of cost equivalence (Assumption A).
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Assumption E. Cost symmetry. Let R be a |M |×|M | permutation matrix. Then ∀Q ∈
Q, C(pi,Q) = C(pi,QR).
It is easy to see that cost equivalence implies cost symmetry. This assumption says that the
cost of an information structure is invariant to the labeling of its signals; only the conditional
probabilities of generating each signal matter.
We have now established a set of sufficient conditions that ensure that the DM’s ex-ante
gross payoff is continuous in incentives.
Proposition 3. Suppose that pi is fixed and C satisfies Assumptions B, C, D, and E. Then
the ex-ante gross payoff is continuous in U .19
Monotonicity of information and cost symmetry ensure that the decision matrix chosen by
the DM can be fixed, which in turn ensures the convexity of the problem. While almost
strict convexity does not ensure a unique solution to the problem, it does ensure that the
optimal ex-ante gross payoff is single-valued, which together with the continuity of the cost
function implies the result.
At this point, a clarification is in order. Proposition 3 is a statement about what the proper-
ties of an information cost function imply about behavior. To obtain a statement about what
behavior implies about the properties of cost functions, we invoke the contrapositive: if gross
payoffs are discontinuous in incentives, then this behavior cannot be rationalized by an in-
formation cost function that satisfies Assumptions B, C, D, and E simultaneously. However,
as we explained earlier in this subsection, Assumption D is not testable, and furthermore,
since Assumption E is implied by the untestable cost-equivalence assumption, Assumption
A, it is also untestable. Therefore, given stochastic choice data, we can assume the cost
function that rationalizes it satisfies Assumptions D and E, and so if we observe that ex-ante
gross payoffs are discontinuous in incentives,20 then this implies that the DM’s cost function
19This result also holds if we assume that Assumptions B, C, D, and E hold on a closed, convex subset
Qˆ ⊆ Q of admissible information structures and that C is positive infinity elsewhere. See Footnote 12.
20The reader may have noticed that strictly speaking, observing a discontinuity is technically impossible
without an infinite data set. We expound upon this point in Subsection 3.7.6. For now, simply assume
that the data strongly suggest that gross payoffs are discontinuous in incentives.
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either is discontinuous or fails almost strict convexity.
The assumptions necessary for 3 are satisfied by many different cost functions. For example,
cost functions that can be expressed as a sum of strictly convex functions of the entries of a
stochastic matrix are almost strictly convex.
Proposition 4. Let {ci,j(·, ·)}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , |M |} be a collection of continuous
functions on ∆(Θ)× [0, 1] such that for fixed pi, each ci,j(pi, ·) is a twice continuously differ-
entiable function with R with ∂
2ci,j(pi,·)
∂q2 > 0 ∀ q ∈ (0, 1),∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , |M |}.
Then C(pi,Q) := ∑i,j ci,j(pi, qi,j) satisfies Assumptions B and C.
3.4. Uniform Guess Tasks
In this section, we present a set of decision problems that serve as a simple testing bed for the
properties outlined in the preceding section. Consider a task where there is some unknown
true state of the world that a decision-maker (DM) has to identify, and learning about the
true state is costly. There are n possible states, each of which is a priori equally likely.
The DM receives a reward r for correctly identifying the state and no reward for incorrectly
identifying the state. Therefore, the DM’s goal is to maximize her probability of correctly
identifying the state, net of whatever costs she incurs in gathering information about the
true state. We refer to tasks with this setup as uniform guess tasks.
An example of such a task is the type of task we implement in our experiment. In this
type of task, which we refer to as the “dots” task, the DM is shown a screen with a random
arrangement of dots. Her goal is to determine the number of dots on the screen, which is
between 38 and 42, inclusive, with each possible number equally likely. She receives a reward
r for correctly guessing the number of dots and no reward otherwise.
In our example, information costs could include the cost of effort exerted in counting dots,
cognitive costs incurred in employing an estimation heuristic, or the opportunity cost of time
spent trying to determine the number of dots.
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Pr(a = x|θ = x)− C(piunif, Q) (3.7)
where θ is a state of the world, a is the subject’s guess of the state, and C(piunif, Q) is the
cost associated with information structure Q and the uniform prior. Put differently, the DM
rationally chooses an information structure to maximize her net payoff (3.7). Thus, uniform
guess tasks can be considered problems of rational inattention. The cost function C(piunif, Q)
is the primary object of interest in our experiment.
3.4.1. Applying the General Model and Performance Functions
The general model we presented in Section 3.3 can be applied to uniform guess tasks. In
these decision problems, since the DM is trying to determine the true state, we can set
A = Θ. Moreover, U = rIn for some r > 0. Therefore, the DM’s ex-ante gross payoff in
this task can be written as rtr(QDΠ). Note that P := tr(QDΠ) = 1
n
tr(QD) is the ex-ante
probability of correctly guessing the state, which we call their performance. Following (3.7),
this can also be written as P = 1
n
∑
x Pr(a = x|θ = x). For each reward r, the DM’s optimal
choice of Q and D induce an optimal performance P ∗(r), which we call the performance
function. We can estimate P ∗(r) from stochastic choice data, and by studying its properties,
we can infer the properties of the DM’s cost function.
Given some choice of Q, the DM should optimally choose D so that given a signal, she
chooses the most likely state; put differently, she should choose the matrix D that selects
the maximal element in each column of Q. Thus, if the DM’s choice of D is optimal, then:








3.4 Uniform Guess Tasks
3.4.2. Rational Inattention
In uniform guess tasks, NIAC can be tested by looking at the performance function P ∗(r).
Proposition 5. In a set of uniform guess tasks, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAC
iff P ∗(r) is nondecreasing.
In other words, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAC if and only if she performs no
worse when given higher incentives; she allocates her attention such that she pays more
attention to more valuable tasks.
For testing NIAS in uniform guess tasks, we require a more detailed summary of the data
than the performance function; simply looking at which questions were answered correctly
or incorrectly is insufficient.
Proposition 6. In a set of uniform guess tasks, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAS
iff ∀x ∈ A, ∀ y ∈ Θ,Pr(θ = x|a = x) ≥ Pr(θ = y|a = x).
In other words, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAS if and only if the mode of each
posterior distribution of states given an action is equal to that action; if an outside observer
were to see the DM’s actions without observing the true states, then his best guess of the
true state for any task would be the answer given by the DM.
3.4.3. Responsiveness
Responsiveness is easy to establish in a stochastic choice data set where the decision problems
are uniform guess tasks. It corresponds to some region of the DM’s performance function
having a strictly positive slope. To see this, note that any set of uniform guess tasks that has
a pair of tasks with different reward levels satisfies the conditions required for the definition
of responsiveness. This is because the utilities associated with payoff-maximizing actions are
constant within each corresponding payoff matrix and higher in one payoff matrix than the
other. Furthermore, the utilities associated with non-payoff-maximizing actions are all zero.
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Therefore, responsiveness in uniform guess tasks boils down to there being at least one pair
of reward levels such that the DM performs strictly better at the higher reward level than
at the lower one.
Thus, responsiveness implies that the performance function cannot be flat everywhere. In
other words, it must have a region of strict increase.
3.4.4. Well-Behavedness
In uniform guess tasks, Proposition 3 has a simple implication for behavior: if the conditions
of the proposition are satisfied, then performance is continuous in reward.
Proposition 7. If C satisfies Assumptions B, C, D, and E, then P ∗(r) is continuous.
Proof. Since optimal gross payoffs are given by rP ∗(r), this follows immediately from Propo-
sition 3.
Using the same contrapositive reasoning as we did in Subsection 3.3.5, this means that
if we observe a discontinuous performance function, then the DM’s cost function either is
discontinuous or violates almost strict convexity. We refer to subjects with continuous per-
formance functions as well-behaved or say they have behavior consistent with “well-behaved”
cost functions.
3.4.5. Perceptual Distance
In uniform guess tasks, where the action space is identified with the state space, the distance
between actions is the same as the distance between states. Perceptual distance refers to
the notion that distant states are easier to distinguish from each other than nearby ones.
For example, if Θ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and the true state is θ = 2, then the DM may be more
likely to answer 1 (which is 1 away from 2) than she is to answer 5 (which is 3 away from
2). This is especially plausible if the states in Θ represent physical, measurable quantities.
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To give a more concrete example, when shopping for televisions, one is much more likely to
misperceive a 27-inch screen as a 23-inch screen than as a 40-inch screen. We formalize this
notion below.
Definition 2. Let ρ be a metric on Θ. Then in this task, the DM evinces perceptual distance
iff ∀x, y, z ∈ Θ, ρ(x, y) > ρ(x, z) =⇒ Pr(a = y|θ = x) < Pr(a = z|θ = x).
In other words, the DM evinces perceptual distance if for each possible true state, she is
more likely to choose an answer (i.e. an action) close to the true state than one farther away
from it.
Though one can define a metric on a given set in many different ways, it makes sense to
take ρ to be a “natural” metric on Θ. For instance, if Θ is a subset of the real line as in
the example above, then absolute value, ρ(x, y) = |x − y|, may be a sensible metric to use.
Since the state space in our experiment is such a subset, absolute value is the metric we use
in analyzing our experimental results.21
3.5. Cost Functions
The space of admissible cost functions is vast. Indeed, any cost function C : ∆(Θ)×Q −→ R¯
leads to behavior consistent with NIAS and NIAC. In this subsection, we introduce the
classes of cost functions that are most relevant for our analysis and derive their behavioral
implications.
3.5.1. Mutual Information
Mutual information is one of the most common information cost functions in the economic
literature, having been used since at least Sims (2003). Mutual information is defined as the
expected reduction in entropy from the prior to the posterior. In other words, it measures
21This would also hold for any strictly monotonically increasing transformation of ρ that preserves its metric
properties on Θ.
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how much of the uncertainty about the state of the world the DM expects to remove once
she updates her belief. Information structures that reduce more of this uncertainty on
average relative to the prior have higher mutual information, and therefore higher costs. If
we denote the mutual information cost function by I and entropy by H, then:
I(pi,Q) := α(H(pi)− E[H(pi|Q)]) = α
− n∑
i=1











where α > 0 and we adopt the convention that 0 ln 0 = 0 and 0 ln 00 = 0.
Mutual information satisfies some of the restrictions of Section 3.3.
Proposition 8. Mutual information is convex and satisfies Assumptions A, D, and E.
In uniform guess tasks, we can derive closed-form expressions for the DM’s optimal behavior.
Proposition 9. Suppose that pii = 1n ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} so that the prior is uniform on Θ and
that C(pi,Q) = I(pi,Q) := α(H(p)−E[H(pi|Q)]), α > 0, i.e. C is the mutual information cost









Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 1 of Matějka and McKay (2015).
Note that mutual information is convex, but it can be shown that it is not almost strictly
convex, i.e. it does not satisfy Assumption C.22 Therefore, Proposition 9 cannot be derived
as a special case of Proposition 3.
There are two important things to note about Proposition 9. The first is that mutual
information implies a logistic performance function, which is defined by a single parameter






























































. These two information
structures induce different distributions of posteriors (albeit with the same support). However, it can be
shown that any convex combination Qλ := λQ1 + (1 − λ)Q2, λ ∈ [0, 1] of them is such that I(pi,Qλ) =
λI(pi,Q1) + (1− λ)I(pi,Q2), thereby violating almost strict convexity.
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α. The second is that for any given true state θ, the probability of answering each incorrect
state is equally likely, i.e. a DM with a mutual information cost function does not evince
the perception of distance.
3.5.2. Fixed Costs
Another common model of information costs in the literature is “all-or-nothing” costs, where
the DM begins with no information but can become completely informed about the state of
the world if she pays a cost (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig et al., 2012). Here,
we generalize this form of costs by allowing for the DM to receive some information for free
and pay a fixed cost to receive more information; we do not stipulate that she must become
fully informed.23
We can represent this situation as follows. Let there exist Q, Q¯ such that Q = Q¯R for some
garbling matrix R (so that Q¯ is more informative than Q in the Blackwell sense) and:
C(Q) =

0, Q = Q
κ, Q = Q¯
∞, otherwise
(3.10)
According to this cost function, the DM can receive the information provided by Q for free,
but she must pay a fixed cost κ to acquire the information provided by Q¯.
Cost functions with fixed costs such as these can be seen as representing dual-system cog-
nitive processes (cf. Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003). In such processes, a
small amount of information may be acquired at a very low cost, but there is a fixed cost
to acquiring more information. This implies a discontinuity in the cost function between
information structures with “low” informativeness and those with “high” informativeness.
23A similar modeling assumption is made by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) in an asset market model, where
a trader can choose either to remain uninformed about asset returns or to receive a noisy signal about
returns at a fixed cost.
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In uniform guess tasks, each of the two admissible information structures Q and Q¯ induces a
corresponding performance level q and q¯, respectively, the former of which is achievable for
free and the latter of which costs κ. She is incapable of achieving a higher performance than
q¯. Therefore, the DM will pay the cost κ of acquiring information only when rq¯ − κ ≥ rq.
This implies a binary performance function: for r ≤ κ
q¯−q , the DM acquires no information
and achieves q, and for r > κ
q¯−q , the DM acquires enough information to achieve q¯.
Figure 3.1.: Fixed cost for information acquisition. The left panel shows the cost
function, and the right panel shows the resulting performance curve. Parameters are
κ = 30, q = 0.3, and q¯ = 0.8.
Cost functions of this subclass are easily recoverable from data by estimating the relationship
depicted in the right panel of Figure 3.1 and finding the incentive level threshold at which
the DM’s performance level jumps.24
3.5.3. Normal Signals
Some authors, such as Verrecchia (1982) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), have
assumed that the DM receives normally distributed signals about the underlying state of the




world, and she pays a higher cost for a more precise signal. In this subsection, we present
a standard normal signals framework. We then present a discretized version of it that is
compatible with our model and generates the same predictions.
Let Θ ⊂ R, so that we can order its elements from smallest to largest as θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θn,25
and suppose that the DM receives signals mˆ ∼ N(θ, σ2) about the state of the world θ. The
DM can choose the precision ζ2 := σ−2 of these signals, and she pays a costK(ζ) accordingly,
where K is increasing, convex, and differentiable.26
Now suppose that the DM has been given a uniform guess task and has received a signal mˆ.



































where φ(·) is the standard normal density. Notice that the denominator in (3.11) depends
only on mˆ; it is the same for all θ. Therefore, if the DM is trying to determine the most
likely state given her signal, she only needs to compare the numerators of (3.11) for each
possible θ; in other words, she only needs to find the state that maximizes the conditional
probability density of her signal.
Since the normal probability density function is symmetric around its mean, the condi-








for i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1}, and at θn if mˆ ≥ 12(θn−1 + θn).
This implies that if the DM guesses optimally given her signal, then her probabilities of
guessing state i given true state j are:




mˆ ≤ 12 (θ1 + θ2)
∣∣θ = θj) , i = 1
Pr
(
mˆ ∈ [ 12 (θi−1 + θi), 12 (θi + θi+1)]∣∣θ = θj) , i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1}
Pr
(
mˆ ≥ 12 (θn−1 + θn)
∣∣θ = θj) , i = n
(3.12)
25Recall that Θ is finite, so it has a minimal element θ1 and a maximal element θn.
26Note that K is defined as a function of the positive square root of the precision. However, for the sake of
parsimony, we will refer to it as the “cost of precision.”
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Since signals are normally distributed, the probabilities in (3.12) can be rewritten as:






2 (θ1 + θ2)− θj
))





2 (θi+1 + θi)− θj





2 (θn−1 + θn)− θj
))
, i = n
(3.13)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.



























If the distance between consecutive states is constant so that ∃ δ such that θi− θi−1 = 2δ for





[2Φ (ζδ) + (n− 2) (2Φ (ζδ)− 1)]−K(ζ) (3.15)
This assumption of equidistant states allows us to draw some conclusions about whether a
DM who receives normal signals necessarily evinces the perception of distance. The answer,
in general, is no. This is because the lowest possible state θ1 is guessed for any signal
mˆ ≤ 12(θ1 + θ2).27 If the costs of precision are very high, so that the DM selects a very low
signal precision, then her distribution of signals may have fat enough tails that for some
true state, guessing the lowest state is likelier than guessing the next outermost state, i.e.
Pr
(
mˆ ≤ 12(θ1 + θ2)
∣∣∣θ = θj) > Pr (mˆ ∈ [12(θ1 + θ2), 12(θ2 + θ3)]∣∣∣θ = θj) for some j ≥ 2.
However, while we cannot conclude that a DM with normal signals necessarily evinces the
perception of distance over the entire state space, we can say that she does if we restrict our
focus to guesses of inner states (i.e. states θ2 to θn−1).
27A symmetric argument applies to the highest possible state.
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Proposition 10. In a uniform guess task with equidistant states, a DM with normal signals
evinces the perception of distance for guesses of inner states; that is to say, ∀x ∈ Θ and
∀ y, z ∈ Θ \ {θ1, θn}, |x− y|> |x− z|=⇒ Pr(a = y|θ = x) < Pr(a = z|θ = x).
The assumption of equidistant states also allows us to determine the shape of the performance
function.
Proposition 11. A DM with normal signals and a convex, increasing cost of precision K(·)
with non-negative third derivative28 has a strictly concave performance function.
This type of performance function is depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2.: Normal signals with cost of precision given by K(ζ) = 4ζ2. The left panel
shows the cost function, and the right panel shows the resulting performance curve.
Thus far in this subsection, we have implicitly assumed an uncountable signal space. How-
ever, the model of Section 3.3 assumes a finite signal space. We can reduce this setup to one
with a finite signal space by assuming a set of signals {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} that are generated
with the probabilities given in (3.13). In other words, the information structure Q is such
that:
28This assumption on the third derivative is a technical assumption. It holds if, for instance, K is linear in
precision (i.e. quadratic in the square root of precision), as we assume later in the paper.
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2 (θ1 + θ2)− θj
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2 (θi + θi−1)− θj
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2 (θn−1 + θn)− θj
))
, i = n
(3.16)
The cost associated with information structures in this setup is then C(pi,Q) = K(ζ) if Q
has the form of (3.16) and ∞ otherwise.
3.5.4. Performance-Dependent Cost Functions
As we showed in Subsection 3.4.1, in uniform guess tasks the DM’s ex-ante gross payoff is
given by rtr(QDΠ). Therefore, their gross payoff depends directly on their performance
tr(QDΠ). It is possible that the DM selects a desired performance level and pays a cost that
depends only on this performance level.














, i.e. q is the






< r < K ′(1), then q solves r = K ′(q), and qi,j = 0 ∀ j > n, and moreover, q = P ∗(r)
is continuous.
If Q∗ is chosen as in Proposition 12, then the optimal decision matrix D∗ is such that its first
|A| rows form the identity matrix. This ensures that q is the subject’s performance. Then,
the cost function can be written as a function of q, i.e. K(q). For this reason, we refer to
the class of cost functions described in Proposition 12 as performance-dependent.
A subclass of cost functions that is easily recoverable from data includes the cost functions
from the second part of Proposition 12, i.e. those with continuously differentiable and strictly
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convex K.29 In that case, as the proposition states, r = K ′(q). Therefore, the performance
function is P ∗(r) = (K ′)−1(r), and the cost function can be recovered by inverting and
integrating the performance function. For example, if the performance function is affine,
then its inverse is also affine, and the inverse’s integral is quadratic; i.e. the cost function is
quadratic in performance.
Figure 3.3.: Quadratic costs. The left panel shows the cost function, and the right panel
shows the resulting performance curve.
29To place this class of cost functions into the framework of almost strict convexity, we can use the method







if q ∈ [ 1n , 1] and Q is such that the diagonal entries of ΠQ are maximal in their columns
q and the off-diagonal entries of Q are fixed fractions of the “remaining” probability in each row. (In
an experimental setting these fixed fractions would be estimated from a decision-maker’s distribution of
suboptimal choices, i.e. mistakes.) Stated more formally, let Ω be a n× n stochastic matrix with zeroes
on its diagonal and entries ωi,j . Then, as in Footnote 12, set Qˆ = {Q | qj,j ∈ argmaxipiiqi,j ∀ j and qi,j =
ωi,j(1− qi,i) for i 6= j} It is easily verified that this set is closed and convex. Then, provided K is strictly
convex, Assumptions B, C, D, and E hold on Qˆ, and using the reasoning of Footnote 19, continuity of the
performance obtains. We use the more general formulation of performance-dependent cost functions in
the main body of the paper to accommodate more general signal spaces and so as not to place theoretical
restrictions on a DM’s distribution of mistakes.
124
Estimating Information Cost Functions in Models of Rational Inattention
3.5.5. Summary
Table 3.1 summarizes the properties of the classes of cost functions discussed in this section.
It should be noted that each of these cost functions implies a different performance function
in uniform guess tasks. Therefore, which of these cost functions best reflects the DM’s
behavior can be determined by seeing which of the corresponding performance functions is
closest to the DM’s observed performance function.
Table 3.1.: Properties of cost functions
Cost Function Continuity Convexity Perceptual Distance Performance Function
Mutual information Yes (Weakly) convex No Logistic
Fixed costs No No Can accommodate Binary
Normal signals In precision In precision On inner states Concave
Strictly convex in performance Yes Strict in performance Can accommodate Inverse of derivative
Note: Perceptual-distance and performance-function properties of normal-signal costs are for state spaces with equidistant
spacing.
3.6. Experimental Design
The experiment we implemented involved a series of perceptual tasks, each for a potential
reward. In each of these tasks, subjects were shown a screen with a random arrangement
of dots and were asked to determine the number of dots on the screen. The number of
dots was between 38 and 42, inclusive, and each number was equally likely.30 Subjects were
informed of these facts; there was no deception or withholding of information about the
structure of the tasks. Subjects also completed tasks involving the identification of angles.
We refer to the first type of task as the “dots” task and to the second as the “angle” task.
Subjects generally did not exhibit responsiveness in the “angle” tasks, and so we relegate
their description and results to Appendix B.
Each task had a potential reward in an experimental currency called “points.” At the start




of each task, subjects were shown this reward, which we refer to as the incentive level, in
large characters for three seconds (e.g. Figure 3.4), before it was replaced with the random
dot arrangement (e.g. Figure 3.5). Displaying the incentive level before the dot arrangement
ensured that subject looking at the screen would see the incentive level before being able to
start the task. While the dot arrangement was on screen, the incentive level continued to
be displayed to the right of the screen, ensuring that subjects would not have to memorize
this number. Subjects then had as much time as they desired to determine the number of
dots on the screen before proceeding to the next task. If they answered correctly, then they
earned the potential reward; if not, then they earned no points for that task. Feedback
was not given until the end of the experiment. After completing the tasks (but before
receiving feedback) subjects completed a brief demographic questionnaire asking about age,
gender, and education. The questionnaire also asked subjects about the strategies they used
for determining the number of dots on each screen, as well as whether they varied their
strategies depending on the level of reward.
Figure 3.4.: Incentive display for a task
Subjects completed 200 tasks, each at an integer incentive level between 1 and 100, inclusive.
They were randomly shown either all 100 “dots” tasks or all 100 “angle” tasks first. Blocks
of tasks were balanced by incentive level to ensure roughly the same level of variation in
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Figure 3.5.: Arrangement of dots for a task
incentive throughout the experiment. Subjects were first shown each of the 50 odd incentive
levels between 1 and 100 in a random order, and were then shown each of the 50 even
incentive levels between 1 and 100 in a random order. This was repeated (in a different
random order) for the next 100 tasks.
Experimental earnings were determined as follows. One task from the first half the ex-
periment and one task from the second half of the experiment were randomly selected for
payment. The incentive level of each selected task determined the probability of winning
one of two monetary prizes. For example, if the first selected task had an incentive level of
84 and was answered correctly, and the second selected task had an incentive level of 33 and
was answered incorrectly, then this would give the subject an 84% probability of winning the
first prize and a 0% probability of winning the second prize. Determining earnings in this
manner ensured that expected earnings were linear in the incentive level, which obviated
the need to elicit risk preferences. In other words, this ensured that under the assumption
of expected utility theory, the subjects’ utilities (ignoring information costs) were known to
us (up to a multiplicative constant). Thus, the estimated relationship between performance
and incentive level for each subject could be considered a valid estimate of their performance
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function, without the need to apply any additional transformation.
As mentioned above, subjects completed 200 tasks in total: 100 “dots” tasks and 100 “angle”
tasks. They either completed all the “dots” tasks or all the “angle” tasks first, and this order
was randomly determined.31 For 41 subjects, the prizes were $10 US, and for 40 subjects,
the prizes were $20 US. In addition, subjects were paid a $10 participation fee.
All sessions were conducted at the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences
(CELSS) at Columbia University, using the Qualtrics platform. We ran 8 sessions with a
total of 81 subjects, who were recruited via the Online Recruitment System for Economics
Experiments (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015b).
3.7. Basic Results and Categorization
In this section, we present the main results of our laboratory experiments. First, we consider
choice data in the aggregate. Then we perform an individual-level analysis to classify sub-
jects according to whether they are rationally inattentive, are responsive to incentives, have
violations of convexity and/or continuity in their cost functions, and evince the perception
of distance.
3.7.1. Demographic Data
Table 3.2 lists basic demographic data for the laboratory subjects. The pool is fairly gender-
balanced;32 the null of perfect gender balance cannot be rejected (two-sided test of propor-
tions, p = 0.146). The pool is also highly educated; over 55% of laboratory subjects have
completed a post-secondary degree. In general, demographic characteristics are not strong
determinants of subjects’ behavior in this experiment. Additional experimental results re-
lated to demographics are provided in Appendix E.
31In the online version of this experiment, subjects completed 200 “dots” tasks and no “angle” tasks. Results
and further details can be found in Appendix C.
32Subjects were given the option to list their gender as “other/non-binary.” No subjects used this option,
though one subject declined to disclose their gender.
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Table 3.2.: Laboratory Demographics
Number of subjects n = 81
Gender (n = 80) 41.3% male; 58.8% female
Age (n = 80) Average: 23.00; St. dev.: 4.17
Highest level of education achieved (n = 81)
Some post-secondary 44.4%
Completed bachelor’s degree 29.6%
Completed graduate or professional degree 25.9%
Area of study (n = 80)
Economics, psychology, or neuroscience 24.7%
3.7.2. Choice Data
The data we are most interested in for each task t are the incentive level rt, the true state
of nature θt, and the subject’s response at. For each task, define the subject’s correctness as
yt := 1{θt} (at). That is, yt takes the value 1 if the subject correctly determined the state of
nature in task t and 0 otherwise.
We are primarily interested in the relationship between correctness and incentive level. We
can think of the pattern of successes and failures that we observe as being generated by some
underlying data-generating process that for every possible reward level tells us the probability
of answering correctly. We denote this probability by Pt := Pr(yt = 1|rt) = Pr(at = θt|rt)
for each task t; in other words, the underlying data-generating process is the performance
function. Using the correctness data allows us to infer properties of the performance function,
which in turn allows us to infer properties of the cost function that generated it. (Figure 3.6
provides an example of what such a performance function might look like.)
In particular, we can answer some of the questions raised in the introduction:
• Do subjects behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of rational inattention?
• Do they respond to incentives?
• Do they exhibit evidence of non-convexities or discontinuities in their cost functions?
(Put differently, are their cost functions not “well-behaved”?)
• Do they evince the perception of distance?
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Figure 3.6.: Isotone nonparametric regression of correctness on incentive level for
Laboratory Subject 3 (Dette et al., 2006)
We are able to categorize subjects according to their answers to these questions. First, we
classify them by whether or not they are rationally inattentive. Then, we classify rationally
inattentive subjects by whether or not they are responsive to incentives. This subset of
subjects is the subset of greatest interest to us; these are the subjects for whom we can
estimate performance functions and back out corresponding information cost functions. We
classify responsive subjects according to whether or not their behavior is consistent with
“well-behaved” (i.e. continuous, convex) cost functions. Finally, we classify all rationally
inattentive subjects according to whether or not they evince the perception of distance. This
categorization scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
However, before proceeding with this categorization exercise, we analyze the subjects’ data
in the aggregate.
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Table 3.3.: Regressions of correctness on incentive level and demographic covariates
(1) (2)




















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
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Figure 3.7.: Categorization of subjects
3.7.3. Aggregate Analysis
Table 3.3 displays a regression of correctness on incentive level. The regression in column 2
includes demographic covariates, including age (in years) and dummies for maleness, holding
at least a bachelor’s degree, studying economics, psychology, or neuroscience, participating
in the $20 prize treatment, and being shown the “dots” tasks before the “angle” tasks. It
also controls for the order in which tasks were completed.
It is apparent that in the aggregate, performance is higher at higher incentive levels. In
particular, on average each increase of 1 point in incentive level results in a 0.3% increase in
the probability of answering correctly.
For the most part, demographic covariates have no significant effect on performance. More-
over, there is no significant effect of doing the “dots” tasks before the “angle” tasks. However,
performance does decline slightly over time, indicating that subjects may experience some
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fatigue.33
3.7.4. Rational Inattentiveness
We now proceed with the individual-level categorization exercise.
Before testing the properties of the subjects’ cost functions, it is necessary to determine
whether there exists a cost function that rationalizes their data in the first place. To that
end, we test the necessary and sufficient “no improving attention cycles” and “no improving
action switches” conditions by testing the equivalent conditions established in Subsection
3.3.3.
3.7.4.1. No Improving Attention Cycles
As demonstrated in Proposition 5, a subject satisfies NIAC in our experiment if and only if
their probability of correctly guessing the state is non-decreasing in the reward. This implies
that rationally inattentive subjects have non-decreasing performance functions.
At this point, a clarification is in order. As we showed in Proposition 5, NIAC holds in a set
of uniform guess tasks iff for any pair of decision problems (r1, r2) with r1 > r2, we have that
P ∗(r1) ≥ P ∗(r2). Observationally, this means that the subject had more correct answers
under incentive level r1 than incentive level r2. However, in our experiment each subject
is given each decision problem only once. Therefore, the empirically-observed probabilities
of answering each decision problem correctly are either 0 or 1. If were to apply the NIAC
condition directly to our data, this would mean that the only subjects whose behavior is
33The effect of task number on performance vanishes if we only consider the second half of the data, i.e. the
last 50 tasks for each subject. (Recall that the first fifty tasks contained the odd-numbered incentives,
and the last fifty tasks contained the even-numbered incentives, so each half of the data contains the same
range variation in incentives as the whole data set.) This is consistent with some portion of the subjects
choosing to exert effort early in the experiment before succumbing to fatigue. As further evidence of this
explanation, we find fewer subjects who are responsive to incentives when considering only the last fifty
tasks as compared to when considering all tasks (33 (40.7%) as compared to 45 (55.6%)). In that case,
the subsequent individual-level analysis can be thought of as estimating behavior in the first half of the
data, with random noise coming from the second half of the data for subjects who stop exerting effort.
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consistent with NIAC would be those who always answer incorrectly up to some incentive
threshold after which they always answer correctly. Given the stochasticity of choice under
limited attention, this scenario is implausible.
Therefore, rather than strictly interpreting our data as stochastic choice data and making
direct pairwise comparisons of decision problems to test NIAC, we adopt an estimation-
based approach. We estimate the performance function given correctness data and see if
this estimate is significantly different from a non-decreasing function, in which case we reject
NIAC. In theory, unless there is some reward threshold below which the subject is never
correct and above which the subject is always correct, the fit of a monotone performance
function can be improved by adding peaks and troughs. The question, then, that we wish
to pose is not whether a non-monotone or decreasing function can fit the data, but whether
we can reject the hypothesis that a non-decreasing function explains the data.
To test for weak positive monotonicity, we employ a method developed by Doveh et al. (2002)
and compare the estimation of an unrestricted cubic polynomial regression of correctness on
incentive level for each subject to one with a positive derivative restriction.34 The null
hypothesis for this test is that the response function is monotonic. At the 5% level, we
fail to reject positive monotonicity for 77 out of 81 lab subjects (95.1%).35 Examples of
polynomial regressions and correctness data for two subjects, one who rejects NIAC and one
who fails to reject NIAC, are depicted in Figure 3.8.
34Several other methods in the statistical and econometric literatures have been devised to test for the
monotonicity of regression, including but not limited to Bowman et al. (1998), Ghosal et al. (2000), Hall
and Heckman (2000), Birke and Dette (2007), and Chetverikov (2013), most of which are nonparametric.
We use Doveh et al.’s (2002) parametric test because it is less prone to rejecting monotonicity when there
are outliers, e.g. a lone failure in a region of success, or vice versa.
35The optimization in the computation of the restricted regression for lab subject 35 failed to converge, and
so we did not perform the test for them. For that subject, a one-tailed t-test of the coefficient on incentive
level in a linear regression of correctness on incentive level failed to reject the null of the coefficient being
non-negative at the 5% level, and so we classify them as having a non-decreasing performance function.
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Figure 3.8.: Unrestricted cubic polynomial regression of correctness on incentive level for
Subjects 1 and 19. The former rejects NIAC (and therefore rejects rational
inattentiveness), and the latter fails to reject NIAC.
3.7.4.2. No Improving Action Switches
To test for the second necessary and sufficient condition for rational inattentiveness, NIAS,
we cannot simply simply examine the estimated performance function; we must look at the
posterior probabilities of each state given each response. We employ a bootstrap procedure.
For each subject and response, we calculate the empirically observed distribution of true
states, i.e. we calculate Pr(θ|a).36 We then simulate 499 bootstrap samples for each distri-
bution.37 If the most common true state is the one corresponding to the response in at least
5% of samples for each response for a given subject, then that subject fails to reject NIAS.
Overall, we find that 74 out of 81 (91.3%) laboratory subjects fail to reject NIAS.
Overall, 70 out of 81 (86.4%) laboratory subjects fail to reject both NIAC and NIAS. We
36It should be noted that strictly speaking, the NIAS condition applies separately to each decision problem
that the DM faces. Since each subject faces each incentive level only once, they actually face 100 different
decision problems. For that reason, we test a slightly weaker condition: whether an individual exhibits
overall systematic misuse of information. Systematic misuse of information in one decision problem
implies overall systematic misuse of information.
37Simulating 1 fewer than 500 bootstrap samples ensures that Type I error probabilities are exact (cf. Section
4.6 of Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).
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refer to these subjects as “rationally inattentive,” or simply “rational,” subjects.
3.7.5. Responsiveness
Of the subjects who fail to reject rational inattentiveness, some of them may have flat
response functions, i.e. while they could be rationally inattentive, they do not actually
respond to incentives (within the range of incentives presented to them).
To determine which subjects are responsive to incentives, for each subject who failed to reject
rational inattentiveness, we run a linear weighted least squares regression of correctness on
incentive level and run a one-sided t-test of the coefficient on incentive level with the null of
non-positivity, i.e. non-responsiveness to incentives. However, this is insufficient to capture
all responsive subjects; a subject may be responsive only within a small range of incentives.
To address this issue, for each subject, we repeat this procedure on incentive levels 1 through
50 and on incentive levels 51 through 100.38 If a subject has a significantly positive coefficient
on incentive level in any of these three regressions, then we classify them as responsive.39
At the 5% significance level, 42 out of 70 lab subjects (60.0%) who fail to reject rational
inattentiveness are responsive to incentives. Examples of full-sample linear regressions and
correctness data for two subjects, one who fails to reject non-responsiveness and one who
rejects non-responsiveness, are depicted in Figure 3.9.
3.7.6. Well-Behavedness
If the assumptions of Propositions 7, 9, 11, or 12 are satisfied (the cost function is almost
strictly convex, the cost function is a strictly convex function of accuracy, the cost function
implies convexity in the square root of the precision of a normal signal, or the cost function
38Further sample splitting leads to the spurious detection of responsiveness; it leads to some subjects with
>95% success being classified as responsive.
39We must consider the full-sample regressions in tandem with the split-sample regressions. If we considered
only the split-sample regressions, then we would classify subjects who have binary-response performance
functions with thresholds around 50 as non-responsive.
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Figure 3.9.: Linear regressions of correctness on incentive level for two subjects. The left
panel shows an unresponsive subject, and the right panel shows a responsive one.
is mutual information, respectively), then the performance function should be continuous in
r; i.e. it should be well-behaved. Therefore, observing a discontinuity in the performance
function is an indication that the cost function is not almost strictly convex in the information
structure, strictly convex in the probability of correctly determining the state, strictly convex
in the square root of the precision of a normally-distributed signal, or mutual information,
i.e. convexity is violated.
Strictly speaking, one cannot definitively observe a discontinuity without an infinite data set;
a continuous function with a sufficiently steep slope at points of potential discontinuity can
always be used to fit finite data. Therefore, for each subject, the question we wish to answer
is whether it is more plausible that a discontinuous performance function or a continuous
performance function generated their correctness data. This implies a statistical test where
the null hypothesis is that the performance function belongs to some class of discontinuous
functions, and the alternative is that the performance function belongs to some class of
continuous functions.
We test for the presence of a discontinuity by applying a likelihood ratio test. We estimate
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a regression of the form:40
Pt = β0 + β11≥δ(rt) (3.17)
where β0, β1, and δ are the parameters to be estimated and compare its likelihood to an
estimation of the following logistic relationship:
Pt =
β1
1 + exp(−λ(rt − δ)) + β0 (3.18)
It can be shown that (3.17) is the pointwise limit of (3.18) as λ goes to infinity. Therefore,
(3.17) can be seen as the restricted null model, and a likelihood ratio test comparing these
models is effectively a test of the null hypothesis that λ = ∞, i.e. it is a test against the
null hypothesis that there is a jump discontinuity. Since we are performing this test only on
responsive subjects, our estimates of β1 for each subject should be positive, and therefore this
procedure should not detect spurious downward jump discontinuities for those subjects.41
Using this test, at the 5% level we cannot reject that 29 out of 42 responsive lab subjects
(69.0%) have discontinuities in their response functions.
3.7.7. Perceptual Distance
A mutual-information cost function, among others, does not embed a concept of perpetual
distance. What that means in our experiment is that mutual information predicts that given
a true state of nature, each incorrect response is equally likely. For example, if the true
number of dots is 39, reporting 42 should be just as likely as reporting 38 for an individual
40We use the procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) for this estimation.
41Several procedures for detecting discontinuities have been proposed in the econometric literature. See, for
example, Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Bai and Perron (1998), and Porter and Yu
(2015). All of these procedures are designed to detect both positive and negative jump discontinuities,
and so they are vulnerable to the detection of spurious negative jumps in our setting. A clarification is
in order here. Bai and Perron (1998) propose both an estimation procedure and a testing procedure for
models with structural breaks with unknown discontinuity points. We use their estimation procedure to
estimate (3.17), but we do not use their testing procedure.
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with a mutual information cost function, even though the difference between 42 and 39 is 3,
whereas the difference between 38 and 39 is 1. Taking absolute value as the natural metric on
{38, . . . , 42}, this means that if a subject’s cost function is such that they evince perceptual
distance, then given a true state of 39, then they should be more likely to report 38 than 42.
For each subject and trial t, we compute the error distance ρ(at, θt) = |at − θt|. In our
experiment this distance in an integer in {1, 2, 3, 4}. In order to test for perceptual distance,
for each responsive subject we compute the distribution of error distances that would be
predicted if the subject were to be equally likely to make any mistake in each state, given
the empirically observed distribution of true states and the subject’s overall accuracy rate.
We then compare the empirically observed distribution of error distances to this distribution
using a chi-square test.
At the 5% level, we find that 26 out of 42 responsive lab subjects (61.9%) have a distribution
of mistakes that evinces perceptual distance. Of course, the notion that perceptual distance
matters for error distance distributions is not limited to responsive subjects; mutual infor-
mation implies responsiveness (i.e. a strictly increasing performance function), so subjects
who are not responsive have already rejected mutual information for other reasons. But as
a test of the general notion that each possible mistake is equally likely given an true state of
nature, it is worth running these tests on the entire pool of rationally inattentive subjects.
At the 5% level, we find that 45 out of 70 rationally inattentive lab subjects (64.3%) reject
this hypothesis.
3.7.8. Summary of Categorization
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of preceding subsections. Each cell indicates the number
and percentage of row category subjects in the column category. It should be noted that the
vast majority (86.4%) of subjects are rationally inattentive, and moreover, most rationally
inattentive subjects are responsive (60.0%). Also of note is the fact that most rationally
inattentive subjects evince the perception of distance (64.3%).
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Table 3.4.: Categorization of subjects
Category Of All Subjects Of R.I. Subjects Of Resp. Subjects Of P.D. Subjects
All subjects 81 (100%) — — —
R.I. subjects 70 (86.4%) 70 (100%) — —
Resp. subjects /// 42 (60.0%) 42 (100%) 26 (57.8%)
W.B. subjects /// /// 13 (31.0%) 8 (17.8%)
P.D. subjects /// 45 (64.3%) 26 (61.9%) 45 (100%)
Note: “R.I.” = rationally inattentive; “Resp.” = responsive; “W.B.” = well-behaved, i.e. subjects
whose behavior is consistent with continuous, convex cost functions; “P.D. Subjects” = subjects
who evince the perception of distance. — denotes that the column category is a subset of the row
category, and /// denotes that the row category is defined only on a subset of the column category.
3.8. Model Selection
In this section, for each responsive subject we fit several possible parametric functional
forms for performance functions, each of which can be generated by some cost function.
These models are listed in Table 3.5.42
Table 3.5.: Performance functions estimated and their corresponding cost functions
Cost Function Performance Function Estimation
1 Very high or low marginal or absolute costs Constant OLS
2 Dual-process or concave Binary BP98
3 Discontinuous or has non-convexity Affine with break BP98
4 Quadratic in accuracy Affine (without break) WLS
5 Integral of inverse of 2nd degree polynomial in accuracy 2nd degree polynomial WLS
6 Integral of inverse of 3rd degree polynomial in accuracy 3rd degree polynomial WLS
7 Mutual information or logit cost Logistic MLE
8 Normal signals with linear cost of precision Concave MLE
Note: BP98 = Bai and Perron (1998)
3.8.1. Description of Models
We now describe each of these models.
42The reason that we do not consider the channel capacity cost function is because since the prior distribution
in our task is uniform, channel capacity would be consistent with the same behavior as mutual information
(cf. Section 1.2.3 of Woodford, 2012)
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Model 1. Since we perform this model selection exercise only on responsive subjects, we fit
a constant performance function as a robustness check. A flat performance function obtains
when there is a single performance level such that a subject’s cost for higher performance
is too high to warrant improvement for any incentive level and their savings in terms of
information costs are too low to warrant lowering their performance at any incentive level.
Models 2 and 3. These models have discontinuous performance functions, implying by
Proposition 7, 9, 11, or 12 that the corresponding cost functions have some violation of
convexity or continuity. We estimate Model 2 by:
Pt = β0 + β11≥δ(rt) (3.19)
and Model 4 by:
Pt = β0 + β11≥δ(rt) + β2rt + β3rt · 1≥δ(rt) (3.20)
where δ is the location of the discontinuity, using the linear structural change estimation
technique of Bai and Perron (1998).
Given the estimates of (3.19), we can recover the parameters of the corresponding fixed-cost
information cost function (3.10). It is clear that q = βˆ0 and q¯ = βˆ0 + βˆ1. As shown in
Subsection 3.5.4, the location δ of the discontinuity in the performance function is given by
κ
q¯−q . Therefore, κ = δˆ(βˆ1 − βˆ0).
A performance function of the form of (3.19) could also be obtained from a concave infor-
mation cost function. To illustrate, consider for simplicity a subject who has a cost function
K that is concave in performance, as depicted in Figure 3.10.
Net payoffs are maximized when the positive distance between gross payoffs and costs is
largest. For low reward levels (such as r1), this happens at the no-information performance
level, 0.2. For high reward levels (such as r2), this happens at the full-information per-














































Figure 3.10.: Concave costs
acquiring no information if the incentive is low and acquiring full information if the incentive
level is high.
Model 3 nests Model 2, and so it can correspond to a wider class of cost functions, including
those of similar form to (3.10), but with two convex components as opposed to only two
admissible information structures.
Models 4, 5, and 6. These models estimate continuous performance functions, and since
these models are estimated only for responsive subjects, these estimated performance func-
tions should be increasing. As explained in Subsection 3.5.4, this means we can recover the
corresponding information cost functions by inverting and taking the antiderivative of the
estimated performance functions. While the quadratic and cubic performance functions of
Models 5 and 6 do not have very simple closed forms for their corresponding cost functions,
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Model 4’s corresponding cost function can be easily recovered from its estimate:
Pt = β0 + β1rt (3.21)
In this case, inverting and integrating the performance function gives us the performance-
dependent cost function K(P ), where:
K(P ) = 1
2βˆ1
(P 2 − 0.04)− βˆ0
βˆ1






= 0, i.e. that acquiring no information entails no cost.
Model 7. As we showed in Proposition 9, a mutual information cost function implies a










However, Proposition 9 also implies that if a subject evinces the perception of distance, then
they cannot have a mutual information cost function. To reconcile logistic performance with
perceptual distance, one can assume that the subject actually has a performance-dependent
cost function and apply the inversion-and-integration procedure of Subsection 3.5.4. This
gives the following “logit” cost function (assuming that acquiring no information entails no
cost):






+ ln(1− P ) + ln(1.25)
)
(3.24)
Model 8. For this model, we assume that the subject receives normal signals with precision
ζ2 and the cost of a signal is linear in precision, as in the numerical example of Section 5
of Verrecchia (1982). Therefore, the cost of a signal is K(ζ) = αζ2. α is the parameter we
wish to estimate for each subject.
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3.8.2. Comparison of Models
We now run a “horse race” to determine which model is the best fit for each subject. Since
the models are non-nested and are estimated using different estimation techniques, we cannot
use a traditional auxiliary regression method for model selection. To determine which model
is the best fit for each responsive subject, we estimate each model for each such subject
and then compare their Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (cf. Section 8.5 of Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005), selecting the model that yields the lowest AIC. The results of this selection
are given in Table 3.6.43
Table 3.6.: Model Selection for Responsive Subjects
Model Binary (2) Logistic (7) Concave (8)
Number of Subjects 10 (23.8%) 26 (61.9%) 6 (14.3%)
All responsive subjects are best fit by binary (fixed costs), logistic (mutual information
or “logit” performance dependence), or concave performance (normal signals with linear
precision cost). The first implies some sort of non-convexity or discontinuity in the cost
function, whereas the latter two are consistent with convex cost functions. Figures 3.11,
43As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis with the small sample-corrected AIC (AICc), where
AICc = AIC + 2k(k+1)T−k−1 , T is the number of tasks, and k is the number of parameters in the model
(Technically, the small sample correction should depend on the underlying model, but this particular
correction formula is said to be appropriate for a wide variety of settings. For more information, refer to
Subsection 7.4.1 of Burnham and Anderson, 2002). Our qualitative findings are completely unaffected.
In particular, none of the subjects have a different best-fitting model under the AICc than under the
AIC.
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3.12, and 3.13 show what these performance functions look like for three subjects.


















































Figure 3.11.: This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal)
performance for Subject 6, with the best-fitting binary model in red.
Table 3.7 shows the average estimated AIC and rank of each model in the “horse race.”44
Models 2 (binary), 3 (affine), and 7 (logistic) have the lowest ranks on average. Flexible
polynomial fits do quite poorly; the average rank of a cubic performance function (Model 6)
is higher than that of the constant performance model (Model 1).
Note that the average AIC and rank for Model 7, the logistic performance function, is lower
than that of Model 2, the binary performance function, despite the fact that significantly
more subjects are best fit by Model 7 than by Model 2. This indicates that the binary model
is a decent fit when the best-fitting model is logistic, but the logistic model is a poor fit when
the best-fitting model is binary. When the logistic model is the best fit, the average rank of
the binary model is 2.577; however, when the binary model is the best fit, the average rank
of the logistic model is 4.100. Note also that the average rank of Model 8 (normal signals
































































Figure 3.12.: This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal)
performance for Subject 14, with the best-fitting logistic model in red.
with linear precision cost) is fairly high at 4.333. This indicates that when Model 8 is not
the best fit for a subject, it is a poor fit.
3.9. Reaction Times
In addition to data on subject responses, we also collected data on how much time subjects
spent on each task. We call this the reaction time.
3.9.1. Time and Attention
Thus far, in this paper, we have remained agnostic about the exact nature of what attention
comprises, and by corollary, we have remained agnostic about the exact source of information
costs. One possibility is that attention can be decomposed into a quantity component —
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Figure 3.13.: This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal)
performance for Subject 66, with the best-fitting concave (normal) model in red.
time spent on a task — and a quality component — how much effort is exerted during
that time. Here, we provide some suggestive evidence that attention indeed has a quantity
component.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 display linear regressions of reaction time on incentive level and correctness
on incentive level, respectively, aggregating over the subject pool. The coefficients on the
dependent variables in both regressions are positive and significant. In the case of the first
regression, this indicates that subjects respond to higher incentives by increasing the quantity
of attention paid to the task at hand. In the case of the second regression, this indicates that
increasing the quantity of attention results in higher performance; this is the speed-accuracy






















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
3.9.2. Dual-Process Mechanisms
As we showed in Subsection 3.8.2, choice data for approximately one-third of responsive
subjects are best fit by binary performance functions. This suggests that these subjects
employ two different strategies for determining the number of dots on the screen — one for
low incentives, and one for high incentives. In this subsection, we provide further suggestive
evidence for this hypothesis.
Figure 3.14 shows the histogram of reaction time on every task for the subject population.
The distribution of reaction times is clearly bimodal. There are at least two possible, non-
mutually exclusive explanations for this. One is that some portion of the subjects simply do
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Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
not exert any effort on the task and make a response at the earliest opportunity, while others
exert effort in acquiring information. Another is that subjects have binary performance
functions, choosing not to spend time acquiring information for some incentive levels but
choosing to do so for others.
The fact that a significant portion of subjects are best fit by binary performance functions
provides an explanation for the pattern observed in Figure 3.14. Some subjects make snap
decisions when confronted with low incentives but take the time to acquire information
at higher incentive levels. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.15, which shows the
histogram of reaction time on every task for responsive subjects only. Observe that this
histogram is also clearly bimodal.
To interrogate this question further, we run the dip test of Hartigan and Hartigan (1985)
on each subject’s reaction times to determine which ones have multimodal reaction time
distributions. We can reject the null of unimodality at the 5% level for 26 out of 42 responsive
subjects (61.9%). This is more than the number of responsive subjects whose data are best
fit by binary performance functions, meaning that some subjects with logistic or concave
performance functions do not have unimodal reaction time distributions. This suggests that
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Figure 3.14.: Histogram of reaction times for all subjects
rather than continuously adjusting their quantity of attention as incentive levels increase,
some subjects randomize between paying a high quantity and a low quantity of attention, and
the probability of paying a high quantity of attention increases as incentive levels increase,
resulting in a sort of “fuzzy” discontinuity.
This evidence implies that for a large portion of the subject pool (61.9%), there are two
information-acquisition processes that they can employ in this task. Still, there is a significant
portion of the pool (38.1%) that is apparently able to adjust their quantity of attention
continuously. As was the case with previous categorizations of subjects, there is significant
heterogeneity.
3.10. Application to the Delegation of Investment
The characteristics of the decision-maker’s cost function can obviously have effects on her
own decisions. But as we show in this section, these characteristics can also have effects on
150
Estimating Information Cost Functions in Models of Rational Inattention
Figure 3.15.: Histogram of reaction times for responsive subjects
economically-relevant outcomes when there is strategic interaction.
In order to demonstrate this notion, let us consider a situation in which an investor is
deciding which of n options to invest in, and he cannot split his investment across options.
Suppose that only one of these options can be a winner, in which case an investment in it
will pay a net return of x. Losing opportunities pay a net return of zero. This setup has the
relevant features of a situation where the success of an investment depends on the outcome
of a contest. Many economic situations, such as competing to be granted development rights
by the government for a plot of land, take the form of contests. Another salient example is
a patent race, where various firms compete to be the first to patent an invention, such as a
drug or a piece of technology.
Suppose that the investor wishes to delegate researching these options to an expert. This is
a common occurrence in reality; people frequently solicit the services of financial advisers,
presumably because it is prohibitively difficult or costly for laypeople to research investment
opportunities themselves, while financial advisers who are trained to seek and interpret
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financial information can research these opportunities at a much lower cost.
We can analyze this situation in a simple principal-agent framework, where the investor
is the principal and the expert is the agent.45 The agent acquires information about the
available investment opportunities at a cost and selects one of the options on the principal’s
behalf. Suppose that the principal employs the agent with a contract that pays r if the
agent correctly selects the winner and zero otherwise.46 Furthermore, suppose that a priori,
each option is equally likely to be the winner. Then, the agent’s problem can be represented




(x− r)P ∗(r) (3.27)
where P ∗(r) is the agent’s performance function.
As we established in Proposition 5, if the agent is rationally inattentive, then her performance
function is (weakly) increasing. Thus, the principal faces a trade-off between incentivizing
the agent to acquire better information and giving up a larger portion of his net return upon
success. The exact nature of this trade-off depends on the potential net return x and the
agent’s information cost function. In the following subsections, we analyze the properties of
the principal’s optimal payment strategy r∗ under the three cost function models fit by our
data: fixed costs; mutual information; and normally-distributed signals.47
45We use male pronouns for the principal and female pronouns for the agent.
46This type of contract is optimal for the principal if we assume that (a) there is a limited-liability constraint
so that the agent cannot earn a negative payoff in any state of the world, which implies that the principal
cannot “sell the firm” to the agent; and (b) the agent’s cost of an uninformative information structure
is zero. As CD15 demonstrate, the latter assumption is without loss of generality; it is not a testable
restriction on information cost functions.
47Some caution is required in applying the assumption of normally-distributed signals, because it implies
that the options have some existing ranking, and it is not clear what it means for the options to be
“equidistant” from each other. In any case, if the normal-signals model is excluded from consideration,
then in our data, the best-fitting model for each subject is either binary (fixed costs) or logistic (mutual
information). (Results available from the authors on request.)
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3.10.1. Fixed Costs
Suppose the agent has a fixed cost κ for acquiring information. If she pays the cost, then
she learns the winner with certainty. If not, then she learns nothing about the identity of
the winner. Thus, she chooses to acquire information if r − κ ≥ r
n
, i.e. when r ≥ κn
n−1 .
Therefore, if x < κn
n−1 , then the reward required to incentivize the agent to acquire infor-
mation is higher than the potential net return, so the principal is better off not hiring the
agent at all and simply picking an option at random. If instead x ≥ κn
n−1 , then the principal
could incentivize information acquisition by paying as little as r = κn
n−1 . To ensure that




n−1 , which holds if and only if x ≥ κn
2




(n−1)2 , the principal will
not hire the agent unless x ≥ κn2(n−1)2 .
To summarize: if x < κn2(n−1)2 , then the principal does not hire the agent and selects an option
at random. If x ≥ κn2(n−1)2 , then the principal hires the agent and gives her a payment of κnn−1 ,
and the agent picks the winner with certainty. This implies a discontinuity in the principal’s
payment as a function of the potential net return x. Figure 3.16 shows what this payment
scheme looks like for κ = 40.
3.10.2. Mutual Information
Suppose the agent has a mutual-information cost function with cost parameter α. Then,










If this maximand is strictly quasiconcave, then this problem has a unique solution for each x,
and the maximum theorem guarantees that the principal’s optimal choice of r∗ is continuous
in x. This turns out to be the case.
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Figure 3.16.: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, fixed costs
Proposition 13. If the agent has a mutual information cost function, then the principal’s
optimal payment strategy r∗(x) is continuous.
To provide an example, suppose n = 5, α = 10, and x ∈ [5, 100]. (A graph of the principal’s
maximand (3.28) is shown in Figure 3.17.) For these parameters, r∗(x) is continuous and
increasing, as shown in Figure 3.18.
3.10.3. Normally-Distributed Signals
Suppose that the options are ranked and equidistant on some scale. For example, in the
case of bidding for development rights, the projects could be ranked by the estimated length
of time until project completion.48 In this case, if the agent’s cost function satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 11, then it can be shown that the principal’s optimal choice of r∗
is continuous in x.
48Shorter completion times mean that the development will be more quickly available for public use, but
may also signal poor craftsmanship.
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Figure 3.17.: Principal’s expected payoff as a function of payment for x = 20, mutual
information costs
Proposition 14. If the options are ranked and equidistant, and the agent has a convex,
increasing cost of precision of normal signals with non-negative third derivative, then the
principal’s optimal payment strategy r∗(x) is continuous.
Figure 3.19 shows what this payment scheme looks like if costs are linear in the precision of
normally-distributed signals, with a marginal cost of precision of 7.5.
3.10.4. Hybrid Models
The previous subsections have studied the investment delegation model under the assumption
of a single type of cost function. However, the results of Section 3.8 indicate that there is
heterogeneity in individuals’ cost function types in the population.
To address this heterogeneity, we simulate the investment delegation model with a population
of agents, each of which could have a fixed costs (κ = 40), mutual information (α = 10), or
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Figure 3.18.: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, mutual information
costs
linear precision in normally-distributed signals (marginal cost of precision 7.5) for their cost
function.49
Figures 3.20 and 3.21 show the principal’s optimal payment scheme in this hybrid model.
Figure 3.20 uses the proportion of each cost function type found among responsive subjects
in our population, while Figure 3.21 uses a population with 50% fixed-cost agents, 40%
mutual-information agents, and 10% normal-signal agents. Notice that the optimal payment
scheme of the hybrid model resembles a mixture of the optimal payment schemes for each of
the individual cost function types, with, going from left to right, a flat region, followed by a
region of strict increase, followed by another flat region. These flat regions increase in size
when the proportion of fixed-cost agents is increased.
The examples of this section demonstrate that the characteristics of an agent’s information
cost function can affect how a principal’s decisions change with the parameters of his environ-
49We assume that agents are rationally inattentive and responsive.
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Figure 3.19.: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, normally-distributed
signals
ment. Some cost functions, like the fixed-cost function described above, induce the principal
to pay for information acquisition only when the potential net return is sufficiently high.
Others, like the mutual information cost function, cause the principal to vary his payment
continuously with changing potential net returns. In hybrid models combining these cost
functions, the optimal payment scheme resembles a mixture of the optimal payments of the
component cost function types.
3.11. Conclusion
This paper has provided a framework for testing properties of and estimating information
cost functions in models of rational inattention. To the extent that the presence or absence of
characteristics such as continuity, convexity, and perceptual distance can have an impact on
people’s decisions, it is worth knowing whether their cost functions satisfy such conditions.
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Figure 3.20.: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, hybrid model with
empirical proportions of types
Decision-makers’ cost functions are not directly observable, so instead we must infer their
characteristics from observed behavior. We conducted a set of experiments that allowed us
to implement tests of the properties of interest and perform a model selection exercise.
These experiments reveal substantial heterogeneity in behavior. Most subjects are rationally
inattentive, but only about half are actually responsive to incentives. Many subjects have
behavior that is consistent with continuous, convex cost functions, and many subjects have
behavior that evince the perception of distance as well. Moreover, there is considerable
heterogeneity in how subjects adjust their attention in response to incentives, though this
heterogeneity is limited to three classes of cost functions: fixed costs, mutual information,
and normal signals are the only best-fitting cost functions for responsive subjects in terms
of performance.
This has implications for economic modeling, for example optimal contracts for financial
experts. In models where agents acquire information, it is perhaps a better reflection of
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Figure 3.21.: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, hybrid model with
50% fixed-cost types
reality to allow for some heterogeneity in their fundamentals. In particular, one may want
to model some portion of the population as non-responsive to incentives for information
acquisition, and we recommend designating some responsive agents as having fixed costs
for information acquisition and others as having mutual-information or normal-signal cost
functions.
Two possible avenues for future experimental research present themselves. The first is to
obtain more detailed data on what subjects are actually paying attention to. Eyetracking
has already been used in several economics experiments (e.g. Wang et al., 2010; Krajbich
et al., 2010; Arieli et al., 2011) to track subjects’ gaze, which allows researchers to find out
what visual information the subjects are acquiring. Tracking subjects’ mouse movements in
computer-based tasks (e.g. Gabaix et al., 2006) is another potential approach, since those
movements indicate to which areas of their computer monitors they are paying attention.
The second is to use choice data in tandem with reaction time data to fit models of dynamic
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information acquisition. This would also allow researchers to determine to what extent
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A. Chapter 1 Additional Mathematical Details
A.1. 5 Node Game When C/B < 1
This section assumes you have already read Section 1.3.5. Note that when C/B < 1− δ we
know the complete network forms by Proposition SPE 1. However, we still have not covered
the solution to the 5 node game when C/B ∈ (1−δ, 1). In the region, the behavior of Player
5 changes. While Player 5 will still connect to a single node when facing most configurations,
when facing a chain,1 he will connect to any pair of nodes other than the first two nodes or
the last two nodes on the chain.
This means that Player 4 when faced by a chain can either choose to vie for dominance by
making 3 connections (payoff 3.5B+ 0.5δB−3C), play myopic moves (payoff B+ 3δB−C),
or connect to one end and lengthen the chain (payoff 1.5B + 1.5δB + δ2B − C). No other
moves can be optimal
Lengthening the chain is preferred to a myopic move when 0.5+δ2 > 1.5δ or when δ ∈ (0, 0.5).
Lengthening the chain is preferred to three connection vying when C/B > 1 − δ/2 − δ2/2.
Therefore Player 4 will choose to lengthen the chain if δ ∈ (0, 0.5) and C
B(1−δ) > 1.25 or when
1.25 > C
B(1−δ) > 1 +
δ−δ2
2(1−δ) .
If Player 4 chooses to extend the chain, after Player 3 plays a myopic move, Player 3 receives
2B + 138 δB +
3
8δ
2B − C which is preferred to vying when C/B > 23 − 724δ − 38δ2.
Therefore, if either δ ∈ (0, 0.5) and C
B(1−δ) > 1.25 or 1.25 >
C
B(1−δ) > 1 +
δ−δ2
2(1−δ) , then if
C/B > 23 − 724δ − 38δ2, Player 3 will play a myopic move, and C/B < 23 − 724δ − 38δ2, he
will vie. Player 4 will then lengthen the chain, and Player 5 will connect to a random pair
of nodes that is not the first or last two nodes on the chain. If neither δ ∈ (0, 0.5) and
C
B(1−δ) > 1.25 nor 1.25 >
C
B(1−δ) > 1 +
δ−δ2
2(1−δ) holds, then outcomes are as reported in Section
1.3.5.
1A chain is a network wherein all but two nodes in the are connected to precisely two other nodes with no
other connections. The last two nodes are each connected to precisely one node. This type of network is
the most “spread out” a network can be while remaining connected.
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A.2. Prediction 1 Robustness
Robustness Result: Prediction 1 is robust to the inclusion of behavioral noise in the
following sense. Assume C > B, J < 5, and players have a utility function u(x, η).We
assume that u(x, η) satisfies we could be using any functional form which satisfies (1) u(..., η)
is strictly more risk averse than u(..., η′) as long as η > η′ (2) u(x, 0) is linear in x, and (3)
u(..., η) becomes arbitrarily risk averse as η goes to infinity. We also assume that η ≥ 0, so
players are risk neutral or risk averse, not risk seeking.
In addition, assume players have a ρ ∈ [0, 1] probability of randomly mixing over moves
and a 1 − ρ probability of selecting their optimally in a subgame perfect manner, then it
still always optimal for each player to either connect to a single dominant node or vie for
dominance.
This is primarily a statement about Player 4 as Player 5’s optimal choice does not depend
on his beliefs about the behavior of others, and Player 3 must satisfy the prediction trivially.
Proof of Robustness: To start, note that Player 5’s optimal move is risk free in the no-risk
aversion model, so introducing risk aversion will not change it.
In this proof all of the conditional and unconditional probabilities of move types by Player
5 were found by brute force counting. If Player 4 does not vie for dominance then his
maximum chance of receiving a direct connection from Player 5 is ρ 815 . Assuming that he
made k connections, his maximum chance of receiving a second degree benefit from Player
5 is ρ 715f(k) + (1 − ρ) . Here f(k) is the probability that Player 5 will connect to at least
one of the k nodes that Player 4 is connected to without connecting directly to Player 4,
conditional on Player 5 acting randomly.
Note that f(1) = 47 , f(2) =
6
7 , f(3) =
7
7 . Therefore, if Player 4 connects to a single dominant
node, he gets a utility of ρ( 815u(2B+ 2b−C, η) + 715f(1)u(B+ 3b−C, η) + 715(1− f(1))u(B+
2b− C, η)) + (1− ρ)u(B + 3b− C, η)
. Connecting to a single non-dominant node will get him strictly less. By connecting to three
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nodes, Player 4 will automatically vie for dominance, so it suffices to show that connecting
to two nodes is always worse than connecting to a single dominant node. By connecting to
two nodes without vying for dominance, Player 4 makes at most ρ( 815u(3B + b − 2C, η) +
7
15f(2)u(2B + 2b− 2C, η) + 715(1− f(2))u(2B + b− 2C, η)) + (1− ρ)u(2B + 2b− 2C, η).
The gain from the second connection is maximized when ρ = 1, since u(B + 3b − C, η) >
u(2B + 2b− 2C, η).
We then compare 815u(2B+2b−C, η)+ 715f(1)u(B+3b−C, η)+ 715(1−f(1))u(B+2b−C, η)
to 815u(3B + b − 2C, η) + 715f(2)u(2B + 2b − 2C, η) + 715(1 − f(2))u(2B + b − 2C, η). Note
thatu(2B + 2b − C, η) > u(3B + b − 2C, η), so if we can show that f(1)u(B + 3b − C, η) +
(1 − f(1))u(B + 2b − C, η) > f(2)u(2B + 2b − 2C, η) + (1 − f(2))u(2B + b − 2C, η). This
must be the case, because B + 3b− C > B + 2b− C > 2B + 2b− 2C > 2B + b− 2C.
A.3. Risk Aversion Solution
In this section we provide detailed predictions of the 5 node game when players have risk
aversion as described in Section 1.6.4.
Risk Aversion Prediction 1: In the SPE of the game with heterogeneous risk averse utili-
ties in which players adopt a random tie-breaking approach, if C = 110, then the equilibrium
has the following features: Player 5 will connect to a single dominant node. Player 4 may.
Otherwise, Player 4 will connect to a single dominant node. Player 3 may vie for dominance
or choose a myopic move depending on the behavior of Player 4 and his own utility function.
Proof of Risk Aversion Prediction 1: Player 5’s behavior follows from the proof of SPE
Prediction 1. Player 4, knowing this, is willing to become a dominant node in order to gain
a potential connection from Player 5 as long as the cost is low and the probability of the
connection is high. Consider first what happens if Player 4 is facing a chain (which implies
one dominant node).
If Player 4 faces a complete network he will either connect to one node or all nodes. Con-
necting to two nodes is strictly worse than connecting to one, because it has higher costs
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with no benefit. Connecting to one node he again receives gi(Y + B − C + 3b) = gi(180)
points. Connecting to all nodes gives 0.25gi(Y + 4B − 3C) + 0.75gi(Y + 3B − 3C + b) =
0.25gi(230) + 0.75gi(140) points. In this case, Player 4 will connect to one node, because
that is the dominant option.
If Player 4 faces a chain, he can either connect to the dominant node earning gi(Y + B +
3b − C) = gi(180);2 connect to the ends of the chain becoming one of four dominant nodes
and earning 0.25gi(Y + 3B − 2C + b) + 0.5gi(Y + 2B − 2C + 2b)0.25gi(Y + 2B − 2C + b) =
0.25gi(250)+0.5gi(160)+0.25gi(150); or connect to all three nodes nodes becoming one of two
dominant nodes earning 0.5gi(Y +4B−3C)+0.5gi(Y +3B−3C+b) = 0.5gi(230)+0.5gi(140),
where the 0.5’s come from a one half chance that Player 5 will connect to node 4 and a one
half chance Player 5 will connect to the other dominant node.
Making one connection second order stochastically dominates making two, so Player 4 will
always either make one connection to a dominant node or three connections when facing a
chain, depending on the shape of ui(). Say that the probability of Player 4 having a gi()
such that vying for dominance is optimal is α.
Player 3 can either connect to one node or two. By connecting to a single node, Player 3
gets
(α)gi(Y + 2B + 2b− C) + (1− α)gi(Y +B + 3b− C) = αgi(270) + (1− α)gi(180)
By making two connections, Player 3 gets
1
3gi(Y + 4B − 2C) + 23gi(Y + 2B + 2b− 2C) = 13gi(340) + 23gi(160)
.
2connecting to one non-dominant node is strictly worse
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Note that if α > 5/9 making one connection second order stochastically dominates making
two connections. This can be shown by examining the area under the cumulative distribution
functions for each distribution. One can also see that when Player 3 is sufficiently risk averse,
he will make one connection, because the minimum payment for that choice is higher. If
Player 3 is risk neutral, he will prefer to make two connections if α < 4/9 and he will make
one connection if the reverse is true.
Now we consider the equilibrium when C = 140.
Risk Aversion Prediction 2: In the SPE of the game with heterogeneous risk averse utili-
ties in which players adopt a random tie-breaking approach, if C = 140, then the equilibrium
has the following features: Players 4 and 5 will choose myopic moves. Player 3 may choose
a myopic move or may vie for dominance depending on the shape of his utility function.
Proof of Risk Aversion Prediction 2: Player 5 will connect only to a single dominant
node as before for the reasons given in previous proofs. Additional connections cannot
provide Player 5 enough benefits to make up the costs.
If Player 4 faces a complete network he will either connect to one node or all nodes. Con-
necting to two nodes is strictly worse than connecting to one, because it has higher costs
with no benefit. Connecting to one node he again receives gi(Y + B − C + 3b) = gi(150)
points. Connecting to all nodes gives 0.25gi(Y + 4B − 3C) + 0.75gi(Y + 3B − 3C + b) =
0.25gi(140) + 0.75gi(90) points. In this case, Player 4 will connect to one node, because that
is the dominant option.
If Player 4 faces a chain, he can either connect to the dominant node earning gi(Y + B +
3b − C) = gi(150);3 connect to the ends of the chain becoming one of four dominant nodes
and earning 0.25gi(Y + 3B − 2C + b) + 0.5gi(Y + 2B − 2C + 2b)0.25gi(Y + 2B − 2C + b) =
0.25gi(190)+0.5gi(100)+0.25gi(90); or connect to all three nodes nodes becoming one of two
dominant nodes earning 0.5gi(Y +4B−3C)+0.5gi(Y +3B−3C+b) = 0.5gi(140)+0.5gi(50),
where the 0.5’s come from a one half chance that Player 5 will connect to node 4 and a one
3connecting to one non-dominant node is strictly worse
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half chance Player 5 will connect to the other dominant node. Connecting to one dominant
node second order stochastically dominates all other options.
Player 3 can then make one connection receiving gi(Y +B −C + 3b) = u(150) or make two
connections earning
1
3gi(Y + 4B − 2C) + 23gi(Y + 2B + 2b− 2C) = 13gi(280) + 23gi(100)
If 13gi(280) +
2
3ui(100) > ui(150) Player 3 will make two connections. If the reverse is true,
he will make one connection.
A.4. Finding a Population of Utility Functions that Support the Data
Here we examine whether the moments α˜ = 0.151, β˜ = 0.576, and κ˜ = 0.342 can be
supported be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with heterogeneous risk aversion.
Empirical Risk Aversion Proposition: There exists a population of utility function
which can generate the observed vying proportions (α˜, β˜, and κ˜) as outcomes of a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game with heterogeneous expected utilities.
Proof of Empirical Risk Aversion Proposition: For convenience we will refer to the
situations in which players may vie by their corresponding Greek letters (For example Player
3 in the C = 110 treatment is situation β). Given that we have observed β > κ > α and
estimate the population α, we are going to want a set of four utility {g1, g2, g3, g4} functions
with the following properties:
• Players will vie in situations α, β, and κ if they have g1 as their utility function.
• Players will vie in situations β and κ if they have g2 as their utility function but not
in situation α.
• Players will vie in situations β if they have g3 as their utility function but not in
situations α and κ.
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• Players will never vie if they have g4 as their utility function.
Note that what constitutes a valid set of utility functions will change based on α, because
Player 3’s incentives change based on the behavior of Player 4 in the C = 110 treatment.
Similarly, if one observed a different ordering over vying proportions, one would need to
switch the situations for which each utility function predicts vying in the corresponding
manner.
If we can find this set, we can easily construct a population which generates the observed
values for α, β, and κ. Simply say α˜ of the population has utility function g1, κ˜− α˜ of the
population has utility function g2, ˜beta − κ˜ of the population has utility function g3, and
everyone else has g4. Using the equilibrium characterization from Appendix Section A.3,
this gives us our result.
Now all that remains to be seen is whether such a set of function exists that can fit our
observed. Consider utility functions of the following type:
g(x, b, η) = (b+ x)
1−η
1− η
We can satisfy all the requirement by picking g1 = g(x, 2000, 5), g2 = g(x, 2000, 5.5), g3 =
g(x, 2000, 5.7), g4 = g(x, 2000, 10).
A.5. Comparison of Tie Breaking Approaches
We use random tie-breaking as our primary benchmark, because it seems to be most plausible
in the data, but other tie-breaking approaches can lead to other subgame perfect equilibria.
It can be illustrative to compare the random tie-breaking results to those derived from other
tie-breaking approaches. This comparison can provide the reader with a better understand-
ing of the range of behaviors that are possible under SPE. We will be comparing the uniform
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random tie-breaking approach to two other tie-breaking approaches which are opposite ex-
tremes. Under the stability seeking tie-breaking approach, players resolve indifferences in
favor of connecting to the oldest node. 4 Under the novelty seeking tie-breaking approach
players resolve indifferences by connecting to the newest node.5 For the sake of simplicity
we will assume risk neutrality throughout this section.
Figure .1 shows how the total connectivity of the resulting network under each tie-breaking
approach changes with C. It is important to note that the tie-breaking approach which yields
the most connections changes as C increases. Furthermore, we can immediately determine
which tie-breaking outcomes are more efficient. To the left of the purple line, more connected
outcomes are more efficient, while to the right of the line they are less so. Stable, random, and
novel tie-breaking all have parameter regions where they yield the most efficient outcome.
Figure .2 shows the payoffs made by each player in expectation in each of the discussed
equilibria. Payoffs for all players other that Player 1 tend to decrease as C increases, since
these players must make at least one connection. The payoffs for Players 3-5 converge as C
increases, because for high C they each make one connection resulting in a star network.
Under the random tie-breaking approach, there is a very thin spike around C = 100 indi-
cating the changeover from the mode wherein Player 5 sometimes makes two connections
to the mode wherein Player 5 makes exactly one connection. Player 2 does better than the
other connection making players under both the random and stability seeking tie-breaking
approaches, because he can be the center of the resulting star. In is notable the, under the
novelty seeking tie-breaking approach, when 135 < C < 180 for Player 3 is greater than
the payoff for Player 2. This is a rarity. In general earlier players have more opportunities
to receive future connections and hence they have higher payoff. The early mover almost
4When choosing between nodes with multiple connections, look first at the oldest node in each move then
going on to the second oldest in each and so on until one is older. An absence of nodes is considered to
have an age of 0. Most of these caveats will not come into play in the experimental game, but they are
important in order to make sure that the tie-breaking approach always produces a unique well defined
response.
5When choosing between nodes with multiple connections, look first at the newest node in each move then
going on to the second newest in each and so on until one is newer. An absence of nodes is considered to
have an age of 0. Again, most of these caveats will not come into play in the experimental game.
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Figure .1.: Connectivity versus cost. Purple line indicates the changeover between
connections being more efficient and connections being less efficient.
always has the advantage as far as payoffs are concerned.
Figure .3, provides a graph of gini coefficient of expected payoffs for each tie-breaking ap-
proach discussed. Looking at all nodes (Upper Left), it seems like the equality of the out-
comes is well ranked with tie-breaking approaches that favor to later nodes leading to a more
equal outcomes. The inequality is generally increasing with C except potentially at the mode
change point of C = 90. This increase is largely driven by two factors. First, Player 1 does
not have to make a connection, and therefore is unaffected by connection cost. Second, only
Player 1 and Player 2 can be the center of the star network for high C.
If we eliminate Player 1, the smoothness of the increase goes away for most tie-breaking
approaches (see Figure .3 Upper Right). If we eliminate both Player 1 and Player 2 then we
see a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and C as in Figure .3 (Lower), usually
peaking at C = 90. In general, decreasing C from 140 to 110 should decrease the inequality
of the expected outcome regardless of which of these tie-breaking approaches are employed.
This result does not change if one eliminates Player 1 and Player 2 from consideration.
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Vying for Dominance: An Experiment in Dynamic Network
Formation
Figure .2.: Payoffs in the experimental for each player by cost under different tie-breaking
approached.
B. Chapter 1 Additional Data
B.1. Node Dominance in the Final Network
The theory gives us predictions about which nodes should be the most connected nodes at
the end of the network formation process. In the C = 110 treatment, Node 4 should be the
most connected node with frequency 0.5, and Nodes 1 and 2 will be the most connected final
node the remainder of the time, split evenly between them. In the C = 140 treatment, Node
3 should all have a 1/3 chance of being the final dominant node, and Nodes 1 and 2 should
each have a 1/3 chance. The histograms of the frequency with which each node was one of
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Figure .3.: Graph of gini coefficient of expected outcome against C (Upper Left), Graph
of gini coefficient of expected outcome against C, no Player 1 (Upper Right), Graph of
gini coefficient of expected outcome against C, no Player 1 or Player 2 (Lower)
the final most connected are presented in Figure .4.
Note that, in addition to the deviations mentioned in the main body, we also see a strong
bias towards Node 2 in the C = 140 game, and a much milder bias in the C = 110 game. It
is unclear why this is the case, but it does not have a strong influence on incentives. Aside




Figure .4.: Histogram of the frequency for most connected node at the end of the network
formation process C = 110 (Left) and C = 140 (right). Red bar show the observed
proportion while blue bars show the predictions. Error bars show a 95% CI for the
observed proportion.
MPL 1 MPL 2 MPL 3
CRRA -log like 101.049 114.771 84.121
CARA -log like 115.120 207.944 157.588
Table .1.: Negative log likelihoods for observed choice behavior in each MPL using
individual level risk parameters estimated with CRRA and CARA utility functions.
B.2. CARA vs CRRA Risk Aversion Estimates
While there are no theoretical reasons to pick one functional form over another in this paper
when dealing with consistent subjects, we can compare theories on how well they predict the
actual data. We estimated risk preferences using both CRRA and CARA utility functions.
The negative log likelihoods for fitting the MPL data are reported in Table.1. The CRRA
utility function fits the choice data better in all cases. It also produces more significant
results in later analysis. Results using estimates from the CARA model are similar but
slightly weaker. They are reported in Appendix Section B.2.
Some readers may find it surprising that the CRRA utility function fits better than the CARA
function given the role that wealth effects play in CRRA and the small size of the gambles
relative to the presumed true wealth of the subjects. If one looks at the original paper of
Holt and Laury (2002), however, one can see that the estimate coefficient corresponding to
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CRRA risk aversion was more significant than the estimate corresponding to CARA utility
(15.8 standard errors from zero versus 1.1, [-values not reported). It may be that players are
treating each gamble as a separate prospect, independent of wealth.
Still as a robustness check, we report the results of analysis as in Section 1.6 but instead of




using Holt and Laury (2002) action probabilities as before
Note that we are again using η as the risk aversion coefficient in order to economize on
notation, although the quantity being measured is not the same. Table .2 summarizes the
estimated values for η.
Mean Eta SDev Eta Mean Mu SDev Mu
Panel 1 0.200 0 2 0
Panel 2 0.100 0.087 0.119 0.103
Panel 3 0.200 0 0.200 0
Overall 0.507 1.291 0.748 0.682
Table .2.: Summary statistics on CARA model parameters
The values are very tightly clustered around 0.1, although there is variation. CARA does not
work well, largely because it is very sensitive to people displaying undefined risk types, which
is quite common in our data. As such µ is quite high, which may lead to a flat objective
function and inaccurate estimates of η.
The CARA estimates do still have some predictive power. Tables .3 and .4 present regressions
of vying behavior on player characteristics with the ηis estimated using the CARA utility
function
Results for Player 4 facing one dominant node are similar to the CRRA case, but here the risk
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Adj R2 0.027 0.003 0.013
Obs 94 94 94
\
Table .3.: Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node. The
ηs are estimated using a CARA utility function with data from MPL 1. Errors clustered
at the individual level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
aversion is not significant. The coefficients on risk aversion are still negative, and sometimes
close to significant, but they never reach significance. The adjusted R2s are substantially
reduced.
Again results for Player 3 are similar to CRRA results. Risk aversion is significant in one
specification only, but the coefficients are consistently negative.
B.3. Controlling for Undefined Risk Type
Tables .5 and .6 repeats the analysis from the previous subsection without the players who
had undefined risk types on the MPL corresponding to each situation. While significance
is impacted in some cases due to the large number of dropped subjects, the coefficients are
very similar implying that the undefined subjects are not driving the results.
We can also address the question of whether undefined risk types are driving results more
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Adj R2 0.147 0.055 0.057
Obs 250 250 250
\
Table .4.: Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 3C = 110. The ηs are estimated
using a CARA utility function with data from MPL 2. Errors clustered at the individual
level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
directly by regressing vying behavior against η, a dummy for undefined risk type in the
corresponding MPL, and an interaction term. If the impact of η on vying for dominance
is significantly different for players with undefined risk types, then the coefficient on the
interaction term should be significant. Table .7 reports results of these regressions. In
neither situation is the coefficient on the interaction term significant.
B.4. Impact of Risk Aversion When Vying is Not Optimal
B.5. Alternative Behavioral Models
There are a number of of common behavioral models that one might consider as alternatives
to risk aversion for explaining the deviations from the base theory. In particular, many
experiments find predictive success with random utility models like the QRE model of McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1998) and heterogeneous sophistication models like the Level-K model of
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Variable Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node


















Adj R2 0.018 0.020 0.024
Obs 62 62 62
Table .5.: All players with undefined risk types on the corresponding MPLs
removed. Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node.
The ηs are estimated using a CARA utility function with data from MPL 1. Errors
clustered at the individual level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
Stahl and Wilson (1994). The risk aversion model does not provide a full stochastic model
of player behavior like these models do, so it cannot be compared directly on AIC without
imposing some error structure. There are, however, a few qualitative reasons to think that
these models will be unlikely to provide a good fit for the data on their own.
One of the moments of the data that we have devoted the most attention to is the proportion
of Player 4s in the C = 110 treatment facing one dominant node who vie for dominance by
making three connections. More players choose the myopic move in this case than vie for
dominance. QRE and other similar random utility models6 always predict that, in equilib-
rium, a player in a given state has actions a1 and a2 such that E(ui|a1) ≥ E(ui|a2) it must
be the case that action a1 is chosen weakly more often than action a2.
Because Player 4s in the C = 110 treatment facing one dominant node make more points
6those in the style of Block and Marschak (1960) RUM’s in which the perceptual errors on utilities are
drawn independent of the choices and utilities.
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Variable Player 3


























Adj R2 0.174 0.009 0.000
Obs 134 134 134
Table .6.: All players with undefined risk types on the corresponding MPLs
removed. Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 3C = 110. The ηs are estimated
using a CARA utility function with data from MPL 2. Errors clustered at the individual
level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
on average by vying than playing the myopic move, they should vie at least as often as they
play myopic the myopic move.7 Instead they vie significantly less. As such, the data does
not seem to be consistent with models of this type.
Level-K also fails to predict several key moments of the data, and similar models are also
unlikely to be more useful. Any player who is savvy enough to vie in position 3 should be
savvy enough to vie when conditions are right in position 4, since the backwards induction
reasoning is easier when there are fewer future players to consider.
For example, if level-0 is random behavior, then level-1 players would always play myopic
moves.8 We can use data on Player 5 in the C = 110 treatment to estimate the number of
level-0 and level-1 or higher players. Looking at Player 5, we see that approximately 28%
of players are level-0 when we account for the probability that a level-0 player might play
7Note that in this condition there is only one dominant node, so there is only one myopic move.
8See Appendix Section A.2
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Adj R2 0.050 0.084
Obs 94 250
Table .7.: Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 4 Facing One Dominant Node and
Player 3 C = 110 as a test of whether having an undefined risk type influences the effect
of risk aversion on vying for dominance. The Player 4 regressions use ηs estimated from
MPL 1, while the Player 3 regressions use η estimated from MPL 2. Errors clustered at
the individual level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
a correct move by chance. Given that estimate, it is actually not optimal for Player 4 to
vie when facing one dominant node, which fails to match payoff data, in which vying is
better for Player 4 in that condition. If taking the myopic action is optimal for Player 4
facing one dominant node when C = 110, then the behavior of Player 4 in that case gives
us an estimated 54% level-0 players, which is significantly different from the estimate we got
looking at Player 5.9
If we instead assume vying for dominance is optimal for player 4, accounting for accidental
correct moves by level-0 players, then from Player 4’s data we estimate that the proportion of
level-2 or higher players is approximately 11%. If we extrapolate from that, we should only
see 22% of players vying for dominance as Player 3 in the C = 110 treatment. Instead we see
60% of Player 3s vying for dominance, which is significantly different from the prediction.10
Models of heterogeneous sophistication fail to account for the data as well as models of
heterogeneous risk aversion.
Learning and experimentation models also offer potential candidates for explaining behav-
9P-value of 0.000 given a standard test of proportions.
10P-value of 0.000 given a standard test of proportions.
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Adj R2 0.042 0.008 0.014
Obs 156 156 156
Table .8.: Predicting Vying for Dominance for Player 4 Facing Three Dominant Nodes
and Player 3 C = 110 using ηs estimated from MPL 1. Errors clustered at the individual
level. (≤ 0.1∗,≤ 0.1∗∗,≤ 0.01∗∗∗)
ioral deviations from theory, but there is little evidence of learning in the experiment. See
Appendix Section B.6 for data and learning.
B.6. Learning Effects
The last major potential determinant of outcomes that we look at is learning effects. Do
players become more or less likely to take vie for dominance as the game progresses? Do
they substantively change their behavior with experience? The answer to both questions
seems to be no. Figure .5 show scatter plots of the round number against the connectivity of
the network formed. Noise is added to the points to allow visual representation of density.
In both treatments there is no discernible effect of round experience on the connectivity of
networks formed. There is a slight suggestion of a U-shaped effect in the C = 140 treatment,
but this is primarily caused by a few outliers with little change in the average network. To
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Figure .5.: Connectivity plotted against round number. Data is perturbed to allow
readers to see density.
check more formally, we regress the connectivity of networks on round number and find no










Residual Std. Error 0.873 (df = 373)
F Statistic 2.059 (df = 1; 373)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table .9.: Regression of Network Connectivity on Round Number, C = 110












Residual Std. Error 0.630 (df = 323)
F Statistic 1.641 (df = 1; 323)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table .10.: Regression of Network Connectivity on Round Number, C = 140
C. Question Batteries
In this appendix we provide screenshots of the question batteries used in some of the sessions.
Figure .6 reproduces the screenshots from the belief elicitation question battery. We do not
reproduce the Big Five Inventory here, because the questions were taken directly from John
and Srivastava (1999)
The first panel is designed to elicit the risk preferences of players. In this panel, players
make binary choices between gambles in a multiple price list in the manner of Holt and
Laury (2002). Players are presented with three sets of ten choices each. The gamble on
the left hand side of the screen (gamble A) is fixed while the gamble on the right hand side
(gamble B) improves going down the page. At the top of the screen gamble A second order
stochastically dominates gamble B while at the bottom of the screen the reverse is true.
Players are paid the outcome of one gamble from among all risk elicitation questions chosen
at random.
The gambles are adapted to be similar to those faced in the equilibrium with heterogeneous
risk aversion and uniform random tie-breaking of Section1.6.4. MPLs 1 and 3 were designed
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Figure .6.: Screenshots from the belief elicitation question battery
Figure .7.: Screenshots of MPL 3
to mimic the trade-off of Player 4 facing one dominant node in the low cost treatment and
Player 3 in the high cost treatment. The left hand choice in both gambles has the same
distribution of payoffs as vying for dominance in the corresponding positions. The right
hand side includes varying constant payoffs with the expected payoff from a myopic move in
the corresponding situation included on one row. See Figure .7 for a screenshot of MPL 3
MPL 2 mimics the trade-off faced by player 3 in the low cost treatment. The left hand gamble
again has the same distribution of payoffs as vying for dominance in the corresponding
situation. The right hand gambles all have the same distribution of payoffs as a myopic
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move for dominance in an equilibrium where Player 4 vies for dominance when facing one
dominant node with a frequency of α. The frequency α is changes over the different questions
in the list.
The second panel elicits the beliefs players hold about the actions of actions of others. Players
are put into the position of Player 3 or Player 4 and given a hypothetical network. Players
are then asked to estimate the probability that later players will connect their node given
the network structure provided. These guesses were then compared to the actual observed
sample probabilities from the first six sessions. Players are rewarded for one question from
the belief elicitation panel chosen at random. Points were based on a quadratic probability
scoring rule. A player who made a guess of p˜ for the awarded question with a real observed
probability of p¯ would receive an 800 point ($4) prize with a probability of 1 − (p˜ − p¯)2.
This payment rule should encourage subjects to truthfully reveal their beliefs about average
probability of receiving a connection under the assumption of expected utility.11
The last panel elicits personality traits of players. We administer a battery of questions taken
from the Big Five Inventory (BFI) of John and Srivastava (1999). The big five inventory
is a common personality assessment method which rates people on five different personality
characteristics: Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Openness.
Extroversion is a person’s tendency to enjoy and be energized by social interaction. Agree-
ableness is the tendency to care about and wish to please other people. Neuroticism is a
measure of emotional instability. Conscientiousness is a measure of how goal-oriented and
organized one is. Openness is a tendency to be creative and try new things. There is no
performance incentive for this section. Instead players are awarded a prize of 800 points ($4)
for completing this section.
The BFI was chosen for two reasons. First, the BFI is fairly common in the academic
literature on personality. Second, the BFI has been linked to entrepreneurial tendency, which
is relevant to answering the question of why some players vie for dominance and others do
not. Vying for dominance can be thought of as an entrepreneurial activity. Players make
11Schotter and Trevino (2014)
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an investment in hopes of some uncertain future payoff. Zhao and Seibert (2006) report
that entrepreneurs tend to be less neurotic, more extroverted, more open, less agreeable,
and more conscientious than other managerial types. We will examine whether any of these
characteristics are linked to the tendency to vie for dominance.
D. Extensions and Generalizations of the Base Game
In this section we cover a number of extensions to the base game and their consequences. In
general, the major qualitative nature of the results is fairly robust to generalizations, but the
details of solutions to the game can often change a great deal. We are only going to cover
the effects of the generalizations on SPE results, because the impacts of the generalizations
on the NE results are more complicated and go beyond the scope of this paper.
D.1. No Connection Requirement
Many readers are likely curious about what happens when we do not require players to
make and connections. The answer looks fairly similar to what we see with the base game,




< 2(1− δ), then the complete network is the most efficient equilibrium.
• If 2 + (J − 2)δ > C
B
> 2(1− δ), then the star network is the most efficient network.
• If C
B
> 2 + (J − 2)δ, then the empty network is the most connected network
Proof of Proposition A 2:
First, consider the case when C
B
< 2(1 − δ). Following the same logic as the proof of
Proposition EF, it must be the case that the complete network is the most efficient network.
Recall from the proof of Proposition EF that the most efficient connected network is the
star when C
B
> 2(1− δ). We can apply the same logic to show that if C
B
> 2(1− δ), then the
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efficiency of any network can be weakly improved by converting every connected component
of the network into a star network. Let V (G) be a vector of length J containing the sizes of
each connected component of G in descending order with zeroes for when there are no more
connected components. The total welfare generated by a subset of size k is
f(k) = (k − 1)(2B − C + (k − 2)δB)
.
We are trying find V (G) to maximize the sum ∑Ji=1 f(Vi), subject to the constraint that
Vi(G) is a whole number and
∑J
i=1 Vi(G) = J .
Note that f(k)s is strictly convex in k and has a positive derivative as long as 2B − (2k −
3)δB > C. Since 2B − (2k − 3)δB > is increasing in k, and 2B − (2k − 3)δB) > C will
always hold when k = J fail to hold when k = 0 it must be that those are the two local
optima of total surplus. Geometrically, f(k) is U-shaped, so the maximum must be on one
of the ends.
The total welfare from a completely disconnected network is 0, so we just need to check
whether (J − 1)(2B−C + (J − 2)δB) > 0 or 2 + (J − 2)δ > C
B
. Since we have assumed that
2 + (J − 2)δ > C
B
we have the result.
Proposition A 2: If C
B
< (1− δ) then the complete network is the only network which can
be formed in SPEs of the game.
Proof of Proposition A 2: Identical to the proof of Proposition SPE 1.
Proposition A 3: If C
B
> B −C + (J − 2)δB, then the empty network is the only network
which can be formed in SPEs of the game.
Proof of A 3: Consider Player J . The most points that Player J can from a single
connection is B − C + (J − 2)δB which he can receive by making one connection to a node
connected directly to all other nodes. When C exceeds this amount, Player J will never
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make a connection regardless of network shape. Knowing that Player J will not connect,
Player J − 1 can make no more than B −C + (J − 3)δB points from making a move with a
non-empty set of connections. Player J − 1 will then not make any connections.
Knowing that all future players will make no connections, Player J − k will make at most
B − C + (J − k − 2)δB points by making a connection. Therefore by induction, no player
will make any connections.
We also get an entirely new result related to connected components of the solution network.
Proposition A 4: The second largest connected component (a connected component of a
graph is a subgraph such that all nodes in the subgraph are connected by paths to all other
nodes in the subgraph, and any node which is connected to a node in the subgraph is in the
subgraph) of a network formed by a SPE must contain fewer than k nodes where k is the
lowest integer such that. 1 +∑k−1i=1 δroundup(i/2) > CB
Proof of Proposition A 4: Consider Player J , who only cares about the myopic benefits
of his move. When Player J connects to a connected component nodes the minimum benefit
he can gain comes when the subset of nodes are connected in a chain. In that case Player J
makes at least B+B∑k−1i=1 δroundup(i/2) from connecting. If this value is greater than C, then
such a connection will be made.
As such, any connected component with k nodes or more will be connected to node J which
means it is impossible for the game to conclude with more than one such subset.
Corollary A 4.1: When C
B
< 1 only connected networks can be formed with positive
probability be SPEs of the game
Proof of Corollary A 4.1: When C
B
< 1, by Proposition A3, the second largest connected
component must contain fewer than one nodes. Therefore, the second largest connected
component must be empty, so the graph must be connected.
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D.2. Heterogeneity and Joint Node Ownership
In general, heterogeneity in the benefits of connection does not have a substantial impact on
the results. If we replace payoffs in the base game with





Then we still have the results of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 as long as the Bij’s all satisfy the
restrictions on B in the base game.
Another natural generalization for the base game involves allowing a single agent to control
multiple nodes. There is little in general said about this type of modification other than the
fact it introduces heterogeneity of benefits in that when a player makes a connection to one
of their earlier nodes, they get twice the benefit. Proposition 1 still holds if we allow for
joint node ownership. If the effective Bij’s satisfy the requirements for B in Propositions2
and 3, then those propositions still hold. The logic behind the proofs remains the same.
D.3. Multiple Moves
There is another question which cannot be addressed quite so easily: what happens if we
relax the restriction that each player only moves as they join the network? Let’s say that
each Player i who has already joined the network has a pij chance of getting the opportunity
to move again after each new Player j joins the network. Moving again means that a player
has the opportunity to make a connection to any node in the network that they are not
currently connected to. If multiple players are moving again, they do so in random order.
The random chance and ordering are drawn and revealed immediately after Player j’s move.
Proposition EF still hold since the payoffs have not changed and the set of feasible networks
has not changed. Proposition SPE 2 also holds by the same logic as before. No player wants
200
Bibliography
to make any extra conditions when costs are so high that they could not possibly benefit
from doing so.
Proposition SPE 1 is slightly more complicated. If the move order was deterministic (with
pij ∈ 0, 1), it would still hold, since each player would always want to make every connection
that no later player will be able to make. If some Player i knows that Player j will have
an opportunity to make connection (i, j) later in the game, they will hold off, knowing that
Player j will make the connection when the time comes. If we allow for randomness, however,
the proposition can fall apart. Consider what happens when C
B
= 1− δ−  and there is some
Player i with 1 > piJ > 0. Assume that all other p’s are zero. In this case if  is sufficiently
small and piJ is sufficiently high, Player J will prefer to not connect to Player i. If Player J
makes the connection, he receives a benefit of B − C =  from that connection. If he does
not connect, Player i may get to move, and in that case Player i will choose to connect to
Player J . Therefore, Player J ’s expected benefit from not moving is piJB − , which can
easily be greater than zero.
If Player J chooses not to connect to Node i and gets unlucky in this case, then the complete
network will not form. The complete network will always have a positive chance of forming,
however, since any player who knows for certain that they are the last player who can make
a specific connection will always do so.
E. Extensions Generalizations and Special Examples of the
DNR Model
In this section we examine the extensions and generalizations as they are applied to the DNR
model.
We again introduce heterogeneity of benefits by replacing the base game payoff function with
the one given in Section D.2. Say βij = Bij/(1−δ). Heterogeneity does much the same in the
DNR model as it did in the Base model. Propositions DNR 1, DNR 2, and DNR 3 still hold
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if all of the βij’s satisfy the requirements for β. There is, however, one other result which
does change slightly. Proposition DNR 4 holds but we must modify our definition of Move
A. We define a modified Move A for Player i as connecting only to a subset of the dominant
nodes in Gi−1 plus connecting to any non-dominant nodes such that βij < 1. Move A players
are still just essentially making a myopic move, but now a myopic move can involve multiple
connections.
Allowing for multiple moves and joint node ownership effects the main results for the DNR
in the same way it effects the main results of the base game. It is notable that allowing
for multiple moves can potentially decrease the gains from vying for dominance, because
can potentially allow for more nodes to compete with a newly dominant node. Allowing
for multiple moves does not change the results when players use the Novelty Seeking Tie-
Breaking Rule, however.
F. Counter Examples
In this appendix we provide a number of worked counter-examples which illustrate several
points from the main body of the text.
F.1. Abusing Multiple Dominant Nodes Example
This example shows why, even in MPE’s with no sunspot tie-breaking, players sometimes
connect to non-singleton subsets of d(Gt−1). In this example we have J = 8, B = 1, C = 1.19.
Player 4 will be optimally choosing to connect to two elements of d(Gt−1). Ties are broken
in the following manner:
• Player 8 favors Player 6 over Player 7 and Player 7 over everyone else, Otherwise ties
are broken at random
• Player 7 breaks ties randomly but never favors node 5
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• Player 6 favors Player 5 and otherwise is random
• Player 5 breaks ties randomly
• Player 4 never breaks ties in favor of Player 3
• All other indifferences are resolved randomly, although this is largely unimportant
We solve the game by backwards induction, giving each player’s strategy and then a proof
of why is is optimal given the strategies of later players.
Player 8 will always chooses Move A connecting to one node
Proof: Always true of Player J
Player 7 will choose move B unless Node 6 is dominant. If node 6 is dominant, he will
choose Move A connecting to a single node. Choice of singleton Move A is payoff irrelevant
for Player 7.
Proof: It is profitable for Player 7 to choose move B relative to move A when Node 6 is not
dominant if 7β−6C > B−C, which is true since (J−2)/(J−3) = 6/5 > C/β = 1.19. Move
B is always bad when Player 6 is dominant, since Player 7 will never get a connection from
Player 8 in that case. We can see that the choice of singleton Move A is payoff irrelevant,
because given any such move, Player 8 will not connect to Player 7.
Player 6 will choose Move B if the number of dominant nodes other than node 5 is less than
two. Otherwise he will choose a singleton Move A. Again choice of singleton Move A is
payoff irrelevant
Proof: If Player 6 becomes dominant then both Player 7 and Player 8 will connect to the
same dominant node chosen at random, but never to Node 5 by tie-breaking. Therefore the
expected gain from choosing Move B when k nodes other than Node 5 are dominant would
be 4β + 2β/(k + 1)− 4C. Note that 4β + 2β/(k + 1)− 4C > 0 when 1 + 1/(2k + 2) > C/β.
Given our parameters this is equivalent to k < 1.63. As such, Move B is profitable when
k = 1 but unprofitable when k = 2. Note that if Player 6 picks single connection Move A,
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Players 7 and 8 will always pick Move B and single connection Move A respectively meaning
that Player 7’s choice of singleton Move A is not payoff relevant.
Player 5 will become dominant if the number of dominant nodes is greater than or equal to
2. Otherwise he will choose a singleton Move A.
Proof: To see this note that if there are at least two nodes that are dominant, then when
Player 5 picks move B, Player 6 will choose Move A and connect to Node 5. Player 7 will
choose Move B and receive a connection from Player 8.
If Player 5 were to choose Move A instead, then Player 6 would choose Move B and then
Player 7 and 8 would choose Move A. Move B is then preferred if 6β − 4C > 2β − C or
4/3 > C
B
, which it is for the given parameters.
If the number of dominant nodes is less than 2 then Player 5 will never get a future connection
after choosing Move B, so move B is never optimal, and he must choose a singleton Move A.
Player 4 will connect to two dominant nodes if there are at least two dominant nodes (Move
A∗),. Otherwise, Player 4 connects to a single dominant node.
Proof: If there are two or more dominant nodes and Player 4 chooses Move B then the
resulting moves will take the pattern BABA, with neither Move A player connecting to
Player 4. This is the same pattern the future moves take if Player 4 connects to only
two dominant nodes, so connecting to two nodes is preferred. If Player 4 connects to one
dominant node the future moves will follow the pattern ABAA. Player 4 will then make two
connections if 4β − 2C > 2β − C or 2 > C/β which it is for the given parameters.
If there are not two dominant nodes then all moves lead to the future move pattern ABAA,
so connecting to a single dominant node is optimal.
Player 3 Player 3 makes 2 connections
Proof: If Player 3 makes two connections the future move pattern is ABABA, whereas if
Player 3 makes one connection, the future move pattern is AABAA. Player 3 will never




So in the end we see the following move pattern (BB)BA∗BAB. The first two Players do
not actually make choices, but they do end up as dominant nodes, so we consider them to
be using move B. The special A∗ move is when Player 4 makes two connections in order to
prevent the pattern (BB)BAABAA, which would generate less payoff. Essentially, Player 4
picks between the following two move sequences and chooses the latter
Player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Sequence 1 B B B A A B A A
Sequence 2 B B B A∗ B A B A
G. Chapter 3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is obvious, since our model generalizes CD15 with finite action sets.
The ‘only if’ direction can be seen as follows. Suppose {(Ui, θi, ai)} can be rationalized by
(3.2) with some cost function C(pi,Q). Since there are finitely many decision problems, C
is pinned down for a finite set of points (i.e. a closed set), and so by the Tietze extension
theorem (cf. Rudin, 1974, pg. 422), it may be assumed continuous. Define QγpiQ to be set




assuming it is well-defined. γpiQ always induces the same maximum gross payoff, no matter
which information structure in QγpiQ generated it. Therefore, since the DM is a payoff maxi-
mizer, for each distribution of posteriors she generates, she will always select the lowest-cost
method of doing so. This implies that behavior that can be rationalized by C can also be
rationalized by C˜, which obviously satisfies cost equivalence.
Now we must verify that C˜ is actually well-defined. Let bpi : Q −→ ∆(∆(Θ)) be the function
that maps an information structure to the distribution of posteriors it induces given prior
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pi. First, we must show that bpi is continuous when ∆(∆(Θ)) is equipped with the weak-∗
topology, i.e. the topology of weak convergence of measure.






∣∣∣∣k ∈ {1, . . . |M |},∑nl=1 pilql,k > 0}, and each
element ζ ∈ Supp(bpi(Q)) is induced with probability ∑k∈Qζ ∑nl=1 pilql,k, where Qζ is the set
of columns of Q that generate the posterior ζ.
Consider a sequence of information structures Q1, Q2, . . . ∈ Q converging to Q. We must
show that lim
j→∞
bpi(Qj) = bpi(Q) (in the sense of weak convergence of measure). By Theorem
25.8 of Billingsley (1995), this is equivalent to showing that lim
j→∞
bpi(Qj)(X) = bpi(Q)(X) for
all continuity sets X in the Borel σ-algebra of ∆(Θ).12
Since X is a continuity set, ∂X ∩ Supp(bpi(Q)) = ∅. There are two cases. Either X ∩
Supp(bpi(Q)) = ∅ or int(X) ∩ Supp(bpi(Q)) 6= ∅.
Case 1: X ∩ Supp(bpi(Q)) = ∅. If ∃ J ∈ N such that bpi(Qj)(X) = 0 ∀ j > J , then
clearly lim
j→∞
bpi(Qj)(X) = bpi(Q)(X) = 0. If not, then ∀ J ∈ N, ∃ j > J such that X ∩
Supp(bpi(Qj)) 6= ∅. Suppose, for a contradiction, that lim
j→∞
bpi(Qj)(X) 6= 0. Then ∃ ε > 0 such









converges in cl(X) for some k.13 If it converges to a
point in int(X), then this contradicts the fact that bpi(Q)(X) = 0. If it converges to a




Case 2: int(X) ∩ Supp(bpi(Q)) 6= ∅. Note that since (Qj) is a convergent sequence, each
entry of the matrices in (Qj) also defines a convergent sequence. Then each ((zk)j) :=









either converges to some limit yk (for zk > 0) or else has an undefined limit (when zk = 0).14
12A continuity set is a set X whose boundary ∂X has measure zero.
13We can take k fixed here because even if we construct a subsequence where the sequence of posteriors is
constructed by different columns of Qjh for different sequence elements, we can merely take a subsequence
of that subsequence, but with k fixed.
14It is possible that (yk)j′ maybe be undefined for some k and j′. This occurs when (zk)j′ = 0. If there are
finitely many such j′, then we can simply consider a sequence (Qj) with these j′ removed. If there are
infinitely many such j′, then (zk)j must converge to zero. Therefore, WLOG, either (Qj) is such that
(zk)j 6= 0 ∀ j, k and possibly converges to zero, or (zk)j definitely converges to zero.
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(when it exists) and zk =
∑n
l=1 pilql,k, where the entries ql,k
are taken from Q. Consider the set K ⊆ {1, . . . ,M} such that {((yk)j)|k ∈ K} is the
collection of sequences that converge to points in int(X). Then, because int(X) is open,
∀ ε > 0 and ∀ k ∈ K, ∃Nk such that ∀ j > Nk, (yk)j ∈ int(X). Let N¯ = max
k∈K
Nk. Then
∀ j > N¯, bpi(Qj)(X) ≥ (∑k∈K(∑nl=1 pilql,k))j.
We now show that bpi(Qj)(X) −∑k∈K(∑nl=1 pilql,k)j goes to zero as j grows large. Suppose
there does not exist J ∈ N such that this sequence has the value 0 ∀ j > J . Then there must




l=1 pilql,k)jh > 0 for all jh. Then
for each jh, there is some k′ ∈K such that (yk′)jh ∈ Supp(bpi(Qjh)). Because |M | is finite,
we may assume that this k′ is fixed. If ((yk′)jh) is convergent, it must converge in cl(X). If
yk′ ∈ int(X), then this contradicts the fact that k ∈K. If yk′ ∈ ∂X, then this contradicts







l=1 pilql,k)jh ] = 0.
This establishes the continuity of bpi. Therefore, for a given γ with finite support in ∆(∆(Θ)),
b−1pi ({γ}) is closed (since singletons are closed). Because b−1pi ({γ}) ⊆ Q and Q is a bounded
subset of Rn × R|M |, by the Heine-Borel theorem b−1pi ({γ}) is compact.
In particular QγpiQ is compact, and since C is continuous (fixing pi), by the Weierstrass
theorem, it attains its minimum on QγpiQ . Therefore, C˜ is well-defined. This concludes the
proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3




1 0 · · · 0
... . . . . . . ...
1 0 · · · 0

(.1)
where I|A| is the identity matrix of dimension |A|×|A| and the lower block of D¯ has dimension
(|M |−|A|)× |A|.
Given Q ∈ Q, select a decision matrix D such that the gross payoff tr(QDUΠ) is maximized.
Since the gross payoff is linear in the entries of D, its entries may be chosen so that all of
its nonzero entries are 1, WLOG. Consider the mapping δ : {1, . . . , |M |} −→ {1, . . . , |A|} so
that δ(j) is the 1 entry in the j-th row of D. The signal (and associated posterior) induced
by the j-th column of Q result in action aδ(j) being taken.
Now consider Q′ constructed from Q and δ in the following manner. For k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|},
the k-th column of Q′ is ∑j∈δ−1(k) q•,j, where q•,j is the j-th column of Q and empty sums
are taken to be columns of zeroes. For k > |A|, the columns of Q′ are all zeroes.
(Q,D) and (Q′, D¯) imply the same Pr(a|θ) for each a ∈ A, θ ∈ Θ, since the (i, j)-th entry of
Q′D¯ is q′i,j =
∑
k∈δ−1(j) qi,k. For j ≤ |A|, q′i,j = Pr(aj|θi), since under D¯, action j is taken only
when signal j is received. Furthermore, for j ≤ |A|, ∑k∈δ−1(j) qi,k = Pr(aj|θi), since under D,
action j is taken if and only if a signal in δ−1(j) is received. Thus, tr(QDUΠ) = tr(Q′D¯UΠ),
i.e. the gross payoffs are the same under either (Q,D) or (Q′, D¯).
Consider the |M |×|M | matrix P with entries pi,j such that pi,δ(i) = 1 for each i and all other
entries are 0. P takes the i-th column of a matrix and shuffles it to the δ(i)-th column.
Thus, Q′ = QP . P is right-stochastic since each of its rows has a single 1 entry and zeroes
for the rest of its entries. Therefore, by monotonicity of information, C(pi,Q′) ≤ C(pi,Q).
Note that Q′ uses as many signals as there are posteriors in its support, with each posterior
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inducing a different action. Therefore, given pi, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
a column of Q′ and the posterior it induces along with its associated probability. Therefore,
the only other matrices that induce the same distribution of posteriors as Q′ with the same
number of signals are permutations of the columns of Q′. By cost symmetry, each of these
information structures has the same cost as Q′. Furthermore, as we showed above, given
D¯, Q′ represents the probability of taking each action in each state. Therefore, the only
information structures that induce the same distribution of actions given states at the same
cost as Q′ are permutations of Q′, and there are no information structures that do so at
lower cost.




Denote the maximand in (.2) by F (Q). Since F (Q) is continuous in Q and U , and Q is
compact, by the maximum theorem, the optimal choice of information structure for each
payoff matrix, Q∗(U), is upper hemicontinuous in U .
Since the first term of F (Q) is linear and the second is almost strictly convex, it inherits its
convexity properties from the second term. In other words, F (Q) is almost strictly concave,
with almost strict concavity defined analogously to almost strict convexity. For each U ,
either Q∗(U) is unique or it is multivalued. Suppose it is multivalued, and Q∗1, Q∗2 ∈ Q∗(U).
Then F (Q∗1) = F (Q∗2). If Q∗1 and Q∗2 induce different distributions of posteriors, then ∀λ ∈
(0, 1), F (λQ∗1 + (1− λ)Q∗2) > λF (Q∗1) + (1− λ)F (Q∗2) = F (Q∗1), contradicting the optimality
of Q∗1 and Q∗2.
Now suppose that Q∗1 and Q∗2 induce the same distribution of posteriors and therefore induce
the same gross payoffs. Then either @λ ∈ (0, 1) such that F (λQ∗1+(1−λ)Q∗2) = λF (Q∗1)+(1−
λ)F (Q∗2), in which case the argument of the preceding paragraph applies, or else there does
exist such λ, in which case Qλ ∈ Q∗(U) as well, and we denote the corresponding information
structure by Qλ. Then, by the linearity of the trace function and the fact that Q∗1 and Q∗2
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induce the same distribution of posteriors, tr(QλD¯UΠ) = tr(Q∗1D¯UΠ) = tr(Q∗2D¯UΠ).
This implies that tr(Q∗(U)D¯UΠ) is single-valued, and since it is the composition of a con-
tinuous function (which can be viewed as an upper hemicontinuous correspondence) with an
upper hemicontinuous correspondence, it is itself upper hemicontinuous (cf. Theorem 14.1.5
of Sydsæter et al., 2008). Together, its upper hemicontinuity and single-valuedness imply
that it is a continuous function of U , thereby completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The continuity of C follows directly from the continuity of each of the functions ci,j.
The Hessian matrix of C(pi,Q) is an n|M |×n|M | matrix with entries ∂2ci,j(pi,·)
∂q2i,j
on the diagonal
and zeroes elsewhere. Since these diagonal entries are all strictly positive, the Hessian is
clearly positive-definite, and we conclude that C is strictly convex for each pi.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We begin by proving the “only if” direction. Let r1 ≥ r2 be two possible rewards.
Let Qi be the information structure optimally chosen under reward ri, i = 1, 2. Let Dji be
the decision matrix chosen under information structure Qi and reward rj, i, j = 1, 2. Since
decisions can be thought of as being made optimally given signals from the information
structure, WLOG, we can take Di := Dii = D¬ii , i = 1, 2.
The NIAC condition gives us:
r1tr(Q1D1Π) + r2tr(Q2D2Π) ≥ r2tr(Q1D1Π) + r1tr(Q2D2Π)
=⇒ r1P ∗(r1) + r2P ∗(r2) ≥ r2P ∗(r1) + r1P ∗(r2)
=⇒ (r1 − r2)[P ∗(r1)− P ∗(r2)] ≥ 0 (.3)




For the “if” direction, consider a set of reward levels r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ≥ rN and associated
performances P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PN , where Pi := P ∗(ri). (We can order the performances in
this manner since P ∗ is nondecreasing.)
Consider an assignment of performances to rewards (ri, Pσ1(i))Ni=1, where σ1 is a cyclic per-
mutation. Let σ2 be defined as follows:
σ2(i) :=

1, i = 1
σ1(1), i = σ1−1(1)
σ1(i), otherwise


















≥ 0, since r1 ≥ rσ1−1(i) and P1 ≥ Pσ1(1)




j, i = j
σj(j), i = σj−1(j)
σj(i), otherwise
By the preceding argument, the total gross payoffs to the assignment increase (weakly) at
each step. Since there are N rewards, this process must finish in N − 1 steps, ending with
σN(i) = i and the highest possible gross payoff. Since the initial assignment (ri, Pσ1(i))Ni=1
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was arbitrary, this implies the NIAC condition for our data.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Fix some x ∈ A and y ∈ Θ. Then:
Pr(θ = x|a = x) ≥ Pr(θ = y|a = x)
⇐⇒ rPr(θ = x|a = x) + 0 ·
∑
z 6=x
Pr(θ = z|a = x) ≥ rPr(θ = y|a = x) + 0 ·
∑
z 6=y




u(x, z) Pr(θ = z|a = x) ≥
∑
z∈Θ










u(y, z) Pr(a = x|θ = z) Pr(θ = z)

Pr(a = x)
⇐⇒ uk,•ΠQ∗d∗•,k ≥ ul,•ΠQ∗d∗•,k,
where x and y are the k-th and l-th elements of Θ, respectively
The last implication holds because the (i, j)-th entry of Q∗D∗ is Pr(aj|θi). Since all these
implications are bidirectional, and x and y were chosen arbitrarily, this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8




since γQ has finite support. It is clear from (.4) that the expected posterior entropy depends
only on γQ and not the specific Q that induced it. Therefore, I(pi,Q) = α(H(pi)−E[H(pi|Q)])
must satisfy cost equivalence.
Consider an information structure Q and a garbling P . Since P is itself a stochastic matrix,
pi −→ Q −→ QP form a Markov chain in that order (cf. Cover and Thomas, 2006, Section
2.8). Therefore, by the data processing inequality (cf. Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem
2.8.1), I(pi,Q) ≥ I(pi,QP ).
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I is a composition of continuous functions and so it is clearly continuous except possibly when
an entry in one of its arguments is zero. However, lim
(x,y)↓(0,0)





0, so continuity does not fail there either.
Convexity follows from Theorem 2.7.4 of Cover and Thomas (2006).
Finally, symmetry follows from cost equivalence.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. To proceed, we need a lemma:
Lemma 1. Let β, ζ, and δ be strictly positive. Then Φ((ξ + β)ζδ) − Φ(ξζδ) is strictly
decreasing in ξ for positive ξ and strictly increasing for in ξ for negative ξ.
This lemma is easily proven by differentiating to obtain ζδ[φ((ξ + β)ζδ) − φ(ξζδ)]. Since
the normal density is decreasing on the positive real line and increasing on the negative real
line, this derivative is negative for positive ξ and positive for negative ξ.
For guesses of inner states that are not the true state, the result follows from setting ξ = 2k+1
and β = 2 for k 6= −1 and comparing it to the expression in Lemma 1 when ξ = 2k + 3.
This shows that guessing an inner state that is not the true state is likelier than guessing the
inner state that is immediately farther from it. Applying this logic iteratively and exploiting
the symmetry of the normal distribution to compare guesses of inner states on opposite sides
of the true state gives the result.
In order to show that guessing the true state is likelier than guessing any other inner state,
assume that the true state is not θn−1 or θn, so that state immediately above the true state
is also an inner state. (An obvious symmetric argument applies in case the true state is θn−1
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or θn.) Lemma 1 implies that:
Φ(ζδ)− Φ(0) > Φ(2ζδ)− Φ(ζδ) and Φ(ζδ)− Φ(0) > Φ(3ζδ)− Φ(2ζδ)
=⇒ 2[Φ(ζδ)− Φ(0)] > Φ(3ζδ)− Φ(ζδ)
=⇒ Φ(ζδ)− Φ(−ζδ) > Φ(3ζδ)− Φ(ζδ)
Since the probability of guessing the true state is at least Φ(ζδ) − Φ(−ζδ) (the true state
could be the lowest state), combining this implication with the result for inner states that
are not the true state proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 11





[2Φ (ζδ) + (n− 2) (2Φ (ζδ)− 1)]−K(ζ)





[(2n− 2)Φ (ζδ)− (n− 2)]−K(ζ) (.5)
The first-order condition is:
F (r, ζ) ≡ (2n− 2)rδ
n
φ(ζδ)−K ′(ζ) = 0 (.6)





ζφ(ζδ)−K ′′(ζ) < 0, since ζ is positive
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The DM’s performance function is:
P ∗(r) = 1
n
[(2n− 2)Φ(ζ(r)δ)− (n− 2)] (.7)























In order to determine the sign of (.8), we must compute dζ
dr
and d2ζ

























































































Substituting (.9) and (??) back into (.8) gives us that d2P ∗
dr2 < 0, since
dζ
dr
> 0 and d2ζ
dr2 < 0.
215
G Chapter 3 Proofs
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Since payoffs are symmetric across states, if the DM is optimizing, then she selects
the most likely state given her posterior beliefs. Therefore, given an information struc-







-th entry of d∗•,j is 1 and all other entries are 0. Then, the probability of








Now we show that this optimal probability can be achieved using no more than n signals.








i,j′ 6= ∅, and the
corresponding maxima are strictly positive. Then, construct Q∗∗ from Q∗ where the columns
of Q∗∗ are the columns of Q∗, except for the j-th and j′-th columns. q∗∗•,j = q∗•,j + q∗•,j′ , and
































i,j. Furthermore, this quantity is unaffected
by rearrangements of the columns of Q∗∗.
Using this logic, we construct Q′ as follows. For j > n, let q′•,j be a column of zeroes. For





















i,j. Therefore, if we construct D′ analogously to D∗,





































subject to piiq′i,i = maxkpikq′k,i ∀ i ≤ n (.11)
Since both the ex-ante gross payoff and the cost depend only on the probability of answering
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correctly. Let this probability be q. Then, the maximand in (.11) can be rewritten as
rq −K(q). In particular, q′i,i can be chosen such it is q for all i ≤ n. Obviously q ≤ 1, since
it is a probability, and q ≥ 1
n
, because the DM can do no worse than her prior.
If K is strictly convex and continuously differentiable, then the first-order condition (FOC)
of this problem with respect to each q′i,i is:









Because of the strict convexity of K and the restriction on its derivative, the FOC, together
with the constraints in (.11), is both necessary and sufficient for a solution to this problem.
Therefore, any Q′ such that (q′i,i)ni=1 satisfies (.11) and the constraints in (.11) is optimal.
In particular, we can select Q′ such that q′i,i = q ∀ i ≤ n, where q := (K ′)−1(r), and
q′i,j = 1−qn−1 ∀ j 6= i, i ≤ n.








pii = q = (K ′)−1(r), which is continuous in r,
since K is continuously differentiable.
Proof of Proposition 13









As argued in the main text of the paper, if this maximand is strictly quasiconcave in r,
then this problem has a unique solution for each x, and since it is continuous in both x
and r, the maximum theorem guarantees that the principal’s optimal payment strategy
r∗(x) is continuous. Therefore, it simply remains to be shown that the maximand is strictly
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Since the denominator in (.14) is always strictly positive, the sign of (.14) depends only on
the sign of the numerator. The numerator is strictly positive (negative) when:
(




















The LHS of (.15) is strictly decreasing, and diverges to positive infinity as r is taken to
negative infinity and to negative infinity as r is taken to positive infinity. The RHS of (.15)
is strictly increasing, and it approaches zero as r is taken to negative infinity and diverges
to positive infinity as r is taken to positive infinity. Therefore, by the intermediate value
theorem, the LHS and RHS must intersect, and they do so only at a single r.











, after which it is strictly decreasing. Thus, (.13) is strictly quasiconcave.







[−P (r) + (x− r) d
dr
P ∗(r)]
= − 2 d
dr




(.16) is negative, since P ∗(r) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and x > r, so the
principal’s ex-ante expected payoff is strictly concave in r. Therefore, there is a unique r∗
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for each x, and by the maximum theorem, r∗(x) is continuous.
Posterior-Equivalent Information Structures
G.1. Posterior Equivalence: Proliminaries
Let Q be a stochastic matrix. Denote its entries by qi,j, its rows by qi,•, and its columns by
q•,j. We define three operations on Q:
1. Q′ is obtained from Q by swapping if q′•,j = q•,k, q′•,k = q•,j, and all other columns are
the same.
2. Q′ is obtained from Q by summing if for some j, k such that q•,j = αq•,k for some
α > 0, q′•,j = q•,j + q•,k, q′•,k is a column of zeroes, and all other columns are the same.
3. Q′ is obtained from Q by splitting if ∃ k and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that q•,k is a column of
zeroes, q′•,j = λq•,j, q′•,k = (1− λ)q•,j, and all other columns are the same.
Note that each of these operations is reversible as one of the other operations. Swapping
columns can be reversed by simply swapping the columns again. Summing columns can
be reversed by splitting the summed column into the summands. Splitting columns can be
reversed by summing the split columns.
Finally, let ♦ be a binary relation on the space of |Θ| × |M | stochastic matrices, defined by
Q♦R iff given some pi ∈ int(∆(Θ)) (i.e. pi has full support on Θ),15 Q and R induce the
same distribution of posteriors, i.e. γpiQ = γpiR. We will say Q and R are posterior-equivalent
if Q♦R.
G.2. Posterior Equivalence and the Algebra of Stochastic Matrices
The posterior equivalence relation defined in the previous subsection is independent of the
prior; if two information structures are posterior-equivalent for some prior with full support,
15We require that pi have full support, because the probability distribution of signals conditional on a zero-
probability state is irrelevant for determining the distribution of posteriors and can therefore be chosen
arbitrarily.
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then the posterior equivalence condition holds for all priors with full support. In other words,
as the following proposition shows, two information structures could be said to be posterior-
equivalent if they induce the same distribution of posteriors for any prior with full support
on the state space.
Proposition 15. If Q♦R, then γpiQ = γpiR ∀ pi ∈ int(∆(Θ)).









Now suppose p¯i is a posterior that generates posterior equivalence between Q and R, i.e.














Since the summands in the inner sums are entries from columns of Q and R whose Hadamard
products with pi are multiples of x¯, the respective columns must be multiples of each other.
To see this, suppose that q is one such column of Q and r is one such column of R. Then we
can write pi ◦ q = αx¯ and pi ◦ r = βx¯ for some α, β > 0. Equivalently, we can write Πq = αx¯
and Πq = βx¯, where Π = diag(pi). Since Π is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive entries
on its diagonal, it is invertible, and we can write q = Π−1(αx¯) and r = Π−1(βx¯). By the
linearity of Π−1, we can write q = αΠ−1x¯ and r = βΠ−1x¯, which implies that q = α
β
r.








for all i and for some κx¯ > 0. Since p¯ii > 0 ∀ i, it must be that κx¯ = 1 or else (.18) could
not hold. Now replace p¯i in (.18) with an arbitrary prior with full support pi. Because (.19)
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holds with κx¯ = 1, (.18) holds for arbitrary pi.
Corollary 1. ♦ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Reflexivity and symmetry are trivially verified.




S for some pi, pi′
with full support. But by Proposition 15, γpiS = γpiR = γpiQ, which establishes the result.
Now, since we know that posterior equivalence can be established without making reference
to any specific prior distribution, we can show that Q♦R is equivalent to a set of linear-
algebraic conditions on the relationship between Q and R, written as stochastic matrices.
Put differently, posterior-equivalence is not just a statistical relationship between stochastic
matrices, but also an algebraic one that can be defined without reference to probabilities.
Proposition 16. Q♦R iff R can be obtained from Q by a sequence of swapping, summing,
and splitting.
Proof. We begin by proving the ‘if’ direction. We show that an information structure ob-
tained from another by each of the three column operations in the proposition is posterior-
equivalent to the original information structure.
Swapping. (3.4) is unaffected by a change in the order of columns.







































Moreover, since the columns of Q that are not j¯ or k¯ are unaffected by summing, it is obvious
that PrpiQ(x) = PrpiQ′(x) ∀x 6= y¯ as well.
Splitting. Suppose Q′ is obtained from Q by splitting column j¯ into columns j¯ and k¯. Then















































Moreover, since the columns of Q that are not j¯ or k¯ are unaffected by splitting, it is obvious
that PrpiQ(x) = PrpiQ′(x) ∀x 6= y¯ as well.
This shows that Q′♦Q if Q′ is obtained from Q by any one of the three column operations.
Since ♦ is transitive, it is therefore true that Q′♦Q if Q′ is obtained from Q by a sequence
of the three column operations. This concludes the proof of the ‘if’ direction.
For the ‘only if’ direction, suppose that Q♦R. We describe an algorithm comprising a
sequence of column operations that takes Q to R.
Step 1: Consolidate
[a)]
1. Select the leftmost column of Q that is not a column of zeroes. Sum to it the next
leftmost column that is a multiple of it. Repeat until no more multiples remain.
2. Repeat a) with the next leftmost non-zero column until all non-zero columns have been
exhausted.
3. Call the matrix resulting from this sequence of summings Q′.
Step 2: Separate
[a)]
1. Select the leftmost non-zero column of Q′, and call it y. Select the leftmost column of
R that is a multiple of y and call it x. Split y into y − x and x, with x replacing the
leftmost remaining column of zeroes of Q′. Set y− x as the new y and repeat until no
more multiples of it in R remain.
2. Repeat a) with the next leftmost non-zero column that is not a multiple of a column
already accounted for.





1. Swap the leftmost column of Q′′ with the column that is in that position in R.
2. Repeat with every column of Q′′, going from left to right.
3. The matrix resulting from this sequence of swappings is R.
This concludes the proof.
H. Angle Task
In addition to the “dots” tasks discussed in the main body of the paper, laboratory subjects
also completed 100 “angle” tasks. For each of these tasks, subjects were shown a pair of
intersecting line segments of random length16 and orientation and were told to identify the
angle between them. This angle could have been 35◦, 40◦, 45◦, 50◦, or 55◦, with each being
equally likely. Subjects were rewarded for a correct answer and received no reward for an
incorrect answer. Therefore, the “angle” tasks were uniform guess tasks of the same format
as the “dots” tasks. Figure .8 shows what this screen looks like to the subjects.
Table .11 presents linear regressions of correctness on incentive level and demographic co-
variates for the entire laboratory subject pool. As was the case with the “dots” task, demo-
graphics are not significant predictors of correctness. However, neither is incentive level. This
evidence indicates that this is not a task in which subjects generally respond to incentives.
I. Online Experiment
In this appendix, we describe and present results from the online experiments mentioned in
the main body of the paper.
16Giving the arms of the angle random length ensured that subjects could not simply measure the distance
between the endpoints of the arms to estimate the size of the angle.
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Table .11.: Linear regression of correctness on incentive level and demographic covariates
in the “angle” tasks
(1) (2)




















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
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Figure .8.: Angle display for a task
Subjects were recruited using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform17 and par-
ticipated in the experiment on the Qualtrics platform. A total of 118 subjects completed
the experiment. Subjects completed 200 tasks, each of the “dots” type. Roughly half the
subjects (57 subjects) were given a participation fee of $3 US and potential monetary prizes
of $3, while the other half (61 subjects) were given a participation fee of $5 US and potential
monetary prizes of $5 US.
I.1. Demographics
Table .12 lists basic demographic data for the online subjects. The pool is fairly gender-
balanced,18 though it is slightly more male than female, and highly educated; over 55% of
the pool has a post-secondary degree.
The online pool is signficantly different from the laboratory pool in some ways. In particular,
17In recent years, many experiments and surveys have been conducted on MTurk. Research has shown that
results from MTurk samples are similar to convenience samples typically used by researchers (e.g. student
samples) and are more representative of the U.S. population, though they also differ markedly in some
psychological and political characteristics. See, for example, Berinsky et al. (2012) and Goodman et al.
(2013).
18One online subject declined to disclose their gender.
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Table .12.: Online Demographics
Number of subjects n = 118
Gender (n = 117) 52.5% male; 47.5% female
Age (n = 118) Average: 32.48; St. dev.: 8.88
Highest level of education achieved (n = 118)
Some post-secondary 43.2%
Completed bachelor’s degree 50.0%
Completed graduate or professional degree 6.8%
the online pool is significantly older (one-tailed t-test of unpaired samples, p < 0.001) and
has a significantly greater proportion of subjects with bachelor’s degrees but no advanced
degrees (one-sided test of equality of proportions, p = 0.003).
I.2. Rational Inattentiveness
No Improving Attention Cycles
We test against weak positive monotonicity using the method of Doveh et al. (2002). At the
5% level, we fail to reject positive monotonicity for 103 out of 118 online subjects (87.3%).19
No Improving Action Switches
We test for NIAS using the bootstrap procedure outlined in Section 3.7. 82 out of 118 online
subjects (69.5%) fail to reject NIAS.
Overall, this gives us 72 out of 118 online subjects (61.0%) whom we classify as rationally
inattentive. This is a significantly smaller portion than in the laboratory pool (one-sided
test of proportions, p < 0.001).
19The optimization in the computation of the restricted regression for online subject 93 failed to converge,
and so we did not perform the test for them. That subject has a success rate in the tasks of 99% (i.e.
they identify the true state of nature correctly in 198 out of 200 tasks), and so we include them in the
103 online subjects who fail to reject positive monotonicity.
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I.3. Responsiveness to Incentives
We test for responsiveness using the full-sample and split-sample tests outlined in Section
3.7. At the 5% significance level 28 out of 72 online subjects (38.8%) who fail to reject
rationality are responsive to incentives. This is a significantly smaller portion than in the
laboratory pool (one-sided test of proportions, p = 0.009).
I.4. Model Selection
We follow the same model selection procedures as in Section 3.7. As with the laboratory
subjects, the only models that best fit the subjects are binary response and logistic response.
2 out of 28 responsive subjects (7.1%) are best fit by constant performance 8 out of 28
responsive subjects (28.6%) are best fit by binary performance, 17 out of 28 responsive
subjects (60.7%) are best fit by logistic performance, and 1 out of 28 responsive subjects
(3.6%) are best fit by the concave performance function implied by normal signals. Ignoring
the subjects who are best fit by constant response, these are similar to the proportions
found in the laboratory. This seems to indicate that once the subset of responsive subjects is
identified, the incidence of different types of cost functions within it is stable across contexts.
J. Chapter 3 Statistical Power Tests
J.1. Discontinuity Test
In this subsection of Appendix D, we present power tests for the discontinuity test introduced
in Subsection 3.7.6. Using r-values from 1 to 100, binary data were simulated using the step-
function equation Pt = (0.9 − ϕ) + ϕ · 1[ψ,100](rt), for various values of ϕ and ψ. ϕ is the
size of the break in the step function, and ψ is the break’s location. 100 samples were taken
for each (ϕ, ψ) pair, and the proportion of samples for which the break was detected was
calculated. The results are summarized in Table .13.
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Table .13.: Power tests for discontinuity test
ϕ \ψ 25 50 75
0.2 1.00 0.95 0.93
0.4 1.00 0.67 0.85
0.6 1.00 0.96 0.97
0.8 1.00 1.00 1.00
K. Chapter 3 Addiditional Data
K.1. Categorization and Demographics
In this appendix, we determine the extent to which demographic covariates predict the
categorization of subjects as rationally inattentive and responsive, as well as whether their
best-fitting performance function is binary or logistic.
K.2. Rational Inattentiveness
To determine the extent to which demographics predict a failure to reject NIAC, we run
a logit regression of an indicator for rational inattentiveness on demographic covariates.
These covariates are age, an indicator for being male, an indicator for having attained at
least a bachelor’s degree, an indicator for studying economics, psychology, or neuroscience,
an indicator for participating in the $20 prize treatment, and an indicator for having done
the dots tasks first. We display the results of this regression in column 1 of Table .14.
Demographic covariates do not seem to be predictive of rational inattentiveness in this partic-
ular subject pool. Neither do experimental variables, such as the higher prize and completing
the dots tasks first. This suggests that for a given set of tasks, rational inattentiveness is
an innate characteristic that is not well captured by demographics, and moreover, it may be
difficult to manipulate experimentally.
229
K Chapter 3 Addiditional Data











$20 Prize 0.128 0.263
(0.714) (0.557)









To determine the extent to which demographics predict responsiveness, we run a logit re-
gression of an indicator for responsiveness on demographic covariates for the subjects who
fail to reject rational inattentiveness. We display the results of this regression in column 2
of Table .14.
As is the case with rational inattentiveness, demographic covariates are not significant pre-
dictors of responsiveness.
K.4. Cost Functions
To determine the extent to which demographics predict model selection, we run a multinomial
logit regression of the best-fitting model on the same set of demographic covariates as in
previous subsections, with logistic performance (Model 7, mutual-information costs) as the
baseline. This regression shows us the extent to which these demographic factors affect
the likelihood of selecting a model that implies a non-convexity or discontinuity in the cost
function over one that is consistent with convexity. We display the results of this regression
in Table .15.
As is the case with previous demographic regressions, demographic factors are not significant
predictors. This seems to indicate that not only is rational inattentiveness not well captured
by demographics, so is the nature of one’s cost function for information in a given task.
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Table .15.: Model Selection and Demographics









$20 Prize 0.505 −0.365
(0.825) (1.255)





Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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